{"id":124,"date":"2010-10-25T22:23:34","date_gmt":"2010-10-25T22:23:34","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.pauljjhansen.com\/?p=124"},"modified":"2011-04-25T15:49:53","modified_gmt":"2011-04-25T15:49:53","slug":"case-law-plus","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"http:\/\/www.pauljjhansen.com\/?p=124","title":{"rendered":"Case Law, Plus"},"content":{"rendered":"

Case Law, Plus<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Below cases are in alphabetical order, they are not shepardized, some may not even be real cases. (Caution always shepardize
\ncases before going into court, you can be sanctioned for false case quotes.)
\nThis Web-Site has no search engine so you can just cut this entire site and ‘Cut & Paste’ it into ‘MS\/WORD’ and use the
\n‘FIND’ prompt, under ‘Edit’.
\nTo quickly find a specific alphabet chapter just go to ‘FIND’ and type in ((J)) for all cases under “J”. (Remember to put the
\ndouble ((?)) around the letter.)<\/p>\n

Case Law Index:<\/p>\n

((A)) <\/strong><\/p>\n

Amercement \u00e2\u20ac\u201cThe fine or penalty so imposed (upon a sheriff) for failing to return the writ of execution. Blacks Law
\n>>
\nFederal<\/p>\n

““Motor vehicle<\/span>” means every description of carriage or other contrivance propelled or drawn by mechanical power and used for commercial purposes on the
\nhighways in transportation of passengers, passengers and property, or property and cargo; … “Used for commercial purposes”
\nmeans the carriage of persons or property for any fare, fee, rate, charge or other consideration, or directly or indirectly in connection with any business, or other
\nundertaking intended for profit[.]” \u00c2\u00a018 U.S.C. \u00c2\u00a7 31.<\/p>\n

“[I]t is a jury question whether … an automobile<\/span> … is a motor vehicle<\/span>[.]” \u00c2\u00a0United States v Johnson, 718 F.2d 1317, 1324 (5th Cir. 1983).<\/p>\n

\u00e2\u20ac\u0153A policy of Insurance is a maritime (vessel) contract<\/span>, and therefore of admiralty Jurisdiction.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d -De Lovio v. Boit 7 Fed. Case Number 3, 776<\/p>\n

ARRAIGHNMENT<\/span> PLEA = \u00e2\u20ac\u0153It is an elementary rule of pleading, that a plea to the jurisdiction is…a tacit admission that the court has a right to judge in the case, and
\nis a waiver to all exceptions to the jurisdiction\u00e2\u20ac\u009d. Girty v. Logan, 6 Bush Ky. 8<\/p>\n

A special appearance<\/span><\/strong>, which is preliminary and collateral to determining the merits of an action, is a pleading within this section, and thus, in a hearing on a
\nspecial appearance, an affidavit may be used to prove or disprove the factual basis for a court’s assertion or exercise of personal jurisdiction over a defendant.
\nWilliams v. Gould, Inc., 232 Neb. 862, 443 N.W.2d 577 (1989).
\nAPPEARANCE \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0A coming into court as party to a suit, either in person or by attorney, whether as plaintiff or defendant. The formal proceeding by which a
\ndefendant submits \u00c2\u00a0himself to the jurisdiction of the court. The voluntary submission to a courts jurisdiction\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6. \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0A special appearance is for the purpose of
\ntesting the sufficiency of service of the jurisdiction of the court;<\/p>\n

GENERAL APPEARANCE \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0consent to the jurisdiction of the court and waiver of all jurisdictional defects except the competency of the court. Johnson v. Zoning
\nBd. Of appeals of town of Branford, 166 Conn. 102, 347 A.2d \u00c2\u00a053, 56. \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0In the general appearance defendant submits his person to jurisdiction of the court by
\nappearing himself or by duly authorized representative. \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0Buehne v. Buehne, 190 Kan. 666, 378 P.2d 159,164.<\/p>\n

Black\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s Law 5th Adition
\n>><\/p>\n

Arrest, citizen\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0Nebraska 29-742
\nArrest without warrant by officer or citizen<\/span><\/strong>; when.<\/p>\n

The \u00c2\u00a0arrest of a person may be lawfully made
\nalso by any peace officer or a private person, without a \u00c2\u00a0warrant
\nupon \u00c2\u00a0reasonable \u00c2\u00a0information \u00c2\u00a0that the accused stands charged in
\nthe courts of a \u00c2\u00a0state \u00c2\u00a0with \u00c2\u00a0a \u00c2\u00a0crime \u00c2\u00a0punishable \u00c2\u00a0by \u00c2\u00a0death \u00c2\u00a0or
\nimprisonment \u00c2\u00a0for a term exceeding one year<\/span><\/strong>, but when so arrested
\nthe accused must be taken before a judge or magistrate \u00c2\u00a0with \u00c2\u00a0all
\npracticable \u00c2\u00a0speed \u00c2\u00a0and \u00c2\u00a0complaint must be made against him under
\noath setting forth the \u00c2\u00a0ground \u00c2\u00a0for \u00c2\u00a0the \u00c2\u00a0arrest \u00c2\u00a0as \u00c2\u00a0in \u00c2\u00a0section
\n29-741; \u00c2\u00a0and \u00c2\u00a0thereafter \u00c2\u00a0his \u00c2\u00a0answer shall be heard as if he had
\nbeen arrested on a warrant.<\/p>\n

Source:
\nLaws 1963, c. 159, \u00c2\u00a7 14, p. 563.<\/p>\n

\u00e2\u20ac\u0153an obligation to the courts and to the public no less significant than his obligation to his clients. \u00c2\u00a0Thus an attorney<\/span> occupies a dual position which imposes dual
\nobligations … His first duty<\/span><\/strong> is to the courts and the public, not to the client; and wherever the duties to his client conflict with those he owes as an officer of the
\ncourt in the administration of justice, the former must yield to the latter<\/span><\/strong>.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d 7 C.J.S. Sec. 4<\/p>\n

\u00e2\u20ac\u0153Wards of court. \u00c2\u00a0Infants and persons of unsound mind. \u00c2\u00a0Davis\u00e2\u20ac\u2122 Committee v. Loney, 290 Ky. 644, 162 S.W.2d 189,190. Their Rights must be jealously guarded,
\nMontgomery v. Erie R. Co., C.C.A.N.J., 97 F.2d 289, 292.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d Black\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition<\/p>\n

>>
\nAttorney, practice without a license:
\n\u00c2\u00b7 \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0Attorney<\/span> at law versus Counsellor<\/span> at law. It is absolutely amazing what has been uncovered.
\n\u00c2\u00b7 \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0First there were barristers (counsellors-at-law in America) and attorneys-at-law. In some of the states initially they were kept separate, but then they started
\nusing attorneys and counsellors-at-law together in one person and he would adjust to the particular issue. They were admitted [licensed] to practice in the courts by
\nthe judges or justices of that particular court, with the judges being public officers in that time frame.
\n\u00c2\u00b7 \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0Attorney at law:
\n\u00c2\u00b7 \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a01. Represents only – stands in your place or stead in business or legal issues.
\n\u00c2\u00b7 \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a02. No attorneys allowed in a criminal trial, except to make bail.
\n\u00c2\u00b7 \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a03. Has Attorney fees – costs money and can use Attorney Lien.
\n\u00c2\u00b7 \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a04. Officer of the court
\n\u00c2\u00b7 \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a05. Can not challenge the court without exposure to sanctions such as judge being a public officer, etc.
\n\u00c2\u00b7 \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a06. Takes over the case and you are at his mercy on how the case is run.
\n\u00c2\u00b7 \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a07. He will raise no issue that he deems the judge will be unhappy with usually.
\n\u00c2\u00b7 \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a08. Co-counsel is the scam they attempt to use to validate the lack of Assistance of Counsel. You can not counsel your self.
\n\u00c2\u00b7
\n\u00c2\u00b7 \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0Counsellor at law:
\n\u00c2\u00b7 \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a01. Assists only and is to protect and defend his client, can not represent.
\n\u00c2\u00b7 \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a02. Counsellors at law are used in criminal trials – access to is an absolute part of a Trial by Jury from the first part of arraignment on.
\n\u00c2\u00b7 \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0a. Can ask questions on your behalf,
\n\u00c2\u00b7 \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0b. Can instruct you what questions to ask
\n\u00c2\u00b7 \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0c. If the client instructs the Counsellor at law to challenge the judge or court, he can do it without being sanctioned (done correctly of course)
\n\u00c2\u00b7 \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a04. Officer of the court.
\n\u00c2\u00b7 \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a05. Does not charge, works on gratuity. Can not sue for Attorney fees.
\n\u00c2\u00b7 \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a06. Is learned in the law.
\n\u00c2\u00b7 \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a07. It is a position of Honor to be a Counsellor at Law.
\n\u00c2\u00b7 \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a08. It is a level above an Attorney at law.<\/p>\n

There is a big difference between a Private Attorney and a PUBLIC ATTORNEY. A Private Attorney operates by and through an assigned Power-of-Attorney
\ninstrument for a specific or general function. A Private Attorney is also known as an Attorney-in-Fact. The PUBLIC ATTORNEY is an officer of the court in question
\nand represents the trust created by Statute or the Statutorily Constructed Scheme through the fascist \u00c2\u00a0(i.e. private business controlled) government that has put up
\na bonding system for each crime be they malum in se or regulatory infraction. The PUBLIC ATTORNEY represents the PUBLIC VESSEL created by and through the
\nSocial Security grantor trust agreement commonly known by the U.S. Treasury as the PUBLIC VESSEL \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0(PV). The PV operates through Equity and within Special
\nMaritime\/Admiralty jurisdiction (law form) and therefore affects the man in his capacity as the Authorized Representative. Only members of the State BAR
\nAssociations are authorized to represent the PV as the USAG is the Trustee for the PV. This is why members of Rice and Associates cannot represent the PUBLIC
\nVESSEL. This is why members of Rice and Associates can represent and assist the man in capacity as the Authorized Representative (AR) for the PUBLIC VESSEL.
\nHowever, the secular courts and the PUBLIC AGENCIES that regulate the PUBLIC VESSELS do not usually separate the PV from the AR. So how far can a non-Bar
\nmember go in representation?
\nThe case of New York vs. Sawyer, (NY) 47 barb. 116 (1866), illustrates how far that Private relationship may go. ?It is quite clear that it is the spirit and intent of
\nthe constitution, of the statutes, and the practice of the courts, that no person shall practice as an attorney or counsellor in actions in the courts but such as have
\nbeen found qualified, upon examination by the Supreme Court. The application for that purpose must be based upon citizenship, the age of twenty-one years, and
\ngood moral character. These qualifications, followed by an order of the court for admission, after the court become satisfied of the possession of sufficient learning
\nand ability, and the signing of the roll, and subscribing and taking the constitutional oath, constitute the right, and authorize the practice, by attorneys and
\ncounsellors in all the courts of record of this state. . . .But this case need not even be put upon that ground. If this case was in a court of record, the signing this
\nnotice in the manner as explained by the affidavits, I think, would have been without objection, and would be no violation of the letter or spirit of the constitution,
\nthe statute, or the rules of practice. A person may be an attorney in fact, for another, without being an attorney at law; a distinction well understood as existing in
\nall kinds of business transactions. They are sometimes distinguished by attorneys in fact, or private attorneys, and attorneys at law, or public attorneys. The former
\nis one who is authorized by his principle, either for some particular purpose, or to do a particular act, not of a legal character. The latter is employed to appear for
\nthe parties to actions, or other judicial proceedings, and are officers of the courts.?
\nThis case (New York vs. Sawyer) is about a party that signed pleadings on behalf of a defendant. How close to the line can a private Attorney go? A pleading ?
\nsigned as ?M.S., Defendant, W.J.S., His Attorney,? is valid, though W.J.S. is not an attorney at law.?
\nBl. Comm Vol 1, Ch 18, all trusts are corporations and vice versa.
\n>><\/p>\n

((B))<\/strong>
\n<\/strong>Rule 23
\nDEMAND FOR JURY TRIALS<\/span><\/strong>
\n<\/span><\/strong>In misdemeanor cases, demands for a jury trial must be made within 10 days following entry of a not guilty plea.
\nDUTIES OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEYS
\nUnless upon good cause shown the court in its discretion has ruled otherwise, the prosecuting attorney shall be present at all arraignments in all cases, all bond
\nsettings in felony cases, and all first hearings in juvenile cases. No trial of any such case will be conducted without the prosecuting entity being represented by a
\nprosecutor. The court will not act as a prosecutor, nor will any law enforcement representative or any other nonattorney be permitted to act as a prosecutor. In all
\ncases, the prosecuting attorney shall<\/span> obtain the defendant’s criminal history<\/span> and provide the same to the court and the defendant <\/span>prior to the setting of any bond or
\nthe imposing of any sentence.<\/p>\n

accord, -United States v. Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, (1947). \u00e2\u20ac\u0153Particularly is the true where the statute imposes a burden or limitation, as distinguished from
\nconferring a benefit or advantage. -United States v. Knight, 14 Pet. 301, 315 (1840).\u00e2\u20ac\u009d Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 U.S. 653 (1979).
\nState of Nebraska Statutes \u00c2\u00a0Section 29-901
\n>>
\nBail; personal recognizance; conditions.<\/p>\n

Any bailable defendant shall be ordered released from custody pending judgment on his or her personal recognizance unless the judge determines in the exercise
\nof his or her discretion that such a release will not reasonably assure the appearance of the defendant as required. When such determination is made, the judge
\nshall either in lieu of or in addition to such a release impose the first of the following conditions of release which will reasonably assure the appearance of the
\nperson for trial or, if no single condition gives that assurance, any combination of the following conditions:<\/p>\n

(1) Place the defendant in the custody of a designated person or organization agreeing to supervise the defendant;<\/p>\n

(2) Place restrictions on the travel, association, or place of abode of the defendant during the period of such release;<\/p>\n

(3) Require, at the option of any bailable defendant, either of the following:<\/p>\n

(a) The execution of an appearance bond in a specified amount and the deposit with the clerk of the court in cash of a sum not to exceed ten percent of the amount
\nof the bond, ninety percent of such deposit to be returned to the defendant upon the performance of the appearance or appearances and ten percent to be retained
\nby the clerk as appearance bond costs, except that when no charge is subsequently filed against the defendant or if the charge or charges which are filed are
\ndropped before the appearance of the defendant which the bond was to assure, the entire deposit shall be returned to the defendant. If the bond is subsequently
\nreduced by the court after the original bond has been posted, no additional appearance bond costs shall be retained by the clerk. The difference in the appearance
\nbond costs between the original bond and the reduced bond shall be returned to the defendant. In no event shall the deposit be less than twenty-five dollars.
\nWhenever jurisdiction is transferred from a court requiring an appearance bond under this subdivision to another state court, the transferring court shall transfer
\nthe ninety percent of the deposit remaining after the appearance bond costs have been retained. No further costs shall be levied or collected by the court acquiring
\njurisdiction; or
\n(b) The execution of a bail bond with such surety or sureties as shall seem proper to the judge or, in lieu of such surety or sureties, at the option of such person, a
\ncash deposit of such sum so fixed, conditioned for his or her appearance before the proper court, to answer the offense with which he or she may be charged and
\nto appear at such times thereafter as may be ordered by the proper court. The cash deposit shall be returned to the defendant upon the performance of all
\nappearances.<\/p>\n

If the amount of bail is deemed insufficient by the court before which the offense is pending, the court may order an increase of such bail and the defendant shall
\nprovide the additional undertaking, written or cash, to secure his or her release. All recognizances in criminal cases shall be in writing and be continuous from term
\nto term until final judgment of the court in such cases and shall also extend, when the court has suspended execution of sentence for a limited time, as provided in
\nsection 29-2202, or, when the court has suspended execution of sentence to enable the defendant to apply for a writ of error to the Supreme Court or Court of
\nAppeals, as provided in section 29-2301, until the period of suspension has expired. When two or more indictments or informations are returned against the same
\nperson at the same term of court, the recognizance given may be made to include all offenses charged therein. Each surety on such recognizance shall be required
\nto justify under oath in a sum twice the amount of such recognizance and give the description of real estate owned by him or her of a value above encumbrance
\nequal to the amount of such justification and shall name all other cases pending in which he or she is a surety. No one shall be accepted as surety on recognizance
\naggregating a sum in excess of his or her equity in the real estate, but such recognizance shall not constitute a lien on the real estate described therein until
\njudgment is entered thereon against such surety; or<\/p>\n

(4) Impose any other condition deemed reasonably necessary to assure appearances as required, including a condition requiring that the defendant return to
\ncustody after specified hours. END
\n>><\/p>\n

((C))<\/strong><\/p>\n

CODE, City Ordinances, Municipal
\nNOTICE<\/p>\n

ENFORCEMENT OF CITY\/COUNTY CODES PROHIBITED<\/p>\n

California Law prohibits Cities and Counties from
\nenforcing City or County Codes and Ordinances upon
\nproperty that is not OWNED by the City or County \u00e2\u20ac\u201c
\neven if the property is within City limits.<\/p>\n

California Penal Code: Chapter 5b CITATIONS FOR
\nVIOLATIONS OF COUNTY, CITY, OR CITY AND COUNTY
\nORDINANCES \u00e2\u20ac\u201c Sections 853.1through 853.4 was repealed
\nin 1967.<\/p>\n

The Supreme Court ruled that Municipalities cannot exert any acts of ownership and control over property that is not OWNED by them, see Palazzolo v. Rhode
\nIsland 533 US 606, 150 L.Ed. 2d 592, 121 S.Ct. ___ (2001) (no expiration date on the taking clause for City’s illegal enforcement of its Codes on the man’s
\nprivate property and restricting the man’s business), affirming both Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 US 1003, 120 L.Ed. 2d 798 (1992). (butterfly
\nactivists and Code Enforcement cannot restrict development of the man’s private swampland unless they lawfully acquire the land FIRST, surveying with
\nbinoculars constitutes a “takings”), and Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 US 687 (1999), 143 L.Ed. 2d 882 S.Ct.____ (1998). \u00c2\u00a0(I could not find the above case it
\nmay be fiction.)<\/p>\n

In the Monterey case, the California private property
\nowner was awarded $8 million for Code Enforcement’ s
\nillegal trespass and restriction of his business, and
\nanother $1.45 million for the aggravation of a forced
\nsale.<\/p>\n

Federal Law also prohibits Cities and Counties from
\nissuing citations against businesses, see Title 18
\nU.S.C. \u00c2\u00a7 \u00c2\u00a7 891-896, quoting Section 891 \u00e2\u20ac\u00a6 “An
\nextortionate<\/span> means is any means which involves the
\nuse, or an express or implicit threat of use, of
\nviolence or other criminal means to cause harm to the
\nperson, reputation, or property.”<\/p>\n

Black’s Law Dictionary 5 th Edition (page 1140):
\nRecaption. At Common Law, a retaking or taking back. A
\nspecies of remedy by the mere act of the party injured
\n(otherwise termed “reprisal”), which happens when
\nanyone has deprived another of his property in goods
\nor chattels personal, or wrongfully detains one’s
\nwife, child, or servant. In this case, the owner of
\nthe goods, and the husband, parent, or master may
\nlawfully claim and retake them, wherever he happens to
\nfind them, so it be not in a riotous manner, or
\nattended with a breach of the peace. Prigg v.
\nPennsylvania, 41U.S. (16 Pet) 539, 612, 10L.Ed. 1060.<\/p>\n

>>>
\n– CONCLUSION –
\n“A mere conclusion of a pleader cannot be availed of to initiate and invite an issue of fact.”
\nHatfield v. Peoples Water Co. (1914), 25 C.A. 711, 145 P. 164.
\n“One may not by the mere device of an allegation in a pleading create a legal duty<\/span> that otherwise does not exist.”
\nPascoe v. Southern California Edison Co. (1951), 102 C.A.2d 254, 227 P.2d 555.
\n“Allegations of legal conclusions cannot be permitted to supply essential allegations of fact.”
\nBailes v. Keck (1927), 200 C. 697, 254 P. 573, 51 A.L.R. 930.
\n“Pleadings should allege facts<\/span>, and not mere conclusions of law.”
\nBailes v. Keck (1927), 200 C. 697, 254 P. 573, 51 A.L.R. 930.
\n“A pleading must allege facts and not conclusions, and conclusions of law are not admitted by demurrer.”
\nVilardo v. Sacramento County (1942), 54 C.A.2d 413, 129 P.2d 165.
\n“Facts, not mere conclusions, should be alleged to establish right to specific performance of contract.”
\nFoley v. Cowan (1947), 80 C.A.2d 70, 181 P.2d 410.
\n“Allegation of conclusion of law tenders no issue.”
\nCalifornia Western Holding Co. v. Merrill (1935), 7 C.A.2d 131, 46 P.2d 175.
\n“Conclusions of law in a pleading are disregarded.”
\nKoehler v. Coronado (1927), 83 C.A. 648, 257 P. 187.<\/p>\n

>>><\/p>\n

U.S. Constitution: Fourteenth Amendment
\nFourteenth Amendment – Rights Guaranteed Privileges and Immunities of Citizenship, Due Process and Equal Protection
\nAmendment Text | Annotations
\nSection. 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
\nreside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
\nperson of life, liberty, or property, without due process<\/span> of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.<\/p>\n

national v. citizen<\/p>\n

“On the other hand, there is a significant historical fact in all of this. \u00c2\u00a0Clearly, one of the purposes of the 13th and 14th Amendments and of the 1866 act and of
\nsection 1982 was to give the Negro citizenship<\/span>. . .”
\nJones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. (1967), 379 F.2d 33, 43.<\/p>\n

“The object of the 14th Amendment, as is well known, was to confer upon the colored race the right of citizenship.”
\nUnited States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 649, 692.<\/p>\n

\u00e2\u20ac\u0153We have in our political system a government of the United States and a government of each of the several States. \u00c2\u00a0Each one of these governments is distinct
\nfrom the others, and each has citizens of it\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s own…\u00e2\u20ac\u009d
\nUnited States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875)<\/p>\n

\u00e2\u20ac\u0153…he was not a citizen of the United States, he was a citizen<\/span> and voter of the State,…\u00e2\u20ac\u009d \u00c2\u00a0\u00e2\u20ac\u0153One may be a citizen of a State and yet not a citizen of the United States\u00e2\u20ac\u009d.
\nMcDonel v. The State, 90 Ind. 320 (1883)<\/p>\n

\u00e2\u20ac\u0153That there is a citizenship of the United States and citizenship of a state,…\u00e2\u20ac\u009d
\nTashiro v. Jordan, 201 Cal. 236 (1927)<\/p>\n

“A citizen of the United States is a citizen of the federal<\/span> government …”
\nKitchens v. Steele, 112 F.Supp 38
\n>>>
\nRichard James, McDonald is a state Citizen of California. \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0Mr. McDonald is a former law enforcement officer who stumbled across this information quite by accident
\nbut felt compelled to investigate the issues related to law enforcement and status. \u00c2\u00a0Based on results of \u00c2\u00a0Mr. McDonald’s research, he took the extraordinary step of
\nrenouncing his “US citizenship”, (the reasons why should become clear to the reader as they review the information posted here), by reclaiming his “birth rights”
\nand original political status, which by the way, is exactly the same as the Founding Fathers who were state Citizens, not “US citizens”.<\/p>\n

Unbeknownst to most people, the class termed “US citizen” did not exist as a political status until 1866<\/span>. \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0It was a class and “political status” created for the newly
\nfreed slaves and did not apply to the people inhabiting the states of the union who were at that time state Citizens.
\n“On the other hand, there is a significant historical fact in all of this. \u00c2\u00a0Clearly, one of the purposes of the 13th and 14th Amendments and of the 1866 act and of
\nsection 1982 was to give the Negro citizenship. . .”
\nJones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. (1967), 379 F.2d 33, 43.<\/p>\n

“The object of the 14th Amendment, as is well known, was to confer upon the colored race the right of citizenship.”
\nUnited States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 649, 692.
\nMr. McDonald is not a racist or bigot but merely wishes that the reader understands that the class of people identified as “US citizens” were the NEWLY FREED
\nSLAVES ONLY as was the intent of the drafters of the so-called 14th Amendment. \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0After their being recognized as people rather than “animate property”, they
\nneeded to be brought within the “naturalization process” and afforded some rights. \u00c2\u00a0As anyone well knows, property has no rights. \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0Mr. McDonald has been
\neducating people about these issues for over 25 years.
\n\u00e2\u20ac\u0153We have in our political system a government of the United States and a government of each of the several States. \u00c2\u00a0Each one of these governments is distinct
\nfrom the others, and each has citizens of it\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s own…\u00e2\u20ac\u009d
\nUnited States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875)<\/p>\n

\u00e2\u20ac\u0153…he was not a citizen of the United States, he was a citizen and voter of the State,…\u00e2\u20ac\u009d \u00c2\u00a0\u00e2\u20ac\u0153One may be a citizen of a State an yet not a citizen of the United States\u00e2\u20ac\u009d.
\nMcDonel v. The State, 90 Ind. 320 (1883)<\/p>\n

\u00e2\u20ac\u0153That there is a citizenship of the United States and citizenship of a state,…\u00e2\u20ac\u009d
\nTashiro v. Jordan, 201 Cal. 236 (1927)<\/p>\n

“A citizen of the United States is a citizen of the federal government …”
\nKitchens v. Steele, 112 F.Supp 383<\/p>\n

The Importance Of state Citizenship<\/p>\n

Why is this important? \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0Because the visitor should know that the rules that apply to “US citizens” may be different that the rules that apply to “state Citizens”, and
\nthat the rights of one are not the same as the other. \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0For example, the “state Citizen” is NOT required to have a driver license to legally use their car to go to the
\nstore to buy food or to attend their place of worship, the “US citizen” is required<\/span> to have a license to do the same thing.
\n\u00e2\u20ac\u0153The governments of the United States and of each state of the several states are distinct from one another. \u00c2\u00a0The rights of a citizen under one may be quite
\ndifferent from those which he has under the other\u00e2\u20ac\u009d.
\nColgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404; 56 S.Ct. 252 (1935)<\/p>\n

\u00e2\u20ac\u0153There is a difference between privileges<\/span> and immunities belonging to the citizens of the United States as such, and those belonging to the citizens of each state as
\nsuch\u00e2\u20ac\u009d.
\nRuhstrat v. People, 57 N.E. 41 (1900)<\/p>\n

\u00e2\u20ac\u0153The rights and privileges, and immunities which the fourteenth<\/span> constitutional amendment and Rev. St. section 1979 [U.S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 1262], for its
\nenforcement, were designated to protect, are such as belonging to citizens of the United States as such, and not<\/span> as citizens of a state\u00e2\u20ac\u009d.
\nWadleigh v. Newhall 136 F. 941 (1905)<\/p>\n

Mr. McDonald educates people about the reasons why this is so and what they can do to reclaim their birth rights which are protected by the State Constitution.
\n\u00e2\u20ac\u0153…rights of nationa<\/span>l citizenship as distinct from the fundamental or natural rights inherent in state<\/span> citizenship\u00e2\u20ac\u009d.
\nMadden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83: 84 L.Ed. 590 (1940)<\/p>\n

“State Citizenship is a vested substantial property right<\/span>, and the State has no power to divest or impair these rights.”
\nFavot v. Kingsbury, (1929) 98 Cal. App. 284, 276 P. 1083.<\/p>\n

SUI \u00c2\u00a0JURIS. One who has all the rights to which a freemen is entitled; one \u00c2\u00a0who is not under the power of another, as a slave, a minor, and the like.
\n2. To make a valid contract, a person must, in general, be sui juris. \u00c2\u00a0Every one of full age is presumed to be sui juris. Story on Ag. p. 10.
\nBouvier’s Law Dictionary, 1856<\/p>\n

INGENUI, civ. law. Those freemen who were born free. Vicat, vocab.
\n2. They were a class of freemen, distinguished from those who, born \u00c2\u00a0slaves, had afterwards legally obtained their freedom the latter were called \u00c2\u00a0at various
\nperiods, sometimes liberti, sometimes libertini. An unjust or \u00c2\u00a0illegal servitude did not prevent a man from being ingenuus.
\nBouvier’s Law Dictionary, 1856<\/p>\n

JURIS ET DE JURE. A phrase employed to denote conclusive presumptions of \u00c2\u00a0law, which cannot be rebutted by evidence. The words signify of law and from \u00c2\u00a0law.
\nBest on Presumption, Sec. 17.
\nBouvier’s Law Dictionary, 1856<\/p>\n

>>><\/p>\n

Those who exercise civil rights or liberties<\/span><\/strong> must apply for license (ask
\npermission).<\/p>\n

” Civil liberty is the power to do whatever is permitted<\/span> by the constitution of \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0(A right is much more expansive.)
\nthe state and the laws of the land. It is no other than natural liberty, so far
\nrestrained by human laws, and no further, operating equally upon all the
\ncitizens, as is necessary and expedient for the general advantage of the
\npublic.” 1 Black. Com. 125; Paley’s Mor. Phil. B. 6, c.5; Swifts Syst. 12
\n— Bouvier’s
\n>>>
\nCorporation:
\nDr. Pepper Co. v. Crow, 621 S.W.2d 464,465 (Tex App.?Waco 1981, no writ). “Plaintiff plead defendant was a corporation. Defendant did not deny by verified
\npleading pursuant to [TRCP] 52 and 93 … that it was not a corporation; thus, such fact was established.” Therefore, you are presumed<\/span> you are a corporation (i.e. a
\ntrust) until you prove otherwise.
\n>>><\/p>\n

DEFINITION OF COMPLAINT –
\nFacts Constituting cause of action
\n“Every fact which, if controverted, plaintiff must prove<\/span> to maintain his action must be stated in the complaint.”
\nJerome v. Stebbins (1859), 14 C. 457;
\nGreen v. Palmer (1860), 15 C. 411, 76 Am. Sec. 492;
\nJohnson v. Santa Clara County (1865), 28 C. 545.
\n“The complaint, on its face, must show that the plaintiff has the better right<\/span>.”
\nRogers v. Shannon (1877), 52 C. 99.
\n“Complaint, to be sufficient, must contain a statement of facts<\/span> which, without the aid of other facts not stated shows a complete cause of action.”
\nGoing v. Didwiddle (1890), 86 C. 633, 25 P. 129.
\n“Pleadings should set forth facts, and not merely the opinions of parties.”
\nSnow v. Halstead (1851), 1 C. 359.
\n“A complaint must contain a statement of facts showing the jurisdiction<\/span> of the court, ownership of a right<\/span> by plaintiff, violation of that right<\/span> by the defendant, injury<\/span>
\nresulting to plaintiff by such violation, justification<\/span> for equitable relief where that is sought, and a demand<\/span> for relief.”
\nPierce v. Wagner, 134 F.2d. 958.
\n“Essential facts<\/span> on which legal points in controversy depend, should be pleaded clearly and precisely, so that nothing is left for court to surmise.”
\nGates v. Lane (1872), 44 C. 392.
\n“The test of the materiality of an averment in a pleading is this: Could the averment<\/span> be stricken from the pleading without leaving it insufficient?”
\nWhitwell v. Thomas (1858), 9 C. 499.
\n“In pleading, the essential facts on which a determination of the controversy depends should be stated with clearness and precision so that nothing is left to
\nsurmise.”
\nBernstein v. Fuller (1950), 98 C.A.2d 441, 220 P.2d 558.
\n“The “facts” which the court is to find<\/span> and the “facts” which a pleader is to state lie in the same plane – that is, in both connections, “facts” are to be stated according
\nto their legal effect.”
\nHihn v. Peck (1866), 30 C. 280.
\n“A plaintiff must set forth in his complaint the essential facts of his case with reasonable precision and with sufficient clarity and particularity that defendant may be
\napprized of nature<\/span>, source<\/span> and extent of his cause<\/span> of action.”
\nMetzenbaum v. Metzenbaum (1948), 86 C.A.2d 750, 195 P.2d 492.
\n“In general, matters of substance must be alleged in direct terms, and not by way of recital or reference.”
\nSilvers v. Grossman (1920), 183 C. 693, 192 P. 534; Reid v. Kerr (1923), 64 C.A. 117, 220 P. 688.
\n“A fact which constitutes an essential element of a cause of action cannot be left to inference.”
\nRoberts v. Roberts, 81 C.A.2d 871, 185 P.2d 381.
\n“Material facts must be alleged directly and not by way of recital.”
\nVilardo v. Sacramento County (1942), 54 C.A.2d 413, 129 P.2d 165.
\n“Material allegations<\/span> must be distinctly stated in complaint.”
\nGoland v. Peter Nolan & Co. (1934), 33 P.2d 688, subsequent opinion 38 P.2d 783, 2 C.2d 96.
\n“Matters of substance must be presented by direct averment<\/span> and not by way of recital.”
\nStefani v. Southern Pacific Co. (1932), 119 C.A. 69, 5 P.2d 946.
\n“A pleading which leaves essential facts to inference or argument is bad.”
\nAhlers. v. Smiley (1909), 11 C.A.343, 104 P. 997.
\n“The forms alone of the several actions have been abolished by the statute. \u00c2\u00a0The substantial allegations of the complaint in a given case must be the same under
\nour practice act as at common law.<\/span>”
\nMiller v. Van Tassel (1864), 24 C. 459.
\n“A pleading cannot be aided by reason of facts not averred<\/span>.”
\nSan Diego County v. Utt (1916), 173 C. 554, 160 P. 657.
\n“Facts necessary to a cause of action but not alleged must be taken as having no existence<\/span>.”
\nFrace v. Long Beach City High School Dist. (1943), 137 P.2d 60, 58 C.A.2d 566.
\n“A fact necessary to pleader’s cause of action, if not pleaded, must be taken as having no existence.”
\nFeldesman v. McGovern (1941), 44 C.A.2d 566.
\n“When pleading is silent as to material dates, or does not clearly state facts relied on, it must be presumed that statement thereof would weaken pleader’s case.”
\nWhittemore v. Davis (1931), 112 C.A. 702, 297 P. 640.
\n“Material matters in pleadings must be distinctly stated in ordinary and concise language.”
\nBrown v. Sweet (1928), 95 C.A. 117, 272 P. 614.
\n“Facts contained in public records should be alleged in pleading when they constitute necessary elements of good cause of action.”
\nGray v. White (1935), 5 C.A.2d 463, 43 P.2d 318.
\n“When facts are available from public records, it is ordinarily improper to allege such facts on mere information and belief.”
\nPeople v. Birch Securities Co. (1948), 196 P.2d 143, 86 C.A.2d 703, cert. denied Birch Securities Co. v. People of State of California, 69 S.Ct. 745, 336 U.S. 936,
\n93 L.Ed. 1095.
\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
\nDefinition of a COMPLAINT:
\nFacts Constituting a Cause of Action
\n\u00e2\u20ac\u0153Every fact which, if controverted, plaintiff must prove to maintain his action must be stated in the complaint\u00e2\u20ac\u009d
\nJerome v. Stebbins (1859), 14 C. 457: Green v. Palmer (1860), 15 C. 411, 76 Am. Sec. 492; Johnson v. Santa Clara County (1865), 28 C. 545
\n\u00e2\u20ac\u0153The complaint, on its face, must show that the plaintiff has the better right.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d
\nRogers v. Shannon (1877), 52 C. 99
\n\u00e2\u20ac\u0153Complaint, to be sufficient, must contain a statement of facts of which, without the aid of other facts no stated shows a complete cause of action.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d
\nGoing v. Dinwiddle (1890), 86 C. 633, 25 P. 129
\n\u00e2\u20ac\u0153Pleadings should set forth facts, and not merely opinions of the parties\u00e2\u20ac\u009d.
\nSnow v. Halstead (1851), 1 C. 359
\n\u00e2\u20ac\u0153A complaint must contain a statement of facts showing the jurisdiction of the court, ownership of a right by plaintiff, violation of that right by the defendant, injury
\nresulting to plaintiff by such violation, justification for equitable relief where that is sought, and a demand for relief.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d
\nPierce v. Wagner, 134 F.2d 958
\n\u00e2\u20ac\u0153Essential facts on which legal points in controversy depend, should be pleaded clearly and precisely, so that nothing is left for the court to surmise.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d
\nGates v. Lane (1872), 98 C. 499
\n\u00e2\u20ac\u0153In pleading, the essential facts on which a determination of the controversy depends should be stated with clearness and precision so that nothing is left to
\nsurmise.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d
\nBernstein v. Piller (1950), 98 C.A.2d 441, 220 P.2d 558
\n\u00e2\u20ac\u0153The \u00e2\u20ac\u02dcfacts\u00e2\u20ac\u2122 which the court is to find and the \u00e2\u20ac\u02dcfacts\u00e2\u20ac\u2122 which a pleader is to state lie in the same plane – that is, in both connections, \u00e2\u20ac\u02dcfacts\u00e2\u20ac\u2122 are top be stated according
\nto their legal effect.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d
\nHihn v. Peck (1866), 30 C. 280
\n\u00e2\u20ac\u0153A plaintiff must set forth in his complaint the essential facts of his case with reasonable precision and with sufficient clarity and particularity that defendant may be
\napprized of nature, source and extent of his cause of action.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d
\nMetzenbaum v. Metzenbaum (1948), 86 C.A.2d 750, 195 P.2d 492
\n\u00e2\u20ac\u0153In general, matters of substance must be alleged in direct terms, and not by way of recital or reference.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d
\nSilvers v. Grossman (1920), 183 C. 693, 192 P. 534; Reid v. Kerr (1923), 64 C.A. 117, 220 P. 688
\n\u00e2\u20ac\u0153A fact which constitutes an essential element of a cause of action cannot be left to inference.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d
\nRoberts v. Roberts, 81 C.A.2d 871, 185 P.2d 381
\nMaterial facts must be distinctly stated in a complaint.
\nGoland v. Peter Nolan & Co. (1934), 33 P.2d 688, subsequent opinion 38 P.2d 738, 2 C.2d 96
\n\u00e2\u20ac\u0153Matters of substance must be presented by direct averment and not by way of recital.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d
\nStefani v. Southern Pacific Co. (1932), 119 C.A. 69, 5 P.2d 946
\n\u00e2\u20ac\u0153A pleading which leaves essential facts to inference or argument is bad.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d
\nAhlers v. Smiley (1909) ,11 C.A. 343, 104 P. 997
\n\u00e2\u20ac\u0153The forms alone of the several actions have been abolished by the statute. \u00c2\u00a0The substantial allegations of the complaint in a given case must be the same under
\nour practice as at common law.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d
\nMiller v. Van Tassel (1864), 24 C. 459
\n\u00e2\u20ac\u0153A pleading can not be aided by reason of facts not averred.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d
\nSan Diego County v. Utt (1916), 173 C. 554, 160 P. 657
\n\u00e2\u20ac\u0153Facts necessary to a cause of action but not alleged must be taken as having no existence\u00e2\u20ac\u009d
\nFrace v. Long Beach City High School Dist. (1943), 137 P.2d 60, 58 C.A.2d 566
\n\u00e2\u20ac\u0153A fact necessary to the pleader\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s cause of action, if not pleaded, must be taken as having no existence.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d
\nFeldesman v. McGovern (1941), 44 C.A.2d 566
\nIn pleading, the essential facts upon which a determination of the controversy depends should be stated with clearness and precision so that nothing is left to
\nsurmise.
\nPhilbrook v. Randall, 195 Cal 95, 103 [231 P. 739].)
\n\u00e2\u20ac\u0153When pleading is silent as to material dates, or does not clearly state facts relied on, it must be presumed that statement thereof would weaken pleader\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s case.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d
\nWhittemore v. Davis (1931), 112 C.A. 702, 297 P. 640
\n\u00e2\u20ac\u0153… if a fact necessary to the pleader’s cause of action is not alleged it must be taken as having no existence.
\nHildreth v. Montecito Creek Water Co., 139 Cal. 22 [72 P. 395]; Callahan v. Loughran, 102 Cal. 476 [36 P. 835].
\nFacts necessary to a cause of action but not alleged must be taken as having no existence.
\n21 Cal. Jur.<\/p>\n

<<<<\/p>\n

Every State law must conform in the first place to the Constitution of
\nthe United States, and then to the subordinate constitutions of the
\nparticular state; and if it infringes upon the provisios of either, it
\nis so far void. \u00c2\u00a0\u00e2\u20ac\u201c Houston v. Moore, 18 US 1, 5 L.Ed 19
\n\u00e2\u20ac\u0153This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority
\nof the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or laws of any State
\nto the Contrary notwithstanding,\u00e2\u20ac\u009d \u00e2\u20ac\u201c Constitution for the United States of America, Article VI, Clause 2.,
\nJudicial decisions, however numerous, are subject to correction by the constitution itself. \u00e2\u20ac\u201c State v. Buente, 256 Mo. 227, 165 SW 340<\/p>\n

2. To make a valid contract, a person must, in general, be sui juris. \u00c2\u00a0Every one of full age is presumed to be sui juris. Story on Ag. p. 10. \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0Bouvier’s Law
\nDictionary, 1856
\n>>
\n“In every criminal trial, the prosecution must prove the corpus delecti, or the body of the crime itself-i.e., the fact of injury, loss or harm, and the existence of a
\ncriminal agency (intent) as its cause.” \u00c2\u00a0People v. Sapp, 73 P.3d 433, 467 (Cal. 2003) [quoting People v. Alvarez, (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1161, 1168-1169, 119 Cal.Rptr.
\n2d 903, 46 P.3d 372.].
\n>>
\nAlthough not directly involved in interstate commerce, allow us to digress for a moment and discuss the word “business”. In ordinary speech this word simply
\nmeans the conduct of the affairs in what we commonly call “work”. However, in law, the word “business” almost always means a corporation, or the actions of a
\ncorporation. This is a pivotal point for one to understand when reading law. It is absolutely essential to understanding laws that are directed at corporations. In
\nother words, in law, the words “corporation” and “business” are generally used as synonyms.
\n>>
\n((D))<\/strong><\/p>\n

The Supreme Court clearly provides in Argersinger V. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 that, “No accused may be deprived of his liberty as the result of any criminal
\nprosecution, whether felony or misdemeanor, in which he was denied assistance of counsel.(due process)”
\n((E))<\/strong>
\n<\/strong>“Allegations such as those asserted by petitioner, (a pro se litigant), however inartfully pleaded, are sufficient to call for the opportunity to offer supporting
\nevidence. \u00c2\u00a0Accordingly, although we intimate no view on the merits of petitioner\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s allegations, we conclude that he is entitled to an opportunity to offer proof
\n(evidence).” \u00c2\u00a0Hanies v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 522<\/p>\n

First, the allegations are not in the indictment and that\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s fatal. Second, it\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s not “legally” sufficient to just make allegations, those allegations must be based on facts;
\nthose facts must establish where, when, why and how the legal right was allegedly acquired. And if facts are alleged (evidence), then they must be based on the
\ntestimony of witnesses with personal knowledge, Rule 602 Federal Rules of Evidence.<\/p>\n

((F))<\/p>\n

Is it a coincidence that usurers will not contract with the unnumbered? \u00c2\u00a0No one who is lacking a social security number is allowed to open an interest bearing
\naccount in any Federal Reserve bank, nor open a stock account.<\/p>\n

“Fraud vitiates the most solemn contracts, documents and even
\njudgments” U.S. v Throckmorton, 98 US 426<\/p>\n

\u00e2\u20ac\u0153Silence can only be equated with fraud when there is a legal or moral duty to speak, or when an inquiry left unanswered would be intentionally misleading\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6 We
\ncannot condone this shocking conduct,.. If that is the case we hope our message is clear. This sort of deception will not be tolerated and if this is routine it should
\nbe corrected immediately.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d U.S. v. Tweel, 550 F 2d 297, 299-300.<\/p>\n

“Constructive fraud: A contract or act, which, not originating in
\nevil design and contrivance to perpetuate a positive fraud or
\ninjury upon other persons, yet, by its necessary tendency to
\ndeceive or mislead them, or to violate a public or private
\nconfidence, or to impair or injure public interest, is deemed
\nequally reprehensible with positive fraud, and therefore is
\nprohibited by law, … ” Bovier’s Law Dictionary – 1856 Edition
\nINGENUI, civ. law. Those freemen who were born free. Vicat, vocab.
\n2. They were a class of freemen, distinguished from those who, born \u00c2\u00a0slaves, had afterwards legally obtained their freedom the latter were called \u00c2\u00a0at various
\nperiods, sometimes liberti, sometimes libertini. An unjust or \u00c2\u00a0illegal servitude did not prevent a man from being ingenuus. \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, 1856<\/p>\n

((G))
\n((H))
\n“A carriage is peculiarly a family or household
\narticle. \u00c2\u00a0It contributes in a large degree to
\nthe health, convenience, comfort, and welfare of
\nthe householder or of the family.” \u00c2\u00a0Arthur v
\nMorgan, 113 U.S. 495, 500, 5 S.Ct. 241, 243
\n(S.D. NY 1884).<\/p>\n

“The Supreme Court, in Arthur v. Morgan, 112
\nU.S. 495, 5 S.Ct. 241, 28 L.Ed. 825, held that
\ncarriages were properly classified as household
\neffects, and we see no reason that automobiles
\nshould not be similarly disposed of.” \u00c2\u00a0Hillhouse
\nv United States, 152 F. 163, 164 (2nd Cir.
\n1907).<\/p>\n

“A soldier’s personal automobile is part of his
\n“household goods[.]” \u00c2\u00a0U.S. v Bomar,
\nC.A.5(Tex.), 8 F.3d 226, 235″ \u00c2\u00a019A Words and
\nPhrases – Permanent Edition (West) pocket part
\n94.
\nUse determines classification<\/p>\n

“In determining whether or not a motor boat was
\nincluded in the expression household effects,
\nMatter of Winburn’s Will, supra [139 Misc. 5,
\n247 N.Y.S. 592], stated the test to be “whether
\nthe articles are or are not used in or by the
\nhousehold, or for the benefit or comfort of the
\nfamily”.” \u00c2\u00a0In re Bloomingdale’s Estate, 142
\nN.Y.S.2d 781, 785 (1955).<\/p>\n

“The use to which an item is put, rather than
\nits physical characteristics, determine whether
\nit should be classified as “consumer goods”
\nunder UCC \u00c2\u00a79-109(1) or “equipment” under UCC
\n\u00c2\u00a79-109(2).” \u00c2\u00a0Grimes v Massey Ferguson, Inc., 23
\nUCC Rep Serv 655; 355 So.2d 338 (Ala., 1978).<\/p>\n

“Under UCC \u00c2\u00a79-109 there is a real distinction
\nbetween goods purchased for personal use and
\nthose purchased for business use. \u00c2\u00a0The two are
\nmutually exclusive and the principal use to
\nwhich the property is put should be considered
\nas determinative.” \u00c2\u00a0James Talcott, Inc. v Gee, 5
\nUCC Rep Serv 1028; 266 Cal.App.2d 384, 72
\nCal.Rptr. 168 (1968).<\/p>\n

“The classification of goods in UCC \u00c2\u00a79-109 are
\nmutually exclusive.” \u00c2\u00a0McFadden v Mercantile-Safe
\nDeposit & Trust Co., 8 UCC Rep Serv 766; 260 Md
\n601, 273 A.2d 198 (1971).<\/p>\n

“The classification of “goods” under [UCC] \u00c2\u00a79-
\n109 is a question of fact.” \u00c2\u00a0Morgan County
\nFeeders, Inc. v McCormick, 18 UCC Rep Serv 2d
\n632; 836 P.2d 1051 (Colo. App., 1992).<\/p>\n

“The definition of “goods” includes an
\nautomobile.” \u00c2\u00a0Henson v Government Employees
\nFinance & Industrial Loan Corp., 15 UCC Rep Serv
\n1137; 257 Ark 273, 516 S.W.2d 1 (1974).<\/p>\n

Household goods<\/p>\n

“The term “household goods” … includes
\neverything about the house that is usually held
\nand enjoyed therewith and that tends to the
\ncomfort and accommodation of the household.
\nLawwill v. Lawwill, 515 P.2d 900, 903, 21
\nAriz.App. 75″ \u00c2\u00a019A Words and Phrases – Permanent
\nEdition (West) pocket part 94. \u00c2\u00a0Cites Mitchell’s
\nWill below.<\/p>\n

“Bequest … of such “household goods and
\neffects” … included not only household
\nfurniture, but everything else in the house that
\nis usually held and used by the occupants of a
\nhouse to lead to the comfort and accommodation
\nof the household. \u00c2\u00a0State ex rel. Mueller v
\nProbate Court of Ramsey County, 32 N.W.2d 863,
\n867, 226 Minn. 346.” \u00c2\u00a019A Words and Phrases –
\nPermanent Edition (West) 514.<\/p>\n

“All household goods owned by the user thereof
\nand used solely for noncommercial purposes shall
\nbe exempt from taxation, and such person
\nentitled to such exemption shall not be required
\nto take any affirmative action to receive the
\nbenefit from such exemption.” \u00c2\u00a0Ariz. Const. Art.
\n9, \u00c2\u00a7 2.<\/p>\n

Automobiles classified as vehicles<\/p>\n

““[Household goods”H]…did not [include] an
\nautomobile…used by the testator, who was a
\npracticing physician, in going from his
\nresidence to his office and vice versa, and in
\nmaking visits to his patients.” \u00c2\u00a0Mathis v
\nCausey, et al., 159 S.E. 240 (Ga. 1931).<\/p>\n

“Debtors could not avoid lien on motor vehicle,
\nas motor vehicles are not “household goods”
\nwithin the meaning of Bankruptcy Code lien
\navoidance provision. \u00c2\u00a0In re Martinez,
\nBkrtcy.N.M., 22 B.R. 7, 8.” \u00c2\u00a019A Words and
\nPhrases – Permanent Edition (West) pocket part
\n94.<\/p>\n

Automobiles not classified as vehicles<\/p>\n

“Automobile purchased for the purpose of
\ntransporting buyer to and from his place of
\nemployment was “consumer goods” as defined in
\nUCC \u00c2\u00a79-109.” \u00c2\u00a0Mallicoat v Volunteer Finance &
\nLoan Corp., 3 UCC Rep Serv 1035; 415 S.W.2d 347
\n(Tenn. App., 1966).<\/p>\n

“The provisions of UCC \u00c2\u00a72-316 of the Maryland
\nUCC do not apply to sales of consumer goods (a
\nterm which includes automobiles, whether new or
\nused, that are bought primarily for personal,
\nfamily, or household use).” \u00c2\u00a0Maryland
\nIndependent Automobile Dealers Assoc., Inc. v
\nAdministrator, Motor Vehicle Admin., 25 UCC Rep
\nServ 699; 394 A.2d 820, 41 Md App 7 (1978).<\/p>\n

“An automobile was part of testatrix’
\n“household goods” within codicil. \u00c2\u00a0In re
\nMitchell’s Will, 38 N.Y.S.2d 673, 674, 675
\n[1942].” \u00c2\u00a019A Words and Phrases – Permanent
\nEdition (West) 512. \u00c2\u00a0Cites Arthur v Morgan,
\nsupra.<\/p>\n

“[T]he expression “personal effects” clearly
\nincludes an automobile[.]” \u00c2\u00a0In re Burnside’s
\nWill, 59 N.Y.S.2d 829, 831 (1945). \u00c2\u00a0Cites
\nHillhouse, Arthur, and Mitchell’s Will, supra.<\/p>\n

“[A] yacht and six automobiles were “personal
\nbelongings” and “household effects[.]”” \u00c2\u00a0In
\nre Bloomingdale’s Estate, 142 N.Y.S.2d 781, 782
\n(1955).
\n((I))<\/p>\n

\u00e2\u20ac\u0153A policy of Insurance is a maritime contract, and therefore of \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0(some claim insurace can give DMV jurisdiction.)
\nadmiralty Jurisdiction.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d -De Lovio v. Boit 7 Fed. Case Number 3, 776
\n>>
\nTitle 49 of the United States Code [Transportation] dealing expressly with “interstate transportation”:<\/p>\n

Section 10501 – \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0((Basically one Federal Zone to another Federal Zone.))<\/p>\n

(2) Jurisdiction under paragraph (1) applies only to
\ntransportation in the United States between a place in –
\n(A) a State and a place in the same or another State as part of
\nthe interstate rail network;
\n(B) a State and a place in a territory or possession of the
\nUnited States;
\n(C) a territory or possession of the United States and a place
\nin another such territory or possession;
\n(D) a territory or possession of the United States and another
\nplace in the same territory or possession;
\n(E) the United States and another place in the United States
\nthrough a foreign country; or
\n(F) the United States and a place in a foreign country.
\nOnly state-to-state commerce is governed by the interstate commerce clause. State-to-territory commerce (or visa versa) is governed under the government’s
\nterritorial authority, and commerce from a state to a foreign nation is governed by the foreign commerce language of the clause.
\n>>
\nTITLE 18 > PART I > CHAPTER 1 > \u00c2\u00a7 10
\n\u00c2\u00a7 10. Interstate commerce and foreign commerce defined
\nRelease date: 2005-08-03
\nThe term \u00e2\u20ac\u0153interstate commerce\u00e2\u20ac\u009d, as used in this title, includes commerce between one State, Territory, Possession, or the District of Columbia and another State,
\n(Between the acts on the soil between Nebraska and Iowa not interstate??) Territory, Possession, or the District of Columbia. The term \u00e2\u20ac\u0153foreign commerce\u00e2\u20ac\u009d, as
\nused in this title, includes commerce with a foreign country.<\/p>\n

IRSInfo:
\n4852 for is one used to correct 1099, W2, to notify IRS that it is not a taxable activity.<\/p>\n

IRS Liens
\nStudents, note that there is a difference between “recording” and “filing.”
\nRecording affects title and a filing does not. \u00c2\u00a0Notices can never be
\nrecorded because they do not affect the condition of title.<\/p>\n

((J)) \r\n\r\n>>>\r\n\r\nSection Nebr. \u00c2\u00a027-201 Print Friendly Copy \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0Revised Statutes \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0Chapter 27\r\n\r\nRule 201. Judicial notice<\/span><\/strong> of adjudicative facts; kinds of facts; when discretionary; when mandatory; opportunity to be heard; time of taking notice;\r\n\r\ninstructing jury.\r\n\r\n(1) This rule governs only judicial notice of adjudicative facts.\r\n\r\n(2) A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (a) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of\r\n\r\nthe trial court or (b) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.\r\n\r\n(3) A judge or court may take judicial notice, whether requested or not.\r\n\r\n(4) A judge or court shall take judicial notice if requested by a party and supplied with the necessary information.\r\n\r\n(5) A party is entitled upon timely request to an opportunity to be heard as to the propriety of taking judicial notice and the tenor of the matter\r\n\r\nnoticed. In the absence of prior notification, the request may be made after judicial notice has been taken.\r\n\r\n(6) Judicial notice may be taken at any stage of the proceeding.\r\n\r\n(7) In a civil action or proceeding, the judge shall instruct the jury to accept as conclusive any fact judicially noticed. In a criminal case, the judge shall\r\n\r\ninstruct the jury that it may, but is not required to, accept as conclusive any fact judicially noticed.\r\n\r\nSource: \u00c2\u00a0Laws 1975, LB 279, \u00c2\u00a7 7.\r\n\r\n>>><\/pre>\n
(Personal Jurisdiction) This claim of Sovereign Immunity is further enhanced by the fact that the statute did not and does not intend to abolish any of the
\nsovereign Rights retained by the Citizens of California. \u00c2\u00a0Statutes which in general terms divest pre-existing rights or privileges will not be applied to the Sovereign
\nwithout express words to that effect. \u00c2\u00a0U.S. v. United Mine Workers of America, (1947) 67 S. Ct. 677, 686, 330 U.S. 258. \u00c2\u00a0But, in fact and in law, such statutes are
\nintended to be applied to those who are here as “residents” in this State under the Interstate Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution and the so-called 14th
\nAmendment.<\/p>\n
English common law is the law in Florida and that law gives the
\nlandlord the right to rent or lease his property under whatever conditions
\nhe wants. \u00c2\u00a0Civil rights are something the government grants those who claim
\nto be citizens or who can prove residency on federal territory. \u00c2\u00a0The
\nparticular language involved makes no difference. \u00c2\u00a0Under the English common
\nlaw, a tenant gains no rights of the property of another by renting it.<\/p>\n
To stop even a mega-lawyer all a person has to do is show the State of
\nFlorida’s administrative courts limited jurisdiction. \u00c2\u00a0Since this is written
\nlaw, that limitation to jurisdiction will appear in the capacity of the
\ndefendant. \u00c2\u00a0To defend all the landlord has to do is deny being a U.S.
\ncitizen or U.S. resident or a resident of the county. \u00c2\u00a0(An entity (or contract) subject to an administrative court.)<\/p>\n
Penhallow v. Doane\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s Administrators
\n3 U.S. 54; 1 L. Ed. 57; 3 Dall. 54 \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0(1795) \u00c2\u00a0(could not find to shepardize)
\nGovernment is Foreclosed from Parity with Real People– Supreme Court of the United States 1795
\n“Inasmuch as every government is an artificial person, an abstraction, and a creature of the mind only, a government can interface only with other artificial
\npersons. \u00c2\u00a0The imaginary, having neither actuality nor substance, is foreclosed from creating and attaining parity with the tangible. \u00c2\u00a0The legal manifestation of this
\nthat no government, as well as any law, agency, aspect, court, etc. can concern (Jurisdiction) itself with anything other than corporate, artificial persons and the
\ncontracts between them.”<\/p>\n
“Subject matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by waiver or consent, and
\nmay be raised at any time.” \u00c2\u00a0Rodrigues v State, 441 S.2d 1129 (Fla App 1983).
\n“Where the court is without jurisdiction it has no
\nauthority to render any judgment other than one of dismissal.” \u00c2\u00a0Garcia v Dial, 596 S.W. 2d 254, 258 (1980).
\n“No authority need to be cited for the proposition that, when a court lacks jurisdiction, any judgment rendered by it is void and unenforceable… and without any
\nforce or effect whatever. \u00c2\u00a0Hooker v Boles, 346 Fed 2d 285, 286 (1965).
\n“A court lacking jurisdiction cannot render judgment but must dismiss the cause at any stage of the proceedings in which it becomes apparent that jurisdiction is
\nlacking.” United States v Siviglia, 686 Fed. 2d 832, 835 (1981).<\/p>\n
\u00e2\u20ac\u0153It is an elementary rule of pleading, that a plea to the jurisdiction is…a tacit admission that the court has a right to judge in the case, an is a waiver to all
\nexceptions to the jurisdiction\u00e2\u20ac\u009d.
\nGirty v. Logan, 6 Bush Ky. 8 \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0[see also arraighnment]<\/p>\n
Absence of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time by any party or by the court sua sponte. State ex rel. Grape v. Zach, (supra) (citing Plock v.
\nCrossroads Joint Venture, 239 Neb. 211, 475 N.W.2d 105 (1991))<\/p>\n
The Plaintiff has the Burden of Proof to Show That Jurisdiction Exists
\nThe party invoking jurisdiction bears the burden of proof that all prerequisites to jurisdiction are satisfied. Hatridge v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 415 F.2d 809, 814 (8th
\nCir. 1969). \u00c2\u00a0“be attentive to a satisfaction of jurisdictional requirements in all cases.” Sanders v. Clemco Indus., 823 F.2d 214, 216 (8th Cir. 1987)<\/p>\n
Where There is Absence of Jurisdiction Judicial Proceedings Are A Nullity
\nIf a federal court takes action in a dispute over which it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, that action is a nullity. See Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 17-18
\n(1951); Hart v. Terminex Int’l, 336 F.3d 541, 541-42 (7th Cir. 2003) (stating that it was “regrettable” that the case had to be dismissed for lack of subject matter
\njurisdiction “rendering everything that has occurred in [the] eight years [of litigation] a nullity”).<\/p>\n
“Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause. Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to
\nthe court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.” Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506, 514 (1869). \u00c2\u00a0In Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523
\nU. S. 83 (1998) “a long and venerable line of our cases,” id., at 94, Steel Co. reiterated: “The requirement that jurisdiction be established as a threshold matter …
\nis `inflexible and without exception,’ ” id., at 94-95 (quoting Mansfield, C. & L. M. R. Co. v. Swan, 111 U. S. 379, 382 (1884)); for “[j]urisdiction is power to declare
\nthe law,” and ” `[w]ithout jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause,’ ” 523 U. S., at 94 (quoting Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506, 514 (1869)).<\/p>\n
State v. Thomas, 685 N.W.2d 69, 268 Neb. 570 (Neb. 08\/13\/2004)
\nSubject matter jurisdiction is the power of a tribunal to hear and determine a case of the general class or category to which the proceedings in question belong and
\nto deal with the general subject matter involved. State v. Gorman, 232 Neb. 738, 441 N.W.2d 896 (1989).<\/p>\n
(Not a holding)
\nThomas does not challenge the power of the district court to hear and determine a case of this general class. Rather, Thomas relies on Nelson v. State, 167 Neb.
\n575, 94 N.W.2d 1 (1959),<\/p>\n
[16] We find this reasoning persuasive and therefore hold that a facial challenge to a presumptively valid criminal statute does not raise an issue of subject matter
\njurisdiction in a criminal prosecution and thus may be waived if not timely asserted. Nebraska law is consistent with federal law in that criminal statutes are
\npresumed constitutional. State v. Hynek, 263 Neb. 310, 640 N.W.2d 1 (2002); State v. Bjorklund, 258 Neb. 432, 604 N.W.2d 169 (2000).<\/p>\n
SMJ
\nthe issue of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised sua sponte by an appellate court. Scherbak v. Kissler, 245 Neb. 10, 510 N.W.2d 318 (1994);
\nIn re Interest of Kelly D., 3 Neb. App. 251, 526 N.W.2d 439 (1994). When a lower court lacks power, that is, subject matter jurisdiction, to adjudicate merits of a
\nclaim, issue, or question, an appellate court also lacks power to determine the merits of the claim, issue, or question presented to the lower court.
\nIn re Interest of J.T.B. and H.J.T., 245 Neb. 624, 514 N.W.2d 635 (1994); Knerr v. Swigerd, 243 Neb. 591, 500 N.W.2d 839 (1993); In re Interest of L.D. et al., 224
\nNeb. 249, 398 N.W.2d 91 (1986); Glup v. City of Omaha, 222 Neb. 355, 383 N.W.2d 773 (1986). However, although an extra-jurisdictional act of a lower court
\ncannot vest an appellate court with jurisdiction to review or evaluate an evidentiary determination involved in such act, an appellate court has jurisdiction and,
\nmoreover, the duty to determine whether the lower court had the power to enter the judgment or final order sought to be reviewed. In re Interest of J.T.B. and H.J.
\nT., supra; In re Interest of L.D. et al., supra.<\/p>\n
SMJ Can Not Be Waived [U] Quality Pork International v. Rupari Food Services, Inc., No. A-01-1203 (Neb.App. 05\/13\/2003)
\nWhile the lack of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived nor the existence of subject matter jurisdiction conferred by the consent or conduct of the parties,
\nlack of personal jurisdiction may be waived and such jurisdiction conferred by the conduct of the parties. Id. When a jurisdictional question does not involve a
\nfactual dispute, the determination of a jurisdictional issue is a matter of law which requires an appellate court to reach a conclusion independent from the trial
\ncourt’s decision; however, when a determination rests on factual findings, a trial court’s decision on an issue will be upheld unless the factual findings concerning
\njurisdiction are clearly incorrect. Higgins v. Rausch Herefords, 9 Neb. App. 212, 609 N.W.2d 712 (2000).<\/p>\n
Subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law for the court. A jurisdictional question which does not involve a factual dispute is determined by an appellate court as
\na matter of law, which requires the appellate court to reach a conclusion independent of the lower court’s decision. Hoschor v. Hoschor, 254 Neb. 743, 580 N.W.2d
\n516 (1998).<\/p>\n
SMJ and Waiver, Estoppel, Consent of Conduct of the Parties Cummins Management, L.P. v. Gilroy, 266 Neb. 635, 667 N.W.2d 538 (Neb. 08\/15\/2003)
\nWhen a lower court lacks the authority to exercise its subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of a claim, issue, or question, an appellate court also lacks
\nthe power to determine the merits of the claim, issue, or question presented to the lower court. Wasikowski v. Nebraska Quality Jobs Bd., 264 Neb. 403, 648 N.W.
\n2d 756 (2002). Parties cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction upon a judicial tribunal by either acquiescence or consent, nor may subject matter jurisdiction be
\ncreated by waiver, estoppel, consent, or conduct of the parties. Creighton St. Joseph Hosp. v. Tax Eq. & Rev. Comm., 260 Neb. 905, 620 N.W.2d 90 (2000).<\/p>\n
A judgment entered by a court which lacks subject matter jurisdiction is void. It is the longstanding rule in Nebraska that such a void judgment may be raised at
\nany time in any proceeding. Bradley v. Hopkins, 246 Neb. 646, 522 N.W.2d 394 (1994); VonSeggern v. Willman, 244 Neb. 565, 508 N.W.2d 261 (1993).<\/p>\n
The party invoking jurisdiction bears the burden of proof that all prerequisites to jurisdiction are satisfied. Hatridge v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 415 F.2d 809, 814 (8th
\nCir. 1969).<\/p>\n
SMJ and Burden Of Proof Lauder v. Bekins Van Lines Co., No. 4:05-CV-1132 CAS (E.D.Mo. 12\/07\/2005)<\/p>\n
SMJ and Removal CPG Finance I, L.L.C. v. Shopro, Inc., No. 06-3015-CV-S-RED (W.D.Mo. 03\/21\/2006)
\n[13] \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0In a case removed to Federal Court, the Court has the duty to determine its jurisdiction, and to raise the issue of subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte, if
\nnecessary. See Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982); Yeldell v. Tutt, 913 F.2d 533, 537 (8th Cir.1990); see
\nalso 28 U.S.C. \u00c2\u00a7 1447(c) (“If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.”) The
\nparty invoking jurisdiction bears the burden of proof that all prerequisites to jurisdiction are satisfied. Hatridge v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 415 F.2d 809, 814 (8th Cir.
\n1969). Removal statutes are strictly construed, and any doubts about the propriety of removal are resolved in favor of state court jurisdiction and remand. Transit
\nCas. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London, 119 F.3d 619, 625 (8th Cir.1997).
\n>>
\nEliments of Jurisdiction as in STANDING:<\/p>\n
Standing is legally defined as “The position of a person in reference to his capacity to act in a particular instance – 19 Am J2d Corp \u00c2\u00a7 559.” Ballentine\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s Law
\nDictionary, page 1209.<\/p>\n
“In essence the question of standing is whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues.” Warth v. Seldin, 422
\nU.S. 490, 498 (1975).<\/p>\n
If a plaintiff lacks standing, then courts, all courts, are legally\/constitutionally incapable of proceeding because: “courts only adjudicate justiciable controversies.”
\nUnited States v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 337 US 426, 430.<\/p>\n
“The requirement of standing, however, has a core component derived directly from the Constitution. A plaintiff must allege personal injury fairly traceable to the
\ndefendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief.” Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) (emphasis mine).<\/p>\n
This (standing) of course references Article III \u00c2\u00a7 2 of the “United States” “constitution” which requires a plaintiff to present a case before a court may proceed: “The
\njudicial power shall extend to all cases”:<\/p>\n
“The case-or-controversy doctrines state fundamental limits on federal judicial power in our system of government. The Art. III doctrine that requires a litigant to
\nhave “standing” to invoke the power of a federal court is perhaps the most important of these doctrines.” Allen page 750.<\/p>\n
More explicit, standing requires the violation of a legally (government) recognized right. The Declaration of Independence proves this: “That to secure these Rights,
\nGovernments are instituted among Men” — \u00c2\u00a0And from the Arizona “constitution”: “governments” are established to protect and maintain individual rights.” Article II
\n\u00c2\u00a7 2 (emphasis mine).<\/p>\n
The “Supreme Court” has held consistent with this principal of standing: \u00e2\u20ac\u0153the duty of this court, as of every judicial tribunal, is limited to determining rights of
\npersons or of property, which are actually controverted.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d Tyler v. Judges of the Court of Registration, 179 US 405<\/p>\n
Standing consists of two absolutely essential elements:
\n1) \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0violation of a legal right, and
\n2) \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a02) personal injury.<\/p>\n
First, the allegations are not in the indictment and that\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s fatal. Second, it\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s not “legally” sufficient to just make allegations, those allegations must be based on facts;
\nthose facts must establish where, when, why and how the legal right was allegedly acquired. And if facts are alleged (evidence), then they must be based on the
\ntestimony of witnesses with personal knowledge, Rule 602 Federal Rules of Evidence.<\/p>\n
“we have explained that prudential standing encompasses the general prohibition on a litigant’s raising another person’s legal rights…” \u00c2\u00a0Elk Grove Unified School
\nDistrict et al. v. Newdow et al., 542 U.S. 1 (2004).<\/p>\n
“As a general principal, standing to invoke the judicial process requires an actual justiciable controversy as to which the complainant has a real interest in the
\nultimate adjudication because he or she has either suffered or is about to suffer an injury.” \u00c2\u00a0People v. Superior Court, 126 Cal.Rptr.2d 793.<\/p>\n
>><\/p>\n
SMJ and Court May Not Proceed
\nA court may not proceed at all in a case unless it has jurisdiction. Crawford v. F. Hoffman-LaRoche Ltd., 267 F.3d 760, 764 (8th Cir. 2001).<\/p>\n
[49] \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0This court has not previously discussed the standard of review for a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction filed under rule 12(b)(2). Because the
\nnew civil rules for notice pleading are modeled after the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, we look to the federal decisions for guidance. Kellogg v. Nebraska Dept.
\nof Corr. Servs., ante p. 40, 690 N.W.2d 574 (2005).<\/p>\n
jurisdiction of the U.S. federal government is defined by
\nArticle I, Section 8, Clause 17 of the U.S. \u00c2\u00a0Constitution, quoted
\nas follows:<\/p>\n
“The Congress shall have the Power . . . To exercise exclusive
\nLegislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (NOT
\nEXCEEDING TEN \u00c2\u00a0MILES SQUARE) as may, by Cession \u00c2\u00a0of particular
\nStates and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of
\nGovernment of the United States [District of Columbia] and to
\nexercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent
\nof the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for
\nthe Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other
\nneedful Buildings; \u00c2\u00a0And-To make all Laws which shall be necessary
\nand proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing \u00c2\u00a0Powers, . .
\n.” \u00c2\u00a0[Ephasis added]<\/p>\n
And Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2:<\/p>\n
“The Congress shall have the Power to dispose of and make all
\nneedful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other
\nProperty belonging to the United States; and nothing in this
\nConstitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of
\nthe United States, or of any particular State.”<\/p>\n
S.S number not required \u00e2\u20ac\u201c Taco Bell Case states that no SS number is required to work.<\/p>\n
((K))<\/p>\n
((L))<\/p>\n
natural liberty v. civil liberty
\npersonal liberty v. civil liberty<\/p>\n
” Personal liberty, or the Right to enjoyment of life and liberty, is one of the
\nfundamental or natural Rights, which has been protected by its inclusion as a
\nguarantee in the various constitutions, which is not derived from, or dependent
\non, the U.S. Constitution, which may not be submitted to a vote and may not
\ndepend on the outcome of an election. It is one of the most sacred and valuable
\nRights, as sacred as the Right to private property…and is regarded as
\ninalienable.” 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, Sect.202, p.987.<\/p>\n
” Personal liberty largely consists of the Right of locomotion to go where and
\nwhen one pleases only so far restrained as the Rights of others may make it
\nnecessary for the welfare of all other citizens. The Right of the Citizen to
\ntravel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon, by
\nhorsedrawn carriage, wagon, or automobile, is not a mere privilege which may be
\npermitted or prohibited at will, but the common Right which he has under his
\nRight to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Under this Constitutional
\nguarantee one may, therefore, under normal conditions, travel at his inclination
\nalong the public highways or in public places, and while conducting himself in
\nan orderly and decent manner, neither interfering with nor disturbing another’s
\nRights, he will be protected, not only in his person, but in his safe conduct.”
\nII Am.Jur. (1st) Constitutional Law, Sect.329, p.1135.<\/p>\n
Au contraire. The legal term “license” is defined as “governmental
\npermission to perform a particular act (like getting married)” (emphasis
\nadded).
\nby requiring a permit or license which may be granted or withheld in the
\ndiscretion of such official—is an unconstitutional censorship or prior
\nrestraint upon the enjoyment of those freedoms.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d -Staub v. Baxley, 355
\nU.S. 313, 322.
\n><\/p>\n
\u00c2\u00b7 \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0Schware v. Board of Examiners, 353 U.S. 238, 239. ..”The practice of law (medicine etc.) is not within the States grace to regulate.” The practice of law
\n(medicine etc.) is an occupation of common right as per Sims v. Ahrens, 271 S.W. 720 (1925). No State in the Union of the United   States of America licenses
\nlawyers, only the State Bar, which issues a private corporation type of “Union Card”\/certificate for payment of dues\/fees. (See also ExParte v. Garland, 4 Wall 333,
\n370 (1866), which authorizes only the practice of law in the courts as an officer of the court and a member of the judicial branch of government, to represent wards
\nof the court such as infants and persons of unsound mind and as a public defender in criminal cases.) …Cannot license an occupation of common right …Redfield v.
\nFisher, 292 P. 813, 817-819
\n“Occupations of common right ARE not taxable. The practice of medicine and law are occupations of common right. An income tax is neither a property tax, nor a
\ntax on occupations of common right, but is an excise tax. …”Gross income tax unconstitutional.” (See also Schware v. Board of Examiners, 353 US 238, 239. …
\nThat an attorney cannot represent any private citizen nor any business as the State cannot license the practice of law. …”That an attorney can only be allowed to
\npractice law in the courts to represent “wards” of the court such as infants and persons of unsound mind as per Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 7, Sect. 4.”)<\/p>\n
\u00c2\u00b7 \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0The definition of an excise tax is found in the supreme Court case of Flint v. Stone Tracy, 220 US 107: ..”Excises are taxes laid upon the manufacture, sale or
\nconsumption of commodities within the country, upon licenses to pursue certain occupations and upon corporate privileges; the requirement to pay such taxes
\ninvolves the exercise of privilege and if business is not done in the manner described, no tax is payable, and it is this privilege which is the subject of the tax and
\nnot the mere buying, selling, or handling of goods; See 53 ALR3d 1163 for the validity and construction of statutes or rules conditioning right to practice law upon
\nresidence or citizenship. (Occupations of natural\/common right are NOT a subject of an excise\/income tax..84 C.J.S. art. 122)
\nThe definition of an excise tax is found in the supreme Court case of Flint v. Stone Tracy, 220 US 107: ..”Excises are taxes laid upon the manufacture, sale or
\nconsumption of commodities within the country, upon licenses to pursue certain occupations and upon corporate privileges; the requirement to pay such taxes
\ninvolves the exercise of privilege and if business is not done in the manner described, no tax is payable, and it is this privilege which is the subject of the tax and
\nnot the mere buying, selling, or handling of goods; See 53 ALR3d 1163 for the validity and construction of statutes or rules conditioning right to practice law upon
\nresidence or citizenship. (Occupations of natural\/common right are NOT a subject of an excise\/income tax..84 C.J.S. art. 122)
\n>
\naccord, -United States v. Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, (1947).
\n\u00e2\u20ac\u0153Particularly is the true where the statute imposes a burden or
\nlimitation, as distinguished from conferring a benefit or advantage.
\n-United States v. Knight, 14 Pet. 301, 315 (1840).\u00e2\u20ac\u009d Wilson v. Omaha
\nIndian Tribe, 442 U.S. 653 (1979).<\/p>\n
Every State law must conform in the first place to the Constitution of
\nthe United States, and then to the subordinate constitutions of the
\nparticular state; and if it infringes upon the provisios of either, it
\nis so far void. \u00c2\u00a0\u00e2\u20ac\u201c Houston v. Moore, 18 US 1, 5 L.Ed 19<\/p>\n
\u00e2\u20ac\u0153This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be
\nmade in Pursuance thereof; \u00c2\u00a0and all Treaties made, or which shall be
\nmade, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law
\nof the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any
\nThing in the Constitution or laws of any State to the Contrary
\nnotwithstanding,\u00e2\u20ac\u009d \u00e2\u20ac\u201c Constitution for the United States of America,
\nArticle VI, Clause 2.,<\/p>\n
Flodov \u00c2\u00a0v. \u00c2\u00a0US 436 US 238
\nIRS must follow UCC for perfecting liens and levies.<\/p>\n
((M))
\nSection 28-924
\nOfficial misconduct; penalty.<\/p>\n
(1) A public servant commits official misconduct if he knowingly violates any statute or lawfully adopted rule or regulation relating to his official duties.
\n(2) Official misconduct is a Class II misdemeanor.<\/p>\n
((N))<\/p>\n
Negotiable instrument, Must have original, Default Judgment, County Court General Rules,
\nRule 32
\nDEFAULT JUDGMENTS
\nIn cases where the defendant fails to answer, demur, or otherwise plead, the plaintiff may, after the day on
\nwhich said action shall be set for answer, take default judgment upon a verified petition, affidavits, or sworn
\ntestimony establishing a claim. No judgment will be entered on a negotiable instrument unless the original is
\nsurrendered for cancellation to the court.
\nRule 32 amended September 1987.<\/p>\n
“Procedural due process” limits the ability of the government to deprive people of interests which constitute liberty or property interests within the meaning of the
\nDue Process Clause and requires that parties deprived of such interests be provided adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard. Marshall v. Wimes, 261 Neb.
\n846, 626 N.W.2d 229 (2001). The central meaning of “procedural due process” is that parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard, and, in order
\nthat they may enjoy that right, they must first be notified. In re Interest of Natasha H. & Sierra H., 258 Neb. 131, 602 N.W.2d 439 (1999).
\n20. Giving a note does not constitute payment. Echart v Commissioners, C.C.A. 42 F2d 158; 283 U. S. 140.<\/p>\n
((O))<\/p>\n
absolute ownership v. qualified ownership<\/p>\n
Originals, SEE Negotiable instrument.<\/p>\n
“OWNERSHIP – … Ownership of property is either absolute or qualified. The
\nownership of property is absolute when a single person has the absolute dominion
\nover it… The ownership is qualified when it is shared with one or more
\npersons, when the time of enjoyment is deferred or limited, or when the use is
\nrestricted. ” – – -Black’s Law dictionary, sixth ed., p. 1106<\/p>\n
P
\nA Sovereign does not obtain permission from the servant. The servant
\nobtains permission from the Sovereign.<\/p>\n
statutes don’t
\ndefine the term, so we must turn to a law dictionary:<\/p>\n
natural person
\nn. a real human being, as distinguished from a corporation, which is
\noften treated at law as a fictitious person.<\/p>\n
“Since in common usage the term `person’ does not include the sovereign,
\nstatutes employing that term are ordinarily construed to exclude it.” –
\nUS Supreme Court in U.S. v. Cooper, 312 US 600,604, 61 SCt 742 (1941):<\/p>\n
“In common usage, the term `person’ does not include the sovereign and
\nstatutes employing it will ordinarily not be construed to do so.” – US
\nSupreme Court in U.S. v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258,
\n67 SCt 677 (1947):<\/p>\n
“Since in common usage, the term `person’ does not include the
\nsovereign, statutes employing the phrase are ordinarily construed to
\nexclude it.” – US Supreme Court in US v. Fox 94 US 315:
\n\u00e2\u20ac\u0153 In common usage, the term \u00e2\u20ac\u02dcperson\u00e2\u20ac\u2122 does not include the sovereign,
\n[and] statutes employing the phrase are ordinarily construed to exclude
\nit.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d -United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 604 (1941);<\/p>\n
“In common usage, the term ‘person’ does not include the sovereign, and
\nstatutes employing the word are ordinarily construed to exclude it.” –
\nUS Supreme Court in Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe 442 US 653, 667 (1979):<\/p>\n
Penhallow v. Doane\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s Administrators
\n3 U.S. 54; 1 L. Ed. 57; 3 Dall. 54 \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0(1795)
\nGovernment is Foreclosed from Parity with Real People– Supreme Court of the United States 1795
\n“Inasmuch as every government is an artificial person, an abstraction, and a creature of the mind only, a government can interface only with other artificial
\npersons. \u00c2\u00a0The imaginary, having neither actuality nor substance, is foreclosed from creating and attaining parity with the tangible. \u00c2\u00a0The legal manifestation of this
\nthat no government, as well as any law, agency, aspect, court, etc. can concern itself with anything other than corporate, artificial persons and the contracts
\nbetween them.”<\/p>\n
Judicial decisions (presidence), however numerous, are subject to correction by the
\nconstitution itself. \u00c2\u00a0\u00e2\u20ac\u201c State v. Buente, 256 Mo. 227, 165 SW 340<\/p>\n
JURIS ET DE JURE. A phrase employed to denote conclusive presumptions of \u00c2\u00a0law, which cannot be rebutted by evidence. The words signify of law and from \u00c2\u00a0law.
\nBest on Presumption, Sec. 17. \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, 1856
\n>
\n“PRIVATE PROPERTY – As protected from being taken for public uses, is such
\nproperty as belongs absolutely to an individual, and of which he has the
\nexclusive right of disposition. Property of a specific, fixed and tangible
\nnature, capable of being in possession and transmitted to another, such as
\nhouses, lands, and chattels.” – – – Black’s Law dictionary, sixth ed., p.1217<\/p>\n
> Public Policy; Defined Black\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s 4th
\nCommunity common sence and cocience extended and applied throughout the state to matters of public morals, health safety, welfare, and the like. \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0It is that
\ngeneral and well settled public oppinionrelating to mans plain complatue duty to his fellow man. \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0Having due regard for each paticulare relation and situwation.
\n(verces general community) \u00c2\u00a0(status that sets you apart contractually [Nebraska Citizen as in common law])
\n>>>
\n\u00e2\u20ac\u0153As a general matter, municipalities may, in the exercise of a valid police power, protect the public health through ordinances.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d Village  of Winside v. Jackson, 250
\nNeb. 851, 857, 553 N.W.2nd 476 (1996).
\n>>>
\nPro Se Laws
\nHAINES v. KERNER, ET AL. 404 U.S. 519, 92 S. Ct. 594, 30 L. Ed. 2d 652. Whatever may be the limits on the scope of inquiry of courts into the internal
\nadministration of prisons, allegations such as those asserted by petitioner, however inartfully pleaded, are sufficient to call for the opportunity to offer supporting
\nevidence. We cannot say with assurance that under the allegations of the pro se complaint, which we hold to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted
\nby lawyers, it appears “beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S.
\n41, 45-46 (1957). See Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774 (CA2 1944).
\nESTELLE, CORRECTIONS DIRECTOR, ET AL. v. GAMBLE 29 U.S. 97, 97 S. Ct. 285, 50 L. Ed. 2d 251. We now consider whether respondent’s complaint states a
\ncognizable 1983 claim. The handwritten pro se document is to be liberally construed. As the Court unanimously held in Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), a pro
\nse complaint, “however inartfully pleaded,” must be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers” and can only be dismissed for
\nfailure to state a claim if it appears “beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Id., at 520-
\n521, quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
\nWILLIAM MCNEIL, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES 113 S. Ct. 1980, 124 L. Ed. 2d 21, 61 U.S.L.W. 4468. Moreover, given the clarity of the statutory text, it is
\ncertainly not a “trap for the unwary.” It is no doubt true that there are cases in which a litigant proceeding without counsel may make a fatal procedural error, but
\nthe risk that a lawyer will be unable to understand the exhaustion requirement is virtually nonexistent. Our rules of procedure are based on the assumption that
\nlitigation is normally conducted by lawyers. While we have insisted that the pleadings prepared by prisoners who do not have access to counsel be liberally
\nconstrued, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976), and have held that some procedural rules must give way
\nbecause of the unique circumstance of incarceration, see Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 (1988) (pro se prisoner’s notice of appeal deemed filed at time of delivery
\nto prison authorities), we have never suggested that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation should be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who
\nproceed without counsel. As we have noted before, “in the long run, experience teaches that strict adherence to the procedural requirements specified by the
\nlegislature is the best guarantee of evenhanded administration of the law.” Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 826 (1980).
\nBALDWIN COUNTY  WELCOME CENTER v. BROWN 466 U.S. 147, 104 S. Ct. 1723, 80 L. Ed. 2d 196, 52 U.S.L.W. 3751. Rule 8(f) provides that ” pleadings shall be so
\nconstrued as to do substantial justice.” We frequently have stated that pro se pleadings are to be given a liberal construction.
\nHUGHES v. ROWE ET AL. 449 U.S. 5, 101 S. Ct. 173, 66 L. Ed. 2d163, 49 U.S.L.W. 3346. Petitioner’s complaint, like most prisoner complaints filed in the Northern
\nDistrict of Illinois, was not prepared by counsel. It is settled law that the allegations of such a complaint, “however inartfully pleaded” are held “to less stringent
\nstandards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). See also Maclin v. Paulson, 627 F.2d 83, 86 (CA7 1980);
\nFrench v. Heyne, 547 F.2d 994, 996 (CA7 1976). Such a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the
\nplaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Haines, supra, at 520-521. And, of course, the allegations of the complaint
\nare generally taken as true for purposes of a motion to dismiss. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972).
\n>>>
\n((Q))
\n((U))
\n((R))<\/p>\n
private property v. estate (real and personal property)<\/p>\n
“PRIVATE PROPERTY – As protected from being taken for public uses, is such
\nproperty as belongs absolutely to an individual, and of which he has the
\nexclusive right of disposition. Property of a specific, fixed and tangible
\nnature, capable of being in possession and transmitted to another, such as
\nhouses, lands, and chattels.” – – – Black’s Law dictionary, sixth ed., p.1217<\/p>\n
inhabitant v. resident \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0domicile v. residence
\n>>
\nNEBR SUP & APP CTS PRAC Rule 18 provides:
\nOther than as provided in Rule 17, there shall be no broadcasting, televising, recording, or photographing in courtrooms and areas immediately adjacent thereto
\nduring sessions of a court or recesses between sessions, except that under rules which may be prescribed by the Nebraska Supreme Court a judge of a court other
\nthan the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals may authorize broadcasting, televising, recording<\/span>, and photographing of judicial proceedings in such courtrooms and
\nareas immediately adjacent thereto consistent with the right<\/span> of the parties (Plaintiff or Defendant) to a fair (public) trial and subject to express conditions,
\nlimitations, and guidelines which allow such coverage in a manner that will be unobtrusive, will not distract the trial participants, and will not otherwise interfere with
\nadministration of justice. \u00c2\u00a0Looks like a quiet recorder is your right.<\/p>\n
>>
\n\u00e2\u20ac\u0153A State [or the United States] may not impose a charge for the
\nenjoyment of a right granted by the federal Constitution.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d Murdock v.
\nPennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 at 113 (1943).<\/p>\n
\u00e2\u20ac\u0153The claim and exercise of a constitutional right<\/span> cannot be converted into a crime.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d \u00c2\u00a0Miller v. U.S. 230 F, 2d 286, 489;
\n“Waivers of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awaremeness of the relevant circumstances
\nand likely consequences.” Brady v.U.S. 397 U.S., 749, 90 S. Ct. 1463 (1970) See also Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Brookhart v. Janis 384 U.S. 6 (1966);
\nEmpsak v. U.S., 190 (1955) and Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 58 (1938).<\/p>\n
\u00e2\u20ac\u0153Where rights as secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be
\nno rule making or legislation which will abrogate them.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d Miranda v.
\nArizona, 384 U.S. 436 at 491 (1966).<\/p>\n
No rule of court, however general it\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s terms, may contravene a privilege
\nbased on a Constitutional right. \u00c2\u00a0\u00e2\u20ac\u201c \u00c2\u00a0San Joaquin and Kings River Canal
\nand Irrigation Co. v. Stevinson, 165 Cal. 540, 132 P. 1021<\/p>\n
\u00e2\u20ac\u0153Waivers of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary but must be
\nknowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant
\ncircumstances and likely consequences.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d<\/p>\n
\u00e2\u20ac\u0153The governments of the United States and of each state of the several states are distinct from one another. \u00c2\u00a0The rights of a citizen under one may be quite
\ndifferent from those which he has under the other\u00e2\u20ac\u009d.
\nColgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404; 56 S.Ct. 252 (1935)<\/p>\n
\u00e2\u20ac\u0153There is a difference between privileges and immunities belonging to the citizens of the United States as such, and those belonging to the citizens of each state as
\nsuch\u00e2\u20ac\u009d.
\nRuhstrat v. People, 57 N.E. 41 (1900)<\/p>\n
\u00e2\u20ac\u0153The rights and privileges, and immunities which the fourteenth constitutional amendment and Rev. St. section 1979 [U.S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 1262], for its
\nenforcement, were designated to protect, are such as belonging to citizens of the United States as such, and not as citizens of a state\u00e2\u20ac\u009d.
\nWadleigh v. Newhall 136 F. 941 (1905)<\/p>\n
\u00e2\u20ac\u0153…rights of national citizenship as distinct from the fundamental or natural rights inherent in state citizenship\u00e2\u20ac\u009d.
\nMadden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83: 84 L.Ed. 590 (1940)<\/p>\n
“State Citizenship is a vested substantial property right, and the State has no power to divest or impair these rights.”
\nFavot v. Kingsbury, (1929) 98 Cal. App. 284, 276 P. 1083.<\/p>\n
SUI \u00c2\u00a0JURIS. One who has all the rights to which a freemen is entitled; one \u00c2\u00a0who is not under the power of another, as a slave, a minor, and the like.<\/p>\n
“The right of holding state office is a civil or political right, which may be
\nsurrendered to the government or to society in order to secure the protection of
\nother rights ((State) Bill of Rights, art. 3), or the government may abridge or
\ntake away such rights for sufficient cause; for, though such rights may be
\nconsidered natural rights (Bill of Rights, art. 2) yet they are not of the class
\nof natural rights which are held to be inalienable, like the rights of
\nconscience (Bill of Rights, art. 4)”
\n– – Hale v. Everett, 53 N.H. 9 (N.H. 1868) (Note: civil and political rights (liberties) are not in the same class of
\nnatural rights (inalienable), and surrender “other rights” when exercised.) Those who exercise civil rights or liberties must apply for license (ask
\npermission).<\/p>\n
((S))
\n>>>
\nJim Schwiesow is a retired sheriff with 46 years of law enforcement service, including 28 years as
\nthe duly elected sheriff of Sioux County, Iowa. Sheriff Schwiesow explains that
\nthe sheriff is unique in the law endorsement arena in that he is the last and
\nonly law enforcement administrator that is elected to his office by the people.<\/p>\n
The administrative heads of all other law endorsement entities are appointed to
\ntheir positions by mayors, city councils, politicians or other managerial
\nboards. The people have no voice in the selection of these law enforcers, and no
\nrecourse if they do not agree with their policies.<\/p>\n
The sheriff is the only law enforcement official with the authority to summon
\nthe power of the county. The sheriff has the right, granted by Posse Comitatus,
\nto assemble a militia or posse, and the power to deputize citizens and require
\nthem to assist in the keeping of the peace and the enforcement of laws.<\/p>\n
“The sheriff represents the power of the people; he does not represent the power
\nof the state.” When it comes to keeping the peace no one’s authority exceeds
\nthat of the sheriff. The sheriff of that county not only had the authority; he
\nhad the absolute obligation to intercede to protect the constitutional rights of
\nthe owner.
\n>>>
\nSocial Security entitlements are synonymous with gifts (charity
\nfrom the public treasury), and all participants are paupers (one without rights) at law.
\n>
\nSOVEREIGN – A person, body or state in which independent and supreme authority
\nis vested…
\nBlack’s Law Dictionary Dictionary, Sixth Edition, p. 1395.<\/p>\n
The Executive Branch’s agency, the Internal Revenue Service, has also recognized this by stating in their publications that “nonresident aliens [state Citizens] must
\ntake their case to the Court of Claims, as they do not have standing in the federal district court or the tax court.” \u00c2\u00a0This premise is based upon the fact that the
\nimmunity rests upon the ground that no enforceable right exists “against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.” Kawananakoa v. Polybank,
\n205 U.S. 349, 353, and it is undisputable that the Citizens of the several States united granted limited powers to the federal government, because the People are
\nvested with complete sovereignty.
\n>>”To the Constitution of the United   States the term SOVEREIGN is totally unknown. \u00c2\u00a0There is but one place where it could have been used with propriety. \u00c2\u00a0But,
\neven in that place it would not, perhaps, have comported with the delicacy of those who ordained and established that Constitution. \u00c2\u00a0They might have announced
\nthemselves “SOVEREIGN” people of the United   States. \u00c2\u00a0But serenely conscious of the fact, they avoided the ostentatious declaration.” \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0Chisholm v. Georgia, 2
\nDallas 440, 455<\/p>\n
SOVEREIGNTY – …By “Sovereignty”, in its largest sense is meant supreme,
\nabsolute, uncontrollable power, the absolute right to govern. Black’s Law
\nDictionary Dictionary, Sixth Edition, p. 1396. A sovereign man who is within his inherent rights regarding his domain and his
\nright of travel is not violating the person or property of another, committing a
\ntort, a trespass, or otherwise required to obtain prior permission from
\ncompetent authority.
\n>
\nsovereign v. subject<\/p>\n
\u00e2\u20ac\u0153There is no such thing as power of inherent Sovereignty in the
\ngovernment of the United States. In this country sovereignty resides in
\nthe People, and Congress can exercise no power which they have not, by
\ntheir Constitution entrusted to it; All else is withheld.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d Jillird v.
\nGreenman, 110 U.S. 421.<\/p>\n
See also Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972);<\/p>\n
Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 6 (1966);<\/p>\n
Empsak v. U.S., 190 (1955);<\/p>\n
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 58 (1938).<\/p>\n
-Brady v. U.S., 397 U.S. 749, 90 S. Ct. 1463, 1469 (1970 );<\/p>\n
The governments are but trustees acting under derived authority and
\nhave no power to delegate what is not delegated to them. But the people,
\nas the original fountain might take away what they have delegated and
\nintrust to whom they please. … The sovereignty in every state resides
\nin the people of the state and they may alter and change their form of
\ngovernment at their own pleasure.” – US Supreme Court in Luther v.
\nBorden, 48 US 1, 12 LEd 581:<\/p>\n
Sovereign – A person, body, or state in which independent and supreme authority is vested; a chief ruler with supreme power.<\/p>\n
(Blacks Law 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th Editions.)<\/p>\n
“There is no such thing as a power of inherent sovereignty in the
\ngovernment of the United States …. In this country sovereignty resides
\nin the people, and Congress can exercise no power which they have not,
\nby their Constitution entrusted to it: All else is withheld.” – US
\nSupreme Court in Julliard v. Greenman, 110 US 421:<\/p>\n
Strictly speaking, in our republican forms of government, the
\nabsolute sovereignty of the nation is in the people of the nation; (q.
\nv.) and the residuary sovereignty of each state, not granted to any of
\nits public functionaries, is in the people of the state. (q. v.) 2 Dall.
\n471; and vide, generally, 2 Dall. 433, 455; 3 Dall. 93; 1 Story, Const.
\n\u00c2\u00a7208; 1 Toull. n. 20 Merl. Reper. h. t.<\/p>\n
Standing:
\nnational v. citizen
\nsovereign v. subject
\ninhabitant v. resident
\ndomicile v. residence
\nnatural liberty v. civil liberty
\npersonal liberty v. civil liberty
\nprivate property v. estate (real and personal property)
\nabsolute ownership v. qualified ownership
\n>>
\nA special appearance<\/span><\/strong>, which is preliminary and collateral to determining the merits of an action, is a pleading within this section, and thus, in a hearing on a
\nspecial appearance, an affidavit may be used to prove or disprove the factual basis for a court’s assertion or exercise of personal jurisdiction over a defendant.
\nWilliams v. Gould, Inc., 232 Neb. 862, 443 N.W.2d 577 (1989).
\n>><\/p>\n
Term State and Defined as:
\nDistinct wording: as found in Nebraska Statute and US Code.
\n-74 us 700, Texas v White \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a01856? case defined state.
\nState or state.<\/span><\/strong>
\nIn this state.<\/strong>
\nIn this state or within the state.<\/strong>
\nThis state<\/strong><\/span><\/strong>.
\n>>
\nSection 58-308
\nState, defined.
\nState shall mean the State of Nebraska.
\nSource:
\nLaws 1984, LB 1117, \u00c2\u00a7 8
\n>>
\nSection 58-224
\nState, defined.
\nState shall mean<\/span><\/strong> the State of Nebraska.
\nSource:
\nLaws 1983, LB 626, \u00c2\u00a7 24
\n>>
\nSection 37-1206
\nWaters of this state, defined.
\nWaters of this state shall mean any waters within the territorial limits of Nebraska.Source:
\nLaws 1978, LB 21, \u00c2\u00a7 6
\n>>
\nSection 60-666
\nState, defined.
\nState shall mean<\/span><\/strong> a state, territory, or possession of the United   States, the District   of Columbia, the Commonwealth  of Puerto Rico, or a province  of Canada.
\nSource:
\nLaws 1993, LB 370, \u00c2\u00a7 162
\n>>
\nSection 77-2701.17
\nIn this state or within the state, defined.
\nIn this state or within the state means within the exterior limits of the State of Nebraska and includes all the territory within these limits owned by or ceded to the
\nUnited States of America.
\nSource:
\nLaws 1992, LB 871, \u00c2\u00a7 9
\nR.S.1943, (1996), \u00c2\u00a7 77-2702.08
\nLaws 2003, LB 282, \u00c2\u00a7 21
\n>>
\nSection 29-419
\nFresh pursuit; state, defined.
\nFor purposes of the Uniform Act on Fresh Pursuit, the word state shall include the District of Columbia.
\nSource:
\nLaws 1937, c. 70, \u00c2\u00a7 4, p. 256
\nC.S.Supp.,1941, \u00c2\u00a7 29-419
\nR.S.1943, \u00c2\u00a7 29-419
\nLaws 2001, LB 299, \u00c2\u00a7 2
\n>>
\nSection 86-628
\nState, defined.
\nState means<\/span><\/strong> a state of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto  Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, or any territory or insular possession subject to
\nthe jurisdiction of the United States. State includes an Indian tribe or band, or Alaskan native village, which is recognized by federal law or formally acknowledged
\nby a state.
\nSource:
\nLaws 2002, LB 1105, \u00c2\u00a7 390
\n>>
\nSection 71-1795
\nNurse Licensure Compact.
\nThe Nurse Licensure Compact is hereby enacted into law and entered into with all other jurisdictions legally joining therein in the form substantially as follows: .ce
\nARTICLE I. Findings and Declaration of Purpose
\n(a) The party states find that:
\n(m) State means a state, territory, or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia, or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
\n>>
\nSection 25-413
\nState, defined.
\nAs used in sections 25-413 to 25-417, unless the context otherwise requires, state shall mean<\/span> any foreign nation, and any state, district, commonwealth, territory or
\ninsular possession of the United States.
\nSource:
\nLaws 1969, c. 179, \u00c2\u00a7 1, p. 769
\n>>
\n4 USC ( 110(d): The term `State’ includes any
\nTerritory or possession of the United States. Each of the fifty
\nState Republics is sovereign except for the eighteen powers
\ndelegated to the United States by the U.S. Constitution (10th
\nAmendment).
\n>>
\nSection 77-2701.17
\n‘In this state’ or within the state, defined.
\n‘In this state’ or ‘within the state’ means within the exterior limits of the State of Nebraska and ‘includes’<\/span><\/strong> (exclusive) all the territory within these limits owned by
\nor ceded to the United States of America. Source:
\nLaws 1992, LB 871, \u00c2\u00a7 9
\nR.S.1943, (1996), \u00c2\u00a7 77-2702.08
\nLaws 2003, LB 282, \u00c2\u00a7 21<\/p>\n
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
\nThe below two lines are paraphrased by Paul.
\n‘In this state’ includes all the territory, within the boundaries of the State of Nebraska, owned by or ceded to the United States of America.
\n‘In this state’ is all the territory, within the boundaries of the State of Nebraska, owned by or ceded to the United States of America.<\/p>\n
>>>>>>>>>>>>><\/p>\n
Section 77-201 \u00c2\u00a0Nebr.
\nProperty taxable; valuation; classification.<\/p>\n
(1) Except as provided in subsections (2) through (4) of this section, all real property ‘in this state’, not expressly exempt therefrom, shall be subject to taxation
\nand shall be valued at its actual value.
\n>>
\n\u00e2\u20ac\u0153The primary and general rule of statutory construction is that the intent of the lawmaker is to be found in the language he has used. He is presumed to know the
\nmeaning of the words and the rules of grammar.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d United Sates v. Goldenberg, 168 U.S. 95.<\/p>\n
There can be no limitation on the power of the people of the United
\nStates; \u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u009d Hauenstein v. Lynharm, 100 US 483 (1879).
\n((T))
\nTax Certificate \/ Sheriff Sale \/ Tax Sale Deed = Color of Law not true title. \/ US v. Beggarley
\n>>
\n\u00e2\u20ac\u0153The right to travel is part of the \u00e2\u20ac\u02dcliberty\u00e2\u20ac\u2122 [includes locomotion] that
\na citizen cannot be deprived without due process of law.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d
\n-Kent v. Dulles 357 U.S. 116;
\n>>>>>>>>>>>
\nAs noted in People v. Battle (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 7 [123 Cal.Rptr. 636] (conc. opn. by Holmes, P. J.), “In the overwhelming majority of infraction…<\/p>\n
Richard McDonald said \u00e2\u20ac\u0153People v. Battle 50 Cal. F 3, 1 \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0saying finding was \u00e2\u20ac\u201c\u00e2\u20ac\u0153traffic infractions are not criminal\u00e2\u20ac\u009d<\/p>\n
But when I Google \u00e2\u20ac\u0153People v. Battle\u00e2\u20ac\u009d remember the (\u00e2\u20ac\u0153\u00e2\u20ac\u009d) in the search or it does not find it.<\/p>\n
This case comes up as corresponding. People v. Carlucci [23 Cal.3d 249]
\n>>>>>>>>>>>
\nTrespass: \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0Entick v. Carrington (1765) Great English Law on Trespass, [Look on Wikipedia]
\n>>>
\n\u00e2\u20ac\u0153The primary and general rule of statutory construction is that the
\nintent of the lawmaker is to be found in the language (TERMS) he has used. He is
\npresumed to know the meaning of the words and the rules of grammar.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d
\nUnited Sates v. Goldenberg, 168 U.S. 95.<\/p>\n
U.S. v. Laub 385 U.S. 475<\/p>\n
jurisdiction of the U.S. federal government is defined by
\nArticle I, Section 8, Clause 17 of the U.S. \u00c2\u00a0Constitution, quoted
\nas follows:<\/p>\n
“The Congress shall have the Power . . . To exercise exclusive
\nLegislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (NOT
\nEXCEEDING TEN \u00c2\u00a0MILES SQUARE) as may, by Cession \u00c2\u00a0of particular
\nStates and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of
\nGovernment of the United States [District of Columbia] and to
\nexercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent
\nof the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for
\nthe Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other
\nneedful Buildings; \u00c2\u00a0And-To make all Laws which shall be necessary
\nand proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing \u00c2\u00a0Powers, . .
\n.” \u00c2\u00a0[Ephasis added]<\/p>\n
And Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2:<\/p>\n
“The Congress shall have the Power to dispose of and make all
\nneedful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other
\nProperty belonging to the United States; and nothing in this
\nConstitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of
\nthe United States, or of any particular State.”<\/p>\n
((U))
\nThe standing 1945 Supreme Court definition of the term United   States:
\nThe term “United States” may be used in any one of several senses. (1) It may be
\nmerely the name of a sovereign occupying the position analogous to that of other
\nsovereigns in the family of nations. (2) It may designate the territory over
\nwhich the sovereignty of the United States extends, or (3) it may be the
\ncollective name of the states which are united by and under the Constitution.
\n(Hooven & Allison Co. vs Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1945)
\n((V))
\nTITLE 18 – CRIMES AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, PART I – CRIMES, \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0CHAPTER 1 – GENERAL PROVISIONS, Section 9. Vessel of the United States defined, ”vessel
\nof the United States”, as used in this title, means a vessel belonging in whole or in part to the United States, or any citizen thereof, or any corporation created by or
\nunder the laws of the United States, or of any State, Territory, District, or possession thereof.<\/p>\n
The general misconception is that any statute passed by legislators bearing the appearance of law constitutes the law of the land. The U. S. Constitution is the
\nsupreme law of the land, and any statute, to be valid, must be in agreement. It is impossible for a law, which violates the Constitution to be valid. This is succinctly
\nstated as follows: “All laws which are repugnant to the Constitution arc null and void.” Marbury vs. Madison, 5 US (2 Cranch) 137, 174, 176, (1803)<\/p>\n
“An unconstitutional act is not law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; affords no protection; it creates no office; it is in legal contemplation, as inoperative as
\nthough it had never been passed.” Norton vs. Shelby  County 118 US 425 p. 442.
\n(add to case law, Paul’s)
\n((W))
\n((X))
\n((Y))
\n((Z))<\/p>\n
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