{"id":129,"date":"2010-10-25T22:49:01","date_gmt":"2010-10-25T22:49:01","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.pauljjhansen.com\/?p=129"},"modified":"2010-10-25T22:49:01","modified_gmt":"2010-10-25T22:49:01","slug":"statutory-construction","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"http:\/\/www.pauljjhansen.com\/?p=129","title":{"rendered":"Statutory Construction"},"content":{"rendered":"

Every time you are facing a code requirement always look at the
\ndefinitions of who \/ what is included.<\/p>\n

The government is ever eager to expand its scope of authority,
\ndoing such is not lawful and often unconstitutional.
\n<\/span><\/p>\n

\u00e2\u20ac\u02dcPerson<\/span>\u00e2\u20ac\u2122<\/p>\n

I have used the term \u00e2\u20ac\u02dcperson\u00e2\u20ac\u2122 a number of times, and I believe it deserves some special attention. It derives from the Latin \u00e2\u20ac\u02dcpersona,\u00e2\u20ac\u2122 an actor\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s mask, used in
\nGreek and Roman times for two purposes\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6to identify the stage character\u00e2\u20ac\u201dfor one actor often played more than one role, so he would simply switch masks\u00e2\u20ac\u201dand to
\nproject his voice by means of a megaphone-shaped mouth\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6per sona, by sound. Hence, our word \u00e2\u20ac\u02dcpersonality,\u00e2\u20ac\u2122 that about ourselves which we project to others. In
\nsome, more than others, a presentation that indeed masks our true character or nature. In the Middle Ages it came to be used as synonymous with \u00e2\u20ac\u02dchomo,\u00e2\u20ac\u2122 man or
\nindividual. This was not the case in ancient (and modern) Roman law. As one legal historian put it:<\/p>\n

jus personarum did not mean law of persons, or rights of persons, but law of status, or condition. A person is here not a physical or individual person, but the
\nstatus or condition with which he is invested. (34 Austins Jur., 363. Emphasis added.)<\/p>\n

In the 15th century, “person came to be used in legal terminology for one (as a human being, a partnership, or a corporation) that is recognized by the law as the
\nsubject of rights and duties.” (Merriam-Webster\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s New Book of Word Histories, 1991. Emphasis added.) Note here that it is only the \u00e2\u20ac\u02dchuman being\u00e2\u20ac\u2122 in his person, as
\na subject of rights and duties. As Ortolan says, in his History of the Roman Law:<\/p>\n

The word \u00e2\u20ac\u02dcperson\u00e2\u20ac\u2122 (persona) does not in the language of the law, as in ordinary language, designate the physical man. In the first, it is every being considered as
\ncapable of having or owing rights, of being the active or passive subject of rights.<\/p>\n

We say every being, for men are not alone comprised therein. In fact, law by its power of abstraction creates persons\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6.because it makes of them beings capable
\nof having or owing rights\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6.<\/p>\n

We shall therefore have to discriminate between, and to study, two classes of person: physical or natural persons, for which we find no distinctive denomination in
\nRoman jurisprudence\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6; that is to say, the man-person; and abstract persons, which are fictitious and which have no existence except in law; that is to say, those
\nwhich are purely legal conceptions or creations.<\/p>\n

In another sense, very frequently employed, the word \u00e2\u20ac\u02dcperson\u00e2\u20ac\u2122 designates each character man is called upon to play on the judicial stage; that is to say, each
\nquality which gives him certain rights or certain obligations\u00e2\u20ac\u201dfor instance, the person of father; of son as subject to his father; of husband or guardian. In this sense
\nthe same man can have several personae at the same time. (Emphasis added.)<\/p>\n

The Internal Revenue Code is Roman or civil law, together with its sibling, maritime or admiralty law. Thus, as I discuss below, the Supreme Court clearly states
\nthat all income taxes are on corporations, as set forth in the Corporation Tax Act of 1909, not on people. That is why all 48 titles always speak of persons, never
\npeople, human beings, or men or women; a fiction can only deal with a fiction.<\/p>\n

This was made clear even before the Constitution, in The Federalist Papers, No. 15:<\/p>\n

Except as to the rule of apportionment, the United States have an indefinite discretion to make requisitions for men and money; but they have no authority to raise
\neither by regulations extending to the individual citizens of America. (Emphasis added.)<\/p>\n

Let me put a little flesh on these bones. The Supreme Court stated in Edwards v. Cuba RR Co., 268 US 628 that:<\/p>\n

\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6the meaning of \u00e2\u20ac\u02dcincome\u00e2\u20ac\u2122 as used in the Corporation Excise Tax Law of 1909 is not to be distinguished from the meaning of the same word as used in the Income
\nTax Law of 1913 and the Revenue Act of 1916. Merchants\u00e2\u20ac\u2122 Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka 255 US 509. (Emphasis added.)<\/p>\n

However, as pointed out by Kenneth Weiland, it is of interest to note, also, a Federal Claims Court case, Maryland Casualty Co. v. U.S.:<\/p>\n

By the act of August 5, 1909, a special excise tax was imposed upon the privilege of carrying on business by corporations. It was in reality a license to carry on
\nbusiness\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6.The Income Tax Act of October 3, 1913, should be considered as a statutory construction of the act of August 5, 1909, in so far as it related to the basis
\nof taxation. (December Term, 1916-17 [52 C. Cls.] Emphasis added. This will take on further meaning toward the end of this paper.)<\/p>\n

Be it noted that in the California Penal Code \u00e2\u20ac\u02dcperson\u00e2\u20ac\u2122 is clearly distinguished from \u00e2\u20ac\u02dcCitizen.\u00e2\u20ac\u2122 Penal Code \u00c2\u00a7 228 states: “Any citizen of this state who shall fight a
\nduel\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6” While at \u00c2\u00a7 232 it states: “Any person of this state who fights a duel\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6” (Emphasis added.)<\/p>\n

“In common usage, the term \u00e2\u20ac\u02dcperson<\/span>\u00e2\u20ac\u2122 does not include the sovereign<\/span>\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6[and] statutes employing the [word] are ordinarily construed to exclude it.” Wilson v. Omaha
\nIndian Tribe, 442 U.S. 653, 667 (1979), quoting United States v. Cooper Corp. 312 U.S. 600, 604 (1941).<\/p>\n

\u00e2\u20ac\u02dcIndividual<\/span>\u00e2\u20ac\u2122<\/p>\n

The term of art \u00e2\u20ac\u02dcindividual\u00e2\u20ac\u2122 is also frequently employed in the codes. Which is even more sneaky, because most people believe this word to be, for all intents and
\npurposes, synonymous with \u00e2\u20ac\u02dca human being\u00e2\u20ac\u2122\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6what the law refers to as a \u00e2\u20ac\u02dcnatural person.\u00e2\u20ac\u2122 Roman law hardly referred to such a physical being, except the rare
\nusage of singularis persona\u00e2\u20ac\u201dwhich, however, still employs \u00e2\u20ac\u02dcpersona,\u00e2\u20ac\u2122 thereby preserving a juridical nexus, inapplicable to a sentient man (homo). An abstract,
\nfictitious \u00e2\u20ac\u02dcperson\u00e2\u20ac\u2122 is needed. Recall Judge Bork, on page 11, above, saying that 90% of those in prison were there because they consented to the process? You
\nconsent when you agree to be subject to a statute dealing with persons\u00e2\u20ac\u201dwhich we have seen to be fictional corporate constructs or entities. The code\u00e2\u20ac\u201dany of the
\n48 titles\u00e2\u20ac\u201donly applies to a human being at the point s\/he agrees to take on the character, status, persona of an artificial juristic persona. Always remember that
\nwhen the code says “\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6any person,” it means “any person in the jurisdiction of this code.” One obligates oneself to the civil code by an act of assumpsit\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6i.e.,
\nvolunteering to be that \u00e2\u20ac\u02dcperson.\u00e2\u20ac\u2122 (Assumpsit: “A promise or engagement by which one person assumes or undertakes to do some act or pay something to another.”
\nBlack\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s Law Dictionary, 6th edition. Recall the Chisholm case, above.) You will never see in any code, State or federal, the word \u00e2\u20ac\u02dcman\u00e2\u20ac\u2122 or \u00e2\u20ac\u02dcwoman\u00e2\u20ac\u2122\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6or \u00e2\u20ac\u02dcpeople\u00e2\u20ac\u2122\u00e2\u20ac\u201dat
\nleast I don\u00e2\u20ac\u2122t recall having done so\u00e2\u20ac\u201donly the juristic, statutory \u00e2\u20ac\u02dcperson.\u00e2\u20ac\u2122<\/p>\n

People are understandably confused about on what I believe to be the correct signification of a particular class of persons, namely, a \u00e2\u20ac\u02dcnatural person.\u00e2\u20ac\u2122 It is almost
\nalways used loosely to refer to the physical, sentient human being. Indeed, in statutory law this is the term of choice for a living man\u00e2\u20ac\u201dbut always in a qualified
\nsense. At 26 CFR 1.6049-4(f) Definitions we read:<\/p>\n

The term natural person means any individual, but shall not include a partnership (whether or not composed entirely of individuals), a trust, or an estate.
\n(Emphasis added.)<\/p>\n

Notice carefully how they see it as both possible and necessary to qualify \u00e2\u20ac\u02dcindividual.\u00e2\u20ac\u2122 If this term stood for a living man, it would be pointless and ridiculous to say
\nthat it could not be a trust or an estate! They wouldn\u00e2\u20ac\u2122t say that a man shall not include an estate.<\/p>\n

So then, we see that \u00e2\u20ac\u02dcperson,\u00e2\u20ac\u2122 \u00e2\u20ac\u02dcnatural person,\u00e2\u20ac\u2122 and \u00e2\u20ac\u02dcindividual\u00e2\u20ac\u2122 are all fictitious legal creations. And, if you acquiesce to being any of them, in a legal setting, you
\nthereby agree that the code addresses and applies to you.<\/p>\n

This is why some have an aversion to referring to their appearance in court as being \u00e2\u20ac\u02dcin propria persona\u00e2\u20ac\u2122\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6which some do to avoid pleading pro se, \u00e2\u20ac\u02dcfor oneself,\u00e2\u20ac\u2122
\nwhen appearing without an attorney. They don\u00e2\u20ac\u2122t want to represent themselves, but be themselves. And, since \u00e2\u20ac\u02dcin propria persona\u00e2\u20ac\u2122 means \u00e2\u20ac\u02dcin one\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s own proper
\nperson,\u00e2\u20ac\u2122 it would seem to overcome this objection. Be this as it may\u00e2\u20ac\u201dand I am aware of many arguments pro and con\u00e2\u20ac\u201dthe court still refers to your appearance as
\nbeing pro se. Personally, if I found myself in that situation, I would appear in rerum natura, \u00e2\u20ac\u02dcin the realm of actuality; in existence,\u00e2\u20ac\u2122 (Black\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s Law Dictionary, 6th
\nedition) the opposite of being a fictitious person.<\/p>\n

We should look, too, at the very first term in the general definition chapter for the entire IRC: Section 7701(a)(1)\u00e2\u20ac\u201dand well they should begin there, for all
\nstatutory law rests on the foundation of this juristic fabrication.<\/p>\n

Person. The term \u00e2\u20ac\u02dcperson\u00e2\u20ac\u2122 shall be construed to mean and include an individual, a trust, estate, partnership, association, company, or corporation.<\/p>\n

Therefore, since we now know that, in law, \u00e2\u20ac\u02dcperson\u00e2\u20ac\u2122 can not be anything but a fictitious juridical creation, it follows ineluctably that if \u00e2\u20ac\u02dcindividual\u00e2\u20ac\u2122 is said to mean the
\nexact same thing, then it must also refer to the same type of unnatural and artificial entity as \u00e2\u20ac\u02dcperson.\u00e2\u20ac\u2122<\/p>\n

This is pretty well nailed down by a couple of cites from the CFR. At 5 CFR 582.101(4) we read:<\/p>\n

Persons may include an individual, partnership, corporation, association, joint venture, private organization or other legal entity, and includes the plural of that
\nterm; person may include any of the entities that may issue legal process as set forth in\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6 (Emphasis added.)<\/p>\n

In 7 CFR 400.303(m) we find:<\/p>\n

Person means an individual, partnership, association, corporation, estate, trust, or other legal entity, and whenever applicable, a State or a political subdivision, or
\nagency of a State. (Emphasis added.)<\/p>\n

Here it is in the regulations, an individual is a \u00e2\u20ac\u02dclegal entity,\u00e2\u20ac\u2122 not a (wo)man, a sentient human being.<\/p>\n

So, it makes perfect sense that 5 USC 552a(a)(2) should hold that “the term \u00e2\u20ac\u02dcindividual\u00e2\u20ac\u2122 means a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for
\npermanent residence; (3)\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6” (Emphasis added.) For a \u00e2\u20ac\u02dccitizen\u00e2\u20ac\u2122 is certainly a juristic \u00e2\u20ac\u02dcperson.\u00e2\u20ac\u2122<\/p>\n

A discussion of \u00e2\u20ac\u02dcperson,\u00e2\u20ac\u2122 however, would not be complete without reference to 26 USC 7343 Definition of term “person.” This is at the very end of Chapter 75
\nCrimes, Other Offenses and Forfeitures, which includes such goodies as \u00c2\u00a7 7203 Willful failure to file return, supply information, or pay tax, which begins: “Any
\nperson required under this title to pay\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6” (Emphasis added.)<\/p>\n

Section 7343 reads in its entirety:<\/p>\n

The term \u00e2\u20ac\u02dcperson\u00e2\u20ac\u2122 as used in this chapter includes [is restricted to] an officer or employee of a corporation [such as the U.S. or some company incorporated in the
\nfederal zone], or a member or employee of a partnership, who as such officer, employee, or member is under a duty to perform the act in respect to which the
\nviolation occurs.<\/p>\n

For starters, Section 7203 is a penalty section and makes no attempt to establish any liability. Plus, the implementing regulations are in Title 27 BATF\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6meaning that
\nit is exclusively for their use, with excise taxes! It has nothing to do with the IRS. Leaving all that aside, do you believe that you could be charged as being the
\nperson described above? Do you work for the federal government or a domestic (U.S., not State) corporation?<\/p>\n

Put up Omaha City Municipal Code.<\/p>\n

Nebraska Statutes.
\n<\/span>>>>
\nLegal Words and Consequences<\/p>\n

by<\/p>\n

Richard McDonald<\/p>\n

This is \u00c2\u00a0a newsletter \u00c2\u00a0that may \u00c2\u00a0be dangerous \u00c2\u00a0to your \u00c2\u00a0well \u00c2\u00a0being, as \u00c2\u00a0it contains \u00c2\u00a0some truth \u00c2\u00a0that \u00c2\u00a0you \u00c2\u00a0were \u00c2\u00a0or \u00c2\u00a0are \u00c2\u00a0not supposed to know or understand.<\/p>\n

To begin \u00c2\u00a0with, I \u00c2\u00a0must tell \u00c2\u00a0you that all words used in any type of \u00c2\u00a0law have \u00c2\u00a0a specific \u00c2\u00a0meaning attached \u00c2\u00a0as it relates to that specific \u00c2\u00a0law. \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0They do \u00c2\u00a0not \u00c2\u00a0mean \u00c2\u00a0
\nthe \u00c2\u00a0standard \u00c2\u00a0everyday dictionary \u00c2\u00a0meaning \u00c2\u00a0at \u00c2\u00a0all \u00c2\u00a0times, \u00c2\u00a0as \u00c2\u00a0you \u00c2\u00a0are \u00c2\u00a0mislead \u00c2\u00a0into thinking.<\/p>\n

First, you \u00c2\u00a0must understand \u00c2\u00a0that \u00c2\u00a0this \u00c2\u00a0is \u00c2\u00a0an \u00c2\u00a0educational forum, and \u00c2\u00a0I will give you the meanings that are utilized by the various governmental \u00c2\u00a0agencies, to
\ndeprive you of your rights and property.<\/p>\n

The word \u00c2\u00a0“person” as \u00c2\u00a0it is \u00c2\u00a0used in \u00c2\u00a0most of \u00c2\u00a0the statutes refers to \u00c2\u00a0the same \u00c2\u00a0person as \u00c2\u00a0defined \u00c2\u00a0in \u00c2\u00a0the \u00c2\u00a0so-called \u00c2\u00a014th Amendment. \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0It does \u00c2\u00a0not include \u00c2\u00a0
\neveryone, as \u00c2\u00a0you are \u00c2\u00a0led \u00c2\u00a0to believe. \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0There are \u00c2\u00a0several court cases that define who is that specific “person,” \u00c2\u00a0and one \u00c2\u00a0of those \u00c2\u00a0cases is Van Valkenburg v.
\nBrown, 43 Cal. 43.<\/p>\n

Next the \u00c2\u00a0term \u00c2\u00a0“United \u00c2\u00a0States” \u00c2\u00a0has \u00c2\u00a0three \u00c2\u00a0(3) \u00c2\u00a0different distinct, and \u00c2\u00a0separate jurisdictional \u00c2\u00a0meanings. \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0This has been stated in \u00c2\u00a0Hooven & \u00c2\u00a0Allison Co. \u00c2\u00a0v. Evatt,
\n324 U. S. 652. \u00c2\u00a0There the court stated:<\/p>\n

The term \u00c2\u00a0“United States” \u00c2\u00a0may be used in any one of several senses. \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0It may \u00c2\u00a0be merely the name of a sovereign occupying the position analogous \u00c2\u00a0to that \u00c2\u00a0of
\nother sovereigns in the family of nations. \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0It \u00c2\u00a0may \u00c2\u00a0designate \u00c2\u00a0the \u00c2\u00a0territory \u00c2\u00a0over \u00c2\u00a0which \u00c2\u00a0the sovereignty of \u00c2\u00a0the United \u00c2\u00a0States extends, \u00c2\u00a0or \u00c2\u00a0it \u00c2\u00a0may \u00c2\u00a0be \u00c2\u00a0the
\ncollective name \u00c2\u00a0of the \u00c2\u00a0States which are united by and under the Constitution.<\/p>\n

Each \u00c2\u00a0of \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0these \u00c2\u00a0definitions \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0have \u00c2\u00a0completely \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0different jurisdictions and \u00c2\u00a0cannot be \u00c2\u00a0mixed. \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0Do you \u00c2\u00a0know which \u00c2\u00a0of the meanings are \u00c2\u00a0being utilized when they
\nsay “United States”? \u00c2\u00a0When in doubt, \u00c2\u00a0ASK! \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0This always brings some type of answer, and you will at \u00c2\u00a0least know \u00c2\u00a0for yourself what they are doing to you with your
\npermission.<\/p>\n

There are \u00c2\u00a0several groups \u00c2\u00a0that are claiming federal rights, that originate in the 1866 Federal Civil Rights Statute, 14 Stat. 27. \u00c2\u00a0They should read and understand
\nthe law before claiming such statutory rights and privileges. \u00c2\u00a0They might be surprised to find out what they are stating and claiming.<\/p>\n

The law states the United States is a foreign corporation in relation to \u00c2\u00a0one of \u00c2\u00a0the several \u00c2\u00a0States. \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0Remember, \u00c2\u00a0that \u00c2\u00a0the District of \u00c2\u00a0Columbia is \u00c2\u00a0not one \u00c2\u00a0of the \u00c2\u00a0
\nStates of the Union of several States, but is a foreign nation (corporation). \u00c2\u00a0See 20 C. J. S. \u00c2\u00a0sec. 1785, \u00c2\u00a0p. 11. \u00c2\u00a0So under these facts of law the “U. S. citizens” of the
\nDistrict of Columbia are only alien residents in any one \u00c2\u00a0of the \u00c2\u00a0several States. \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0So, \u00c2\u00a0if all state agencies are operating under the purview of the municipal laws of
\nthe District of Columbia, have they registered with this State’s Department of State as \u00c2\u00a0an agency \u00c2\u00a0of a \u00c2\u00a0foreign power \u00c2\u00a0doing business \u00c2\u00a0in this State?<\/p>\n

The original \u00c2\u00a0Political Code \u00c2\u00a0of 1872, \u00c2\u00a0states that \u00c2\u00a0you are either a Citizen of this State, a Citizen of another State, or an alien. \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0So, if \u00c2\u00a0you do \u00c2\u00a0not possess \u00c2\u00a0Primary
\nand Paramount State Citizenship, then \u00c2\u00a0you must be a resident alien, who can and must be controlled \u00c2\u00a0at all \u00c2\u00a0times when, \u00c2\u00a0where, how, \u00c2\u00a0and \u00c2\u00a0why \u00c2\u00a0to \u00c2\u00a0do anything
\naffecting the public (Citizens of the State).<\/p>\n

I am a Citizen of this State first, then as a consequence, I am a \u00c2\u00a0Citizen of \u00c2\u00a0the United States of America, as defined in the Original Constitution \u00c2\u00a0for the \u00c2\u00a0United
\nStates \u00c2\u00a0of America (1787), and have \u00c2\u00a0full, complete \u00c2\u00a0and unencumbered \u00c2\u00a0access to \u00c2\u00a0all of the Bill of \u00c2\u00a0Rights (1791), \u00c2\u00a0Amendments 1 \u00c2\u00a0through 10. \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0The \u00c2\u00a0U. \u00c2\u00a0S.
\nSupreme Court \u00c2\u00a0has stated that since 1969, Amendments 1 through 8 have limited application to the States through the 14th Amendment for the \u00c2\u00a0U. S. citizens. \u00c2\u00a0
\nThey as citizens of a non-state (notice a difference \u00c2\u00a0of status \u00c2\u00a0between the \u00c2\u00a0State and \u00c2\u00a0the District \u00c2\u00a0of Columbia) have \u00c2\u00a0no access \u00c2\u00a0to the \u00c2\u00a09th and 10th
\nAmendments. \u00c2\u00a0As a Citizen of \u00c2\u00a0a State, \u00c2\u00a0I have \u00c2\u00a0all the \u00c2\u00a0powers not \u00c2\u00a0given \u00c2\u00a0to \u00c2\u00a0the governments. \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0I am a sovereign and as the courts have stated the Constitutions
\nare \u00c2\u00a0a limitation upon the government as it relates to the \u00c2\u00a0Citizen of \u00c2\u00a0the State. \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0But \u00c2\u00a0this is not so if you are a citizen of \u00c2\u00a0the District \u00c2\u00a0of Columbia. \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0SO, just what
\nare you??? \u00c2\u00a0If you \u00c2\u00a0are a \u00c2\u00a0slave on \u00c2\u00a0the \u00c2\u00a0Federal \u00c2\u00a0plantation \u00c2\u00a0known \u00c2\u00a0as \u00c2\u00a0the District of Columbia, then act like one. \u00c2\u00a0If you are a Citizen of this State \u00c2\u00a0then act \u00c2\u00a0like
\nthe sovereign you are by heritage and Birthright. \u00c2\u00a0Read and understand the laws that apply to you. \u00c2\u00a0You must always \u00c2\u00a0obey these \u00c2\u00a0laws under \u00c2\u00a0all circumstances. \u00c2\u00a0I
\ndo not obey the laws of Japan, Germany, England or the municipal laws of the District of Columbia for the very simple reason that I am not one of their citizens.<\/p>\n

So read the law, understand it and ask questions if in doubt of your status.
\n<\/span>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
\nejusdem generis <\/span><\/span><\/strong>\u00c2\u00a0(ee-jos-dem jen-o-ris also eejoos- or ee-yoos-). [Latin \u00e2\u20ac\u0153of the same kind or class\u00e2\u20ac\u009d]
\nA canon of construction that when a general word or phrase follows a list of specific persons or things, the general word or phrase will be interpreted to include only
\npersons or things of the same type as those listed.
\n<\/span>! For example, in the phrase horses, cattle, sheep, pigs, goats, or any other barnyard animal, the general language or any other barnyard animal \u00e2\u20ac\u201d despite its
\nseeming breadth \u00e2\u20ac\u201d would probably be held to include only four-legged, hoofed mammals (and thus would exclude chickens).<\/p>\n

\u00e2\u20ac\u201d Also spelled eiusdem generis. \u00e2\u20ac\u201dAlso termed ejusdem generis rule; Lord Ten terden\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s rule. Cf. EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSIO ALTERIUS; NOSCITUR A
\nSOUIS; \u00c2\u00a0RULE OF RANK.<\/p>\n

ejusdem \u00c2\u00a0generis rule-Doctrine off-<\/p>\n

Lord Ten \u00c2\u00a0terden\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s rule-<\/p>\n

EXPRESSIO \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0UNIUS \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0EST \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0EXCLUSIO \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0ALTERIUS;<\/p>\n

NOSCITUR A SOUIS;
\n>><\/p>\n

Person: \u00c2\u00a0The word “person<\/span>” shall include and be applied to: \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0<This is from the OMAHA MUNICIPAL CODE, Definition of “PERSON”.
\n<\/span>a firm,(A legal entity.)
\npartnership, (A legal entity.)
\nassociation, (A legal entity.)
\ncorporation, (A legal entity.)
\norganization, (A legal entity.)
\nclub, society, (A legal entity.)
\ngroup acting as a unit, (A legal entity.)
\npolitical subdivision, (A legal entity.)
\nor body politic, (A legal entity.)
\nand corporate, (A legal entity.)
\nas well as to an individual<\/span><\/span>. \u00c2\u00a0(Therefore<\/span><\/span><\/strong> must also mean legal entity.)<\/p>\n

Ejusdem generis
\n<\/span><\/span><\/strong>[Latin: Of the same kind or nature] A rule of statutory interpretation that where particular words are followed by general words, the general words are limited to
\nthe same kind as the particular worlds.
\nThus where the Sunday Observance Act 1677 provided that “no tradesman, artificer, workman, labourer or other person whatsoever shall do or exercise any
\nworldly labour business or work of their ordinary callings upon the Lord’s Day…” the words “or other persons whatsoever” were to be construed ejusdem generis
\nwith those words which proceeded them so that an estate agent was not within the exception (Gregorry v Fearn [1953])
\n>><\/p>\n

\/w\/index.php?title=Statutory_interpretation&action=edit&section=4Internal and external consistency
\nIt is presumed that a statute will be interpreted so as to be internally consistent. A particular section of the statute shall not be divorced from the rest of the act.
\nThe ejusdem generis rule applies to resolve the problem of giving meaning to groups of words where one of the words is ambiguous or inherently unclear.
\n>> \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0
\nEjusdem generis (Of the same kinds, class, or nature)<\/p>\n

When a list of two or more specific descriptors are followed by more general descriptors, the otherwise wide meaning of the general descriptors must be restricted
\nto the same class, if any, of the specific words that precede them
\ne.g where –cars,motor bikes,motor powered, vehicles– are mentioned there the ‘vehicles’ would be interpreted in a limited sense( therefore vehicles cannot be
\ninterpreted as including air planes)
\n>>><\/p>\n

Expressio unius est exclusio alterius (The express mention of one thing excludes all others)<\/p>\n

Items not on the list are assumed not to be covered by the statute. However, sometimes a list in a statute is illustrative, not exclusionary. This is usually indicated
\nby a word such as “includes.”
\n>>><\/p>\n

In pari materia (Upon the same matter or subject)<\/p>\n

When a statute is ambiguous, its meaning may be determined in light of other statutes on the same subject matter.
\n>>><\/p>\n

Noscitur a sociis (A word is known by the company it keeps)<\/p>\n

When a word is ambiguous, its meaning may be determined by reference to the rest of the statute.
\n>>><\/p>\n

Rule of Lenity \u00c2\u00a0
\nIn construing an ambiguous criminal statute, the court should resolve the ambiguity in favor of the defendant. See McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987);
\nSee, e.g., Muscarello v. U.S., 524 U.S. 125 (1998) (declining to apply the rule of lenity); Evans v. U.S., 504 U.S. 255 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Scarborough
\nv. U.S., 431 U.S. 563 (1977) (Stewart, J., dissenting); See United States v. Santos (2008).
\n>>><\/p>\n

Avoidance of abrogation of state sovereignty<\/p>\n

See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991); [prerogative as citizens of a sovereign State to do so]<\/p>\n

see also Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006).
\n>>><\/p>\n

Avoidance Canon (Canon of Constitutional Avoidance)<\/p>\n

If a statute is susceptible to more than one reasonable construction, courts should choose an interpretation that avoids raising constitutional problems. In the US,
\nthis canon has grown stronger in recent history. The traditional avoidance canon required the court to choose a different interpretation only when one interpretation
\nwas actually unconstitutional. The modern avoidance canon tells the court to choose a different interpretation when another interpretation merely raises
\nconstitutional doubts.
\n>>><\/p>\n

Clear Statement Rule<\/p>\n

When a statute may be interpreted to abridge long-held rights of individuals or states, or make a large policy change, courts will not interpret the statute to make
\nthe change unless the legislature clearly stated it. This rule is based on the assumption that the legislature would not make major changes in a vague or unclear
\nway.
\n>>>
\nUnder the rule of ejusdem generis, “[g]eneral words are construed to be restricted in their meaning by preceding particular words.” Minn. Stat. \u00c2\u00a7 645.08(3) (1996)
\n>>>
\nThe rule of ejusdem generis, an aid to statutory construction problems, suggests that where general words follow a specific enumeration of persons or things, the
\ngeneral words should be limited to persons or things similar to those specifically enumerated. The rule of ejusdem generis is no more than an aid to construction
\nand comes into play only when there is some uncertainty as to the meaning of a particular clause in a statute. UNITED STATES v. TURKETTE
\nNo. 80-808
\nSUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
\n452 U.S. 576; 101 S. Ct. 2524; 1981 U.S. LEXIS 32; 69 L. Ed. 2d 246; 49 U.S.L.W. 4743
\n>>>
\nFirst, it relied in part on the rule of ejusdem generis, an aid to statutory construction problems suggesting that where general words follow a specific enumeration of
\npersons or things, the general words should be limited to persons or things similar to those specifically enumerated. See 2A C. Sands, Sutherland on Statutory
\nConstruction \u00c2\u00a7 47.17 [**2528] (4th ed. 1973).
\n>>><\/p>\n

EJUSDEM GENERIS \u00e2\u20ac\u201c Of the same kind, class, or nature.
\nIn statutory construction, the “ejusdem generis rule” is that where general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and specific
\nmeaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same general kind or
\nclass as those specifically mentioned.
\nBlack’s Law Dictionary, 2nd Edition, pages 415.
\n>>><\/p>\n

STATES that WHAT the DEFINITIONS actually “include” is LIMITED to those things which are in the SAME GENERAL CLASS as the ENUMERATED items.
\n>>>
\n\u00e2\u20ac\u0153The constructional problem is resolved by the second principle Alloyd overlooks, which is that a word is known by the company it keeps (the doctrine of noscitur a
\nsociis).
\n>>><\/p>\n

RULE OF RANK.<\/p>\n

>>
\nEJUSDEM GENERIS. Of the same kind.
\n2. In the construction of laws, wills and other instruments, when certain things are enumerated, and then a phrase is used which might be construed to include
\nother things, it is generally confined to things ejusdem generas; as, where an act (9 Ann. C. 20) provided that a writ of quo warranto might issue against persons
\nwho should usurp “the offices of mayors, bailiffs, port reeves, and other offices, within the cities, towns, corporate boroughs, and places, within Great Britain,” &c.;
\nit was held that “other offices” meant offices ejusdem generis; and that the word “places” signified places of the same kind; that is, that the offices must be
\ncorporate offices, and the places must be corporate Places. 5 T. R. 375,379; 5 B . & C. 640; 8 D. & Ry. 393; 1 B. & C. 237.
\n3. So, in the construction of wills, when certain articles are enumerated, the terra goods is to be restricted to those ejusdem generis. Bac. Ab. Legacies, B; 3 Rand.
\n191; 3 Atk. 61; Abr. Eq. 201; 2 Atk. 113.
\nBOUVIER\u00e2\u20ac\u009dS LAW DICTIONARY 1856 Edition<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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