{"id":162,"date":"2010-12-24T04:14:12","date_gmt":"2010-12-24T04:14:12","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.pauljjhansen.com\/?p=162"},"modified":"2011-01-07T23:29:08","modified_gmt":"2011-01-07T23:29:08","slug":"360-jail-sentence-appeal-brief-60-pages","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"http:\/\/www.pauljjhansen.com\/?p=162","title":{"rendered":"360 Jail Sentence, Appeal Brief, 60 pages"},"content":{"rendered":"

360 Day Jail Sentence Appeal to Nebraska Appeal Court, Brief, Composed by Paul John: Hansen.\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 (Word Document, parts are scrambled in transfer.)<\/p>\n

NO. A-10-000983\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 (due\u00c2\u00a0 1-12-10) Gray<\/span><\/p>\n

IN THE NEBRASKA COURT OF APPEALS<\/p>\n

STATE OF NEBRASKA<\/p>\n

Plaintiff, Appellee<\/p>\n

vs.<\/p>\n

Paul John:Hansen, a Free Inhabitant <\/strong><\/p>\n

Defendant, Appellant.<\/p>\n

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF DOUGLAS COUNTY, NEBRASKA<\/p>\n

(County CR 09-11581, McDermott)<\/p>\n

Doc 181\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 No. 996\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 Judge, Hartigan<\/p>\n

(Amended)\u00c2\u00a0 BRIEF OF APPELLANT<\/p>\n

Prepared and Submitted by:<\/p>\n

_______________________<\/p>\n

C\/O\u00c2\u00a0 Paul John:Hansen, a free inhabitant<\/p>\n

5311 Navajo Street<\/p>\n

Council Bluffs, Iowa<\/p>\n

402-957-2853<\/p>\n

pauljjhansen@hotmail.com<\/p>\n

TABLE OF CONTENTS<\/span><\/p>\n

Page<\/p>\n

Statement of the Basis of Jurisdiction upon the Appeals Court\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6…\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a62-3<\/p>\n

Statement of the Case, Issues before the Court, Scope \u00e2\u20ac\u00a6(R-p20)\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6…\u00e2\u20ac\u00a64-5<\/p>\n

Assignments \/ Statement of Error, \u00c2\u00a7 2-109(D)(1)(e)\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a65-7<\/p>\n

Proposition of law\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6……………….\u00e2\u20ac\u00a68-12<\/p>\n

Statement of the Facts \u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6…\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6……………….12-15<\/p>\n

Brief\/Arguments associated with errors \u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6..\u00e2\u20ac\u00a615-48<\/p>\n

Summary of the Argument.. \u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a648-50<\/p>\n

Certificate of Service\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6.50<\/p>\n

Statement of the basis of jurisdiction of the <\/span><\/strong>Appeals Court<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Judgment rendered by Douglas County District Court, affirming, on the date of September 8, 2010 of the Douglas County Court Order with Poverty Affidavit.<\/p>\n

Appealed filed by Paul John on October 5, 2010 in forma pauperis.\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 Pauperis Order issued October 28, 2009 (T 5).\u00c2\u00a0 Appeal authorized by the Constitution of the State of Nebraska, Article I, Section 23, Neb. Rev. Stat<\/span>. \u00c2\u00a7 25-1912 (Reissue 2008), and Neb. Rev. Stat<\/span>. \u00c2\u00a7 29-230 1 (Reissue 2008).\u00c2\u00a0 Also of common law as right to all \u00e2\u20ac\u02dcfree inhabitants\u00e2\u20ac\u2122<\/span> as found in Article IV in the Articles of Confederation of November 15, 1777.\u00c2\u00a0 -Nebraska Revised Statute Section 25-1911,\u00c2\u00a0 Appellate jurisdiction; scope.\u00c2\u00a0 \u00e2\u20ac\u0153A judgment rendered or final order made by the district court may be reversed, vacated, or modified for errors appearing on the record.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d Source:Laws 1991, LB 732, \u00c2\u00a7 51, \u00c2\u00a0\u00e2\u20ac\u0153When a defendant appeals a conviction and sentence under a municipal ordinance, claiming insufficiency of the evidence<\/span>\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6, an appellate court’s consideration of the assignments of error requires examination of the specific ordinance involved,\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6. that the evidence sustains the findings of the trial court, \u00e2\u20ac\u00a6.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d Frederick C., 594 N.W.2d 294<\/a> Neb.App.,1999.\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 \u00e2\u20ac\u0153The party invoking jurisdiction bears the burden of proof that all prerequisites to jurisdiction are satisfied.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d Hatridge v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 415 F.2d 809, 814 (8th Cir. 1969).<\/p>\n

Annotations<\/span><\/strong>:
\n1. Scope:\u00c2\u00a0 -\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 \u00e2\u20ac\u0153The Supreme Court reviews determinations made in the district courts only where there is a judgment rendered or final order made by the district court.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d\u00c2\u00a0 Lewis v. Craig, 236 Neb. 602, 463 N.W.2d 318 (1990).\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 -\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 Judgment may be reversed “for errors appearing on record.” Frey v. Drahos, 7 Neb. 194 (1878); Morrill v. Taylor, 6 Neb. 236 (1877).2. Appeal proper\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 -\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 \u00e2\u20ac\u0153Judgment should be reversed where clearly wrong on sole issue of fact involved.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 In re Estate of O’Connor, 105 Neb. 88, 179 N.W. 401 (1920).\u00c2\u00a0 \u00e2\u20ac\u0153In reviewing a criminal conviction,\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6 and a conviction will be affirmed, in the absence<\/span><\/strong> of prejudicial error<\/span><\/strong>, if<\/span><\/strong> the properly admitted evidence,\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6 is sufficient to support the conviction<\/span><\/strong>.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 STATE of Nebraska, v. William J. HILL, 254 Neb. 460, 577 N.W.2d 259, 1998.<\/p>\n

STANDARD<\/span> OF<\/span> REVIEW<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

<\/strong>When dispositive issues on appeal present questions of law, an appellate court has an obligation to reach an independent conclusion inspective of the decision of the court below. State <\/em>\u00e2\u20ac\u02dci. Smith, <\/em>267 Neb. 917, 920, 678 N.W.2d 733, 735-36 <\/em>(2004).\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 When reviewing a criminal conviction on appeal, it is not the duty of the appellate court reviewing the defendant\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s conviction to resolve conflicts in the evidence, pass on the credibility of the witnesses, or reweigh the evidence. State v. Curlile, <\/em>11 Neb. App. 52, 55, <\/em>642 N.W.2d 517, 520 (2002). Such matters are for the finder of fact, and the defendant\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s conviction must be affirmed if the properly admitted evidence, viewed and construed most favorably to the State, is sufficient to support the conviction. Id.<\/em> <\/em>The findings of the court have the effect of a jury verdict and cannot be disturbed by an appellate court unless they are clearly wrong. Id.<\/em><\/p>\n

Statement of the Case & Issues before the Court<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

NOTICE-Hereinafter Paul<\/span><\/strong> shall mean captioned Appellant.\u00c2\u00a0 -The term Defendant,<\/span><\/strong> Appellant<\/span><\/strong>, Paul<\/span><\/strong>, shall not be construed to mean a statutory entity, but Paul<\/span><\/strong> as a man of lawful standing of right with all rights and liberties preserved, not a corporate sole, an free inhabitant.\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 –Court<\/span><\/strong> shall mean County Court and the Affirming District Court.\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 -The term property<\/span><\/strong> shall mean Paul\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s private Land as associated with this case, Land not owned by the United States of America.\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 1. The appeal is a Law<\/span><\/strong> argument in nature. \u00e2\u20ac\u02dcDue process\u00e2\u20ac\u2122, violations based on Paul\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s standing as to the courts personal jurisdiction.\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 2. Issue<\/span> <\/strong>before the Court:\u00c2\u00a0 \u00e2\u20ac\u02dcCity of Omaha Planning Department\u00e2\u20ac\u2122 gave citations to Paul for the following: \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a01, \u00e2\u20ac\u0153unsafe structure, 48-71 (a)\u00e2\u20ac\u009d (T:9, 18) guilty.\u00c2\u00a0 12. \u00e2\u20ac\u0153failure to comply with notice, 48-53\u00e2\u20ac\u009d (T,7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20) guilty. \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a01. \u00e2\u20ac\u0153Obstructing Administrative Law, 20-21\u00e2\u20ac\u009d (T, 21, 23) guilty.\u00c2\u00a0 1. \u00e2\u20ac\u0153False Information, 20-26\u00e2\u20ac\u009d (T, 22) guilty.\u00c2\u00a0 1. \u00e2\u20ac\u0153Resisting Arrest, 20-22\u00e2\u20ac\u009d (T, 24) guilty.\u00c2\u00a0 1. \u00e2\u20ac\u0153imminent danger, 48-81\u00e2\u20ac\u009d (T,6)\u00c2\u00a0 to wit found guilty.<\/p>\n

Issue in Dispute<\/span><\/strong>:<\/p>\n

a. If Paul is a type of entity as found in each individual charging statute.\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 b. If Paul received constitutional notice as to his duty to perform each individual charging statute.\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 c. If Appellee had a duty to serve a constitutional notice<\/span><\/strong> upon Paul before demanding a duty from him, thus no notice equates to no transgression.\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 d. If the record<\/span><\/strong> shows evidence from the Appellee, of personal jurisdiction as challenged by Paul. And if no personal jurisdiction of the County Court was produced at the minimum this would have opened an opportunity for Paul to access a trial by jury as in common law as a right per-Articles of Confederation of November 15, 1777.<\/p>\n

d1. If Appellee produced evidence of a promulgation rule<\/span><\/strong>\/process that gives evidence that Paul and Paul\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s private property has been included, by a competent authority, to give each charged statute force and effect of law upon Paul and\/or His land.\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 e. If Paul\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s demand for a trial by jury was one of right<\/span><\/strong> if the Appellee could not prove he was subject to a statutory bench trial.<\/p>\n

g. If Paul was deprived of the above, therefore he was ultimately deprived of his right to an opportunity to a non-statutory \u00e2\u20ac\u02dctrial by jury\u00e2\u20ac\u2122 or if no evidence existed on the record to subjected Paul to corporate\/administrative\/trial and deny Paul\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s right to a jury trial.\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 h. If the Omaha Municipal Code, or any State Code has force and effect of law on territory\u00c2\u00a0 NOT<\/span><\/strong> owned or ceded to the United States of America. \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0SCOPE <\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

1. The scope<\/span><\/strong> of the Appeals Court review:\u00c2\u00a0 To take notice of the constitutional violations and vacate the conviction, or remand as appropriate, and primarily to force the Plaintiff to produce factual, documented, evidence of \u00e2\u20ac\u02dcpersonal jurisdiction\u00e2\u20ac\u2122 and all essential elements of Subject Matter Jurisdiction on the record.\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 2. The Court is asked to find evidence that all information\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s (charging documents) are in fact vague, and do have all the essential elements so as not to violate Paul\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s liberties and rights, nor prejudice Paul from a fair trial and a due process notice.<\/p>\n

Assignment\/ Statements of Errors<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Below are Errors Noticed by Public Defender:<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

I.\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 The County Court abused its discretion when it denied Appellant\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s Request for Discovery<\/span>. The County Court never gave a justification of its denial of Appellant\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s Request for Discovery. The denial of Appellant\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s Request for Discovery unfairly deprived Appellant of his right to a fair trial.\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 II.\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 The County Court erred when it convicted Appellant for Giving False Information<\/span> because Appellant believed the information to be true. Since the crime of Giving False Information requires knowledge of the falsity, the Appellant did not have requisite mental state to support the conviction.\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 III.\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 The County Court erred when it convicted Appellant for Obstruction<\/span> of a Law Enforcement Officer because Appellant\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s acts were not done with the intent to interfere with Officer Collins\u00e2\u20ac\u2122 official duties.\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 IV.\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 The County Court erred in convicting Appellant of Obstruction<\/span> of Law Enforcement because Appellant was not under arrest when he entered the stairwell.\u00c2\u00a0 In order for the act of flight to constitute the crime of Obstruction of a Law Enforcement Officer, there must be a command not to flee. Appellant was not given a command by Officer Hansen, so he was free to leave via the stairwell.\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 V.\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 The County Court erred in convicting Appellant for Resisting<\/span> Arrest because Appellant was not under arrest when he entered the stairwell. In order for the act of flight to constitute Resisting Arrest there must be a command not to flee. Appellant was not given a command by Officer Hansen, so he was free to leave via the stairwell.\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 VI. The County Court\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s sentence of 14 concurrent sentences of 6 months to run consecutively to 4 concurrent sentences of 6 months was excessive<\/span>. The court did not properly take into consideration the Timmens<\/span>\u00e2\u20ac\u2122 factors of the nature of the offense and the amount of violence involved in the commission of the offense. State v. Timmens<\/span>, 263 Neb. 622, 631, 641 N.W.2d 383, 391 (2002). The judge erred when he was influenced by irrelevant information such as Appellant\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s pro se representation and unique trial tactics. State v. Pattno<\/span>, 254 Neb. 733. 579 N.W.2d 503 (1998).<\/p>\n

Below are Additional Errors Noticed by Appelant, Public Defender Refused to List:<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

A. All Charging Statutes are vague<\/span>, therefore unconstitutional as applied;\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 B. All Charging Statutes and Information(s) lack essential elements of specifics to give constitutional notice<\/span>;<\/p>\n

C. Defendant Received no constitutional notice<\/span> from agency;\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 D. Trial Court refused to reveal its jurisdiction<\/span> to deny defendant a type of trial by jury; \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0E. State failed to prove, on the record, subject property was in the jurisdiction<\/span> of the corporate STATE OF NEBRASKA;<\/p>\n

F. State failed to prove, on the record, subject property was in the jurisdiction<\/span> of the corporate CITY OF OMAHA;\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 G. Court failed to confirm that prosecutor was licensed<\/span> by the STATE OF NEBRASKA authorities;\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 H. Court errored to see Defendant had no funds to repair or demo any subject buildings, therefore can not be punished for failure to perform an impossibility<\/span>;<\/p>\n

I. Court errored to see that Nebraska statutes chapter 28 does not include a violation of an Omaha Building Municipal Code as a criminal act<\/span>;\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 J. Court errored in not noticing that no affidavit accompanied the information of a party being damaged <\/span>by the man called Paul John Hansen, as \u00e2\u20ac\u0153not\u00e2\u20ac\u009d a named corporation.\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 \u00c2\u00a0K. Court errored when Defendant motioned for Plaintiff to prove<\/span> up Personal Jurisdiction<\/span><\/strong>, on the record<\/span>, with written findings<\/span> of fact and conclusions of law, to which nothing was placed on the record, nether were findings written into the record.<\/p>\n

L. Court errored to see that the Plaintiff failed to produced sufficient evidence that each individual charge did in fact apply<\/span> (promulgation-subject matter jurisdiction) to the Defendant as a private man, His Land, and not a statutory person\/entity only.\u00c2\u00a0 (Essentially acknowledging a difference of Public statutes vs. free inhabitant.) \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0M. Court errored in not noticing that Paul was denied due process<\/span>.\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 N. Court errored in not noticing no evidence is in the record of a promulgated rule<\/span> that identifies, reaches, notices, Paul as one subject to the municipal code to be applied to Paul, to prove force and effect of law. \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0O. Court errored in not noticing that no statute is found in the record making a violation of a municipal code a criminal violation<\/span>.<\/p>\n

P. The Court errored that a charge of \u00e2\u20ac\u0153Giving False Information\u00e2\u20ac\u009d is not a criminal act<\/span> subject to arrest.\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 Q. The Court errored in not noticing that when Paul was arrested and told he was going to be booked that he was not taken before a Magistrate as is due process<\/span> for any act that is not a breach of the peace.<\/p>\n

Propositions & Evidence of Law<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

1. Appellant had a right to discovery.<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

\u00e2\u20ac\u0153Discovery in a criminal case is generally, and in the absence of a constitutional requirement, controlled by either a statute or court rule.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d State v. Kinney<\/span>, 262 Neb. 812, 635 N.W.2d 449 (2001).\u00c2\u00a0 -\u00e2\u20ac\u0153While a defendant does not by law have a right to discovery, the court must not abuse its discretion when denying a discovery request.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d State v. Phelps<\/span>, 241 Neb. 707, 490 N.W.2d 676 (1992).\u00c2\u00a0 -\u00e2\u20ac\u0153\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6deprive the defendant of a substantial right and a just result.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d State v. <\/span>Segura<\/span>, 265 Neb. 903, 909, 660 N.W.2d 512, 5 17-18 (2003).\u00c2\u00a0 -“Where a court failed to observe safeguards, it amounts to denial of due process of law, court is deprived of jurisdiction.”\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 Merritt v. Hunter, C.A. Kansas 170 F2d 739<\/p>\n

2. Appellant had a right to prepare a defense and denial of discovery infringed on that right<\/span><\/strong>. <\/strong>A judicial abuse of discretion exists when the reasons or rulings of a trial court are clearly untenable, thereby unfairly depriving a litigant of a substantial right or a just result in matters properly submitted for judicial disposition. State v. Mantich<\/span>, 249 Neb. 311, 543 <\/em>N.W.2d 181 (1996).<\/p>\n

3. Appellant did no act to warrant an arrest.<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Newton<\/span> v. Huffman<\/span>, 10 Neb.App. 390, 632 N.W.2d 344 (2001) (holding that arrest is based on the totality of the circumstances as understood by a reasonable person).<\/p>\n

4. Insufficient evidence against Appellant as to all Charges.<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

\u00e2\u20ac\u0153\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6court has abused its discretion.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d State v. Hurbenca<\/span>, 266 Neb. 853, 865, 669 <\/em>N.W.2d 668, 676 (2003).<\/p>\n

5. Excessive sentence for a non-violent crime.<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

\u00e2\u20ac\u0153\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6court abused its discretion in considering and applying circumstantial factors as well as any applicable legal principles in determining the sentence to be imposed.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d State v. Miller<\/span>, 11 Neb. App. 404,411,651 N.W.2d 594, <\/em>600 (2002).\u00c2\u00a0 \u00e2\u20ac\u0153\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6clearly against justice, reason, or evidence, constitute an abuse of discretion.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d State v. <\/span>Harrison<\/span>, 255 <\/em>Neb. 990, 1001, 588 <\/em>N.W.2d 556, <\/em>562 (1999).\u00c2\u00a0 \u00e2\u20ac\u0153In imposing a sentence, a judge should consider the defendant\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s age, mentality, education, experience, and social and cultural background, as well as his or her past criminal record or law-abiding conduct, motivation for the offense, nature of the offense, and the amount of violence<\/span> involved in the commission of the crime.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d State v. Timmens<\/span>, 263 Neb. 622, 631, 641 N.W.2d 383, 391 (2002).\u00c2\u00a0 The Nebraska Supreme Court made clear in Pattno<\/span> that, \u00e2\u20ac\u0153Due Process requires that Sentencing judges consider only relevant information as the basis for a sentence.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d State v. Pattno<\/span>, 254 Neb. 733, 741, 579 <\/em>N.W.2d 503 (1998) (citing State v. Clear<\/span>, 236 Neb. 648, 463 N.W.2d 581 (1990).<\/p>\n

6. Appellant had a right to trial by jury based on fact that no evidence exist that He was a type of \u00e2\u20ac\u02dcperson as defined in the statute that has no such right.<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

-Due process of law in a criminal case includes right to trial by jury and right to defend in person or by counsel. Johnson v. State, 169 Neb. 783, 100 N.W.2d 844 (1960).<\/p>\n

– The Constitution guarantees a fair and impartial trial to every person accused of crime, and that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor shall he be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Coxbill v. State, 115 Neb. 634, 214 N.W. 256 (1927).\u00c2\u00a0 -\u00e2\u20ac\u0153In common usage, the term `person<\/span><\/strong>\u00e2\u20ac\u2122 does not include the sovereign and statutes employing it will ordinarily not be construed to do so.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d \u00e2\u20ac\u201c US Supreme Court in U.S. v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258, 67 SCt 677 (1947):\u00c2\u00a0 -\u00e2\u20ac\u0153Since in common usage, the term `person<\/span><\/strong>\u00e2\u20ac\u2122 does not include the sovereign, statutes employing the phrase are ordinarily construed to exclude it.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d \u00e2\u20ac\u201c US Supreme Court in US v. Fox 94 US 315<\/p>\n

7. Appellant had a right to constitutional notice.<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

-\u00e2\u20ac\u0153test of sufficiency of the indictment or information is whether it contains all<\/p>\n

essential elements of offense as set out in statute and clearly apprises defendant of fact<\/p>\n

constituting the offense\u00e2\u20ac\u009d. State v. Simpson<\/span>, 846 S.W. 2d 724 (Mo.1993); and State v. Quigley 829 S.W. 2d 117(Mo.App.1992)\u00c2\u00a0 -\u00e2\u20ac\u0153\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6due to improper service and lack of actual notice, a court fails to obtain personal<\/a> jurisdiction<\/a> over the party in possession of or owning the property being sold.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 Curtis v. Giff, 17 Neb.App. 149, 757 N.W.2d 139, Neb. App., 2008.<\/p>\n

8. Appellant had a right to written findings when demanded \/ motioned.<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

-\u00e2\u20ac\u0153The court need only state its finding generally unless one of the parties timely<\/span><\/strong> requests conclusions of fact.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d Henkle & Joyce Hardware Co. v. Maco, Inc., 195 Neb. 565, 239 N.W.2d 772 (1976).\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 Special findings are unnecessary unless<\/span><\/strong> requested. Bailey v. McCoy, 187 Neb. 618, 193 N.W.2d 270 (1971).\u00c2\u00a0 -\u00e2\u20ac\u0153It is material when it affects whether the defendant received adequate notice from the information and it is prejudicial when it affects the defendant\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s ability to to..adequately defend against the charges in the information and those given to the jury in the instructions.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d Turner v State,<\/span> 892 S.W.2d 737 (Mo.App.1994).<\/p>\n

9. When the Court lost personal or subject matter jurisdiction it had a duty to dismiss.<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

-“Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause. Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.” Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506, 514 (1869).<\/p>\n

-\u00e2\u20ac\u0153While the plaintiffs bear the ultimate burden of proof, personal jurisdiction<\/span> need not be proved by a preponderance of the evidence until trial<\/span><\/strong> or until the court holds an evidentiary hearing.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d Ameritas Inv. Corp. v. McKinney, 269 Neb. 564, 694 N.W.2d 191 Neb.,2005.<\/p>\n

-\u00e2\u20ac\u0153Lack of personal<\/a> jurisdiction<\/a> may be waived and such jurisdiction conferred by the conduct of the parties.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d Trogdon v. Trogdon, 18 Neb.App. 313, 780 N.W.2d 45, Neb.App.,2010.<\/p>\n

-\u00e2\u20ac\u0153Personal<\/a> jurisdiction<\/a> is the power of a tribunal to subject and bind a particular entity to its decisions.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 \u00e2\u20ac\u0153Lack of personal<\/a> jurisdiction<\/a> may be waived and such jurisdiction conferred by the conduct of the parties.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d Trogdon v. Trogdon, 18 Neb.App. 313, 780 N.W.2d 45, Neb.App.,2010<\/p>\n

-\u00e2\u20ac\u0153A judgment entered without personal<\/a> jurisdiction<\/a> is void.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d\u00c2\u00a0 Cave v. Reiser 268 Neb. 539, 684 N.W.2d 580, Neb.,2004.\u00c2\u00a0 -\u00e2\u20ac\u0153\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6a party could file a special appearance for the sole purpose of objecting to the court\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s assertion of personal<\/a> jurisdiction<\/a> over the objector.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 Miller v. Steichen, 268 Neb. 328, 682 N.W.2d 702, Neb.,2004.\u00c2\u00a0 -\u00e2\u20ac\u0153the party seeking to establish the court\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s in personam jurisdiction still carries the burden of proof, and the burden does not shift to the party challenging jurisdiction.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d Ameritas Inv. Corp. v. McKinney, 269 Neb. 564, 694 N.W.2d 191 (2005)<\/a>.\u00c2\u00a0 -\u00e2\u20ac\u0153To defeat a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the nonmoving party need only make a prima facie showing of jurisdiction.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d Applied Underwriters, Inc. v. Employer Outsource Service, Inc., 2007 WL 1470454 (Neb. Ct. App. 2007)<\/a>.\u00c2\u00a0 -Plaintiff has burden<\/a> to sustain requisite jurisdiction<\/a> when motion is made to dismiss for lack of personal<\/a> jurisdiction<\/a>, but once prima facie case has been established, defendant bears burden<\/a> of producing evidence to rebut that showing.\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 Omni Lingua, Inc<\/a>. v. Great Golf Resorts of World, Inc<\/a>. 500 N.W.2d 721, Iowa App.,1993.\u00c2\u00a0 -The Court of Appeals held that personal<\/a> jurisdiction<\/a> over nonresident former employee was consistent with due process. Omaha Cold Storage Terminals v. Cunningham 417 N.W.2d 254, Iowa App.,1987.<\/p>\n

10. Appellant had a right to a trial by jury do to his sovereign standing.<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

-\u00e2\u20ac\u0153..The right<\/span><\/strong> of trial by jury<\/span><\/strong> shall<\/span><\/strong> remain inviolate<\/span><\/strong>, ..\u00e2\u20ac\u009d\u00c2\u00a0 Neb. Const. art. I, sec. 6 (1875)\u00c2\u00a0 \u00e2\u20ac\u0153It is a part of our fundamental law that the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d Fugate v. Skate, 169 Neb. 420, 99 N.W.2d 868 (1959).\u00c2\u00a0 -\u00e2\u20ac\u0153For the purpose of breach of the peace statute, peace is that state and sense of safety which is necessary to the comfort and happiness of every citizen, and which government is instituted to secure.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d\u00c2\u00a0 State v. Edwards, 239 S,C. 339, 123 S.E. 2d 247, 249.\u00c2\u00a0 “When acting to enforce a statute and its subsequent amendments to the present date, the judge of the municipal court is acting as an administrative officer and not in a judicial capacity; courts in administering or enforcing statutes do not act judicially, but merely ministerially”.\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 Thompson v. Smith, 154 SE 583.
\n11. Appellant has a right to have this case reversed or vacated.<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

-\u00e2\u20ac\u0153A judgment rendered or final order made by the district court may be reversed, vacated, or modified for errors appearing on the record.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 Source:\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 Laws 1991, LB 732, \u00c2\u00a7 51<\/p>\n

\u00e2\u20ac\u0153When a defendant appeals a conviction and sentence under a municipal ordinance, claiming insufficiency of the evidence<\/span>\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6, an appellate court’s consideration of the assignments of error requires examination of the specific ordinance involved,\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6. that the evidence sustains the findings of the trial court, \u00e2\u20ac\u00a6.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d Frederick C., 594 N.W.2d 294<\/a> Neb.App.,1999.\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 \u00e2\u20ac\u0153The party invoking jurisdiction bears the burden of proof that all prerequisites to jurisdiction are satisfied.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d Hatridge v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 415 F.2d 809, 814 (8th Cir. 1969).\u00c2\u00a0 –<\/span><\/strong>\u00e2\u20ac\u0153The Supreme Court reviews determinations made in the district courts only where there is a judgment rendered or final order made by the district court.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d\u00c2\u00a0 Lewis v. Craig, 236 Neb. 602, 463 N.W.2d 318 (1990). -\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 Judgment may be reversed “for errors appearing on record.” Frey v. Drahos, 7 Neb. 194 (1878); Morrill v. Taylor, 6 Neb. 236 (1877).2. Appeal proper\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 -\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 \u00e2\u20ac\u0153Judgment should be reversed where clearly wrong on sole issue of fact involved.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 In re Estate of O’Connor, 105 Neb. 88, 179 N.W. 401.<\/p>\n

\u00e2\u20ac\u0153In reviewing a criminal conviction,\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6 and a conviction will be affirmed, in the absence<\/span><\/strong> of prejudicial error<\/span><\/strong>, if<\/span><\/strong> the properly admitted evidence,\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6 is sufficient to support the conviction<\/span><\/strong>.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 STATE of Nebraska, v. William J. HILL, 254 Neb. 460, 577 N.W.2d 259, 1998.<\/p>\n

12. Defendant has a natural right to own, use, enjoy, alienate, and even exclude man created government from his private property that is not in a <\/span><\/strong>United States of America<\/span><\/strong> Possession or Territory.<\/span><\/strong> \u00e2\u20ac\u0153the free inhabitants of each of these States,..\u00e2\u20ac\u009d Article IV. Articles of Confederation of November 15, 1777.<\/p>\n

13. Defendant has a natural right to a common law remedy with all issues related to his acts, private property, land, independent of written law.<\/span><\/strong> \u00e2\u20ac\u0153the free inhabitants of each of these States,..\u00e2\u20ac\u009d Article IV. Articles of Confederation of November 15, 1777.<\/p>\n

STATEMENT OF FACTS<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

The record shows that Appellant has never waived his rights as a native born, free inhabitant, on the Land called Nebraska, and never consented to governance by written law as related to this subject case.\u00c2\u00a0 Appellant was found guilty of 18 violations of the Omaha City Code (referenced above) on September 3, 2009. Appellant was found not guilty of Entering a Structure after Posting of Appropriate Notice under Omaha City Code Section 48-81.\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 On September 17, 2009, Appellant was sentenced to serve a term of 180 days for the Failure to Comply with Notice of Violation charges and the Having an Unsafe Structure charges, all of which were to run concurrently (449:12-15). <\/em>Appellant was also<\/span> sentenced to serve 180 days on each of the Obstruction of a Law Enforcement Officer charges, the Resisting Arrest charge, and the Giving False Information charge, which were to run concurrently with one another and consecutively to the 180 day sentences for Unsafe Structure and Failure to Comply with Notice Charges (449:15-19). Appellant was given credit for 0 days served (449:24-450:2). The facts presented at trial are as follows:\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 On April 9, 2009, Officer Kevin Collins was summoned to the Douglas County Courthouse by Housing Code Enforcement to give a citation to Appellant for housing code violations (126:17-20), which included twelve counts of Failure to Comply with Notice of Violation, two counts of Having an Unsafe Structure, and one count of Entering a Structure after Posting of Appropriate Notice. Officer Collins attempted to write Appellant a citation but Appellant gave his full Christian name, Paul John, when asked for his last name, as Appellant always refers to \u00e2\u20ac\u0153Hansen\u00e2\u20ac\u009d as a sur-name, and was accused of failing to provide a physical address (127:5-128:11), even though no law requires one to have an address. For these acts, Appellant was also cited for Obstruction of a Law Enforcement Officer and Giving False Information. Officer Collins told Appellant that Appellant was under arrest but allowed Appellant to remain in the courtroom in order to finish unrelated business.\u00c2\u00a0 Several hours later on April 9, 2009, Officer Hansen received an assignment to arrest Appellant once Appellant was finished with his unrelated courtroom business. Officer Hansen was assigned this duty because Officer Collins was going off-duty (138:2-7). When Officer Hansen was asked how he came into contact with Appellant, Officer Hansen testified, \u00e2\u20ac\u0153We actually passed by [one another] just outside the courtroom doors five plus hours later. And the bailiff inside the courtroom pointed to [Appellant]\u00e2\u20ac\u009d (138:16-20). When Officer Hansen was asked what he did next he testified, \u00e2\u20ac\u0153I turned and Mr. Hansen handed his brief case to an associate he was with and ran into the stairwell\u00e2\u20ac\u009d (13 8:22-23). Noting Paul\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s witness testified there was no exchange of any briefcase, and Appelant was arrested with brief case in his possession. Once Officer Hansen got to the stairwell, the Appellant was \u00e2\u20ac\u0153nowhere to be seen, (as Appelant walked up the stairs and Officer Hansen ran down the stairs) so Officer Hansen radioed the Douglas County Sheriffs (139:3-4). Deputy Jacob Ritonya heard the call and proceeded into the stairwell (147:2-11). Deputy Ritonya found Appellant in the stairwell and placed him under arrest without incident (148:4-19). Appellant\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s flight caused officers to cite Appellant for Resisting Arrest and a second Obstruction of a Law Enforcement Officer charge.\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 On April 28, 2009, the 19 above-mentioned charges were filed with the Clerk of the County Court. On May 1, 2009, Appellant entered a plea of not guilty (6:4-5). <\/em>The presiding judge set trial for August 14, 2009. On August 5th 2009, Appellant filed a Motion for Discovery along with several other motions (117:16-22). On August 14, 2009, Appellant appeared for trial and asked the presiding judge why Appellant was not able to see the exhibits before trial (117:6-10; 155:22-23). The presiding judge informed Appellant that the Motion for discovery had been denied because Appellant \u00e2\u20ac\u0153entitled [several different motions] as one motion\u00e2\u20ac\u009d (117:19-21). Appellant denied that he entitled his several motions as one motion (117:22), objected to the lumping together of his separate motions (155:22-25), <\/em>objected to the dismissal of his motions without having an opportunity to speak on them (155:25-156:2), <\/em>and claimed that the denial of his Motion for Discovery resulted in unfair surprise and a violation of his right to due process of law (156:1-3). Appelant motioned the Court to call upon the Plaintiff to prove up personal jurisdiction several times before the trial day (arraignment) , during the trial, and at sentencing.\u00c2\u00a0 The trial proceeded and concluded. At the conclusion of the trial, the presiding judge set a hearing for September 3, 2009, for the announcement of the verdict (378:23-24).\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 On September 3, 2009, Appellant was found guilty of 18 violations of the Omaha City Code (see above). Appellant was found not guilty of Entering a Structure after Posting of Appropriate Notice. At the conclusion of the hearing, the presiding judge set sentencing for September 17, 2009 (411:13-14).\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 On September 17, 2009, Appellant was sentenced (see above). Immediately after rendering his sentence, the presiding judge apologized for his conduct at trial. The judge stated, \u00e2\u20ac\u0153You, know, I raise my voice, not because I\u00e2\u20ac\u2122m angry, because I\u00e2\u20ac\u2122ve never been angry with you, just frustrated. Frustrated at the time of trial and frustrated with a lot of things\u00e2\u20ac\u009d(449:4-7).\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 The Notice of Appeal was filed on October 13, 2009, and an Order allowing the Appellant to proceed inform a pauperis <\/em>was signed by District Court Judge Greg Q. McDermott on October 28, 2009.\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 An appeal was herd by District Court Judge Hartigan, affirming, an appeal was timely filed with the Nebraska Appeals Court on October 5, 2010, in inform a pauperis<\/em>, appeal received\/accepted on October 7.<\/p>\n

The below I to IV are Arguments made by the appointed Public Defender<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Brief\/Argument on Assignment\/ Statements of Errors \u00e2\u20ac\u201cARGUMENT<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

I. <\/strong> The County Court abused its discretion when it denied Appellant\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s Request for Discovery. The County Court never gave a justification of its denial of Appellant\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s Request for Discovery. The denial of Appellant\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s Request for Discovery unfairly deprived Appellant of his right to a fair trial<\/span>. <\/strong>On July 30<\/sub>th the Appellant had a hearing in County Court and asked the judge whether his motion for discovery had been received, because it was \u00e2\u20ac\u0153very important to [Appellant\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s] case\u00e2\u20ac\u009d (82:23). The presiding judge stated that she had no such motion in the file (82:16-22).\u00c2\u00a0 On August 5, <\/em>2009, Appellant\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s resubmitted<\/span> motion for discovery was filed with a number of other motions (117:16-22). On August 14, 2009, Appellant appeared for trial and asked the presiding judge why he was not able to see the exhibits before trial (117:6-10; 155:22-23). The presiding judge informed Appellant that the motion for discovery had been denied because Appellant \u00e2\u20ac\u0153entitled [several different motions] as one motion\u00e2\u20ac\u009d (117:19-21). Appellant denied that he entitled his several motions as one motion (117:22), objected to the lumping together of his separate motions (155:22-25), objected to the dismissal of his motions without having an opportunity to speak on them (15 5:25-156:2), <\/em>and claimed that the denial of his motion for discovery resulted in unfair surprise and a violation of his right to due process of law (156:1-3). <\/strong>Discovery in a criminal case is generally, and in the absence of a constitutional requirement, controlled by either a statute or court rule. State v. Kinney<\/span>, 262 Neb. 812, 635 N.W.2d 449 (2001). In Nebraska, NeW Rev. Stat \u00c2\u00a7 29-1912 controls discovery, and it states that when a defendant is charged with a misdemeanor under a city ordinance and makes a request for discovery:\u00c2\u00a0 (2)The court may issue such an order pursuant to the provisions of this section. In the exercise of its judicial discretion, the court shall consider among other things whether:\u00c2\u00a0 (a) The request is material to the preparation of the defense; <\/strong>(b) The request is not made primarily for the purpose of harassing the prosecution or its witnesses;\u00c2\u00a0 (c) The request, if granted, would not unreasonably delay the trial of the offense and an earlier request by the defendant could not have reasonably been made; <\/strong>(d) There is no substantial likelihood that the request, if granted, would preclude a just determination of the issues at the trial of the offense; or\u00c2\u00a0 (e) The request, if granted, would not result in the possibility of bodily harm to, or coercion of, witnesses.<\/p>\n

(3) Whenever the court refuses to grant an order pursuant to the provisions of this section, it shall render its findings in writing together with the facts upon which the findings are based. While a defendant does not by law have a right to discovery, the court must not abuse its discretion when denying a discovery request. State v. Phelps<\/span>, 241 Neb. 707, 490 N.W.2d 676 (1992). A judicial abuse of discretion exists when the reasons or rulings of a trial court are clearly untenable, thereby unfairly depriving a litigant of a substantial right or a just result in matters properly submitted for judicial disposition. State v. Mantich<\/span>, 249 Neb. 311, 543 <\/em>N.W.2d 181 (1996).\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 The County Court abused its discretion by summarily dismissing Appellant\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s Request for Discovery, since it is untenable to dismiss a Request for Discovery on the sole basis that it was submitted with other motions. According to Neb. Rev. Stat \u00c2\u00a7 29-1912(2), submitting a Request for Discovery along with other motions is not a relevant criterion for denying a Request for Discovery. Additionally, it does not appear that the trial court ever reduced its denial into writing as required by Neb. Rev. Stat \u00c2\u00a7 29-1912(3). Furthermore, after being alerted on August 14, 2009, to the fact that Appellant intended the Request for Discovery to be a separate motion, the County Court\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s failure to review the denial of the Request for Discovery was an abuse of discretion. The County Court should have reviewed the motions independently once Appellant alerted the County Court that the Request for Discovery was intended as a separate motion. Appellants Motion for Discovery was material<\/span> to the preparation of his defense, had no harassing<\/span> effect on the prosecution,\u00c2\u00a0 created no unreasonably delay<\/span>, was accompanied by an earlier request<\/span> that was lost in the mail or the clerks office, would not have preclude<\/span> a just determination, would have not resulted in the possibility of bodily harm<\/span> to, or coercion of, witnesses, and the denial was not render as findings \u00e2\u20ac\u0153in writing<\/span>\u00e2\u20ac\u009d together with the facts upon which the findings are based.<\/p>\n

The County Court\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s denial of Appellant\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s Request for Discovery and its failure to review the denial deprived Appellant of substantial rights, including Appellant\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s right to a fair trial. Thus, the County Court erred, creating a substantive due process violation, thus lost subject matter jurisdiction and it\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s ruling is a nullity.<\/p>\n

II.\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 The County Court erred when it convicted Appellant for Giving False Information because Appellant believed the information to be true. Since the crime of Giving False Information requires knowledge of the falsity, the Appellant did not have requisite mental state to support the conviction.\u00c2\u00a0 Essentially no false information was given.<\/span> <\/strong>The County Court convicted the Appellant for Giving False Information on the basis of testimony from Officer Kevin Collins. Officer Collins testified that on April 9, 2009, he was summoned to the courthouse by Housing Code Enforcement to give a citation to Appellant for housing code violations (126:17-20). Apparently, Appellant was in court attending to business unrelated to matters pertaining to this appeal. Officer Collins testified that when he approached Appellant he informed Appellant that a citation would be issued to him. Next, Officer Collins asked the Appellant to state Appellant\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s last name (127:5-14). According to Officer Collins, the Appellant responded, \u00e2\u20ac\u0153John\u00e2\u20ac\u009d (127:13-24). When asked by Officer Collins for a mailing address, the Appellant \u00e2\u20ac\u0153kept giving me a U.S. post officer number\u00e2\u20ac\u009d (128:5-10). Officer Collins then told Appellant, \u00e2\u20ac\u0153I can\u00e2\u20ac\u2122t use that, I have to have a physical address\u00e2\u20ac\u009d (128:5-<\/em>10). According to Officer Collins the Appellant \u00e2\u20ac\u0153wouldn\u00e2\u20ac\u2122t give it to [Officer Collins]\u00e2\u20ac\u009d (128:11). <\/strong>Based on these facts, there was insufficient evidence for the County Court to convict Appellant for Giving False Information under the Omaha City code Section 20-26. Omaha City Code Section 20-26 makes it \u00e2\u20ac\u0153unlawful for any person to give any information to a police officer, fireman or other city official, knowing that such information is false.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d None of Appellant\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s responses to Officer Collins contained information that Appellant knew to be false, or were proven to be false. Appellant\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s response of \u00e2\u20ac\u0153John\u00e2\u20ac\u009d when Officer Collins asked Appellant for Appellant\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s last name was not false. According to Appellant\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s conception of his identity, Appellant\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s name is \u00e2\u20ac\u0153Paul John\u00e2\u20ac\u009d and he is from the family \u00e2\u20ac\u0153Hansen.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d Throughout the course of Appellant\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s pretrial hearing, trial, and sentencing, Appellant has consistently represented himself to the court as \u00e2\u20ac\u0153Paul John\u00e2\u20ac\u009d (24:1 5-18; <\/em>94:20-22). At Appellant\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s arraignment for the charges concerning this appeal, Appellant stated he did not recognize the name \u00e2\u20ac\u0153Paul J. Hansen\u00e2\u20ac\u009d on the docket (24:20-21) Appellant\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s signature on all court documents shows a semicolon between \u00e2\u20ac\u0153Paul John\u00e2\u20ac\u009d and \u00e2\u20ac\u0153Hansen.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d Appellant only responds with his last name when he is asked for his family name, surname (24:15-18).\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 Merriam-Webster Definition of SURNAME-<\/em> 1 :<\/strong> an added name derived from occupation or other circumstance :<\/strong> nickname<\/a> 2 :<\/strong> the name borne in common by members of a family. Therefore, when Officer Collins asked for Appellant\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s last name and Appellant responded with \u00e2\u20ac\u0153John,\u00e2\u20ac\u009d Appellant was truthfully answering the question in accordance with his conception of what a last name is based on Webster\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s Dictionary. <\/strong>Since Appellant responded honestly according to his definition of \u00e2\u20ac\u0153last name,\u00e2\u20ac\u009d Appellant did not have give information that he knew to be false, which is required by the Omaha City Code for a Giving False Information conviction. Appellant\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s conception of identity and surnames is admittedly unique specific as defined in popular dictionaries and possibly difficult for some people to comprehend, nonetheless 100% accurate. However, the only relevant inquiry is into the mental state of the Appellant. Appellant unwaveringly asserts that his last name is \u00e2\u20ac\u0153John\u00e2\u20ac\u009d and that \u00e2\u20ac\u0153Hansen\u00e2\u20ac\u009d is the family he is from and not his last name. Knowing the fact that Hansen is his family name and can not be his last name. For if in fact it is his family name how can it be his last name at the same time. Thus, there was insufficient evidence for the County Court to convict Appellant for False Information for his response of \u00e2\u20ac\u0153John.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d\u00c2\u00a0 No false information equals no cause for an arrest. <\/strong>Appellant\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s second response to Officer Collins contained no falsity either. Officer Collins asked Appellant for an address. Appellant kept giving a U.S. post office box. When Officer Collins told Appellant that a U.S. post office box was not a sufficient address, the Appellant was accused of \u00e2\u20ac\u0153refusing to give [a permanent address]\u00e2\u20ac\u009d (128:11). The testimony from Officer Collins failed to show any falsity relating to these statements. There was no testimony that Appellant did not have access to the U.S. post office box that he recited to Officer Collins. While the Appellant\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s response to Officer Collins was not the precise answer desired by Officer Collins, there is no evidence that the response contained any falsity.\u00c2\u00a0 There is no known law that a private person must have a residential address, and that a mailing location is not an acceptable, honest, answer. <\/strong>Since neither of Appellant\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s responses contained information that Appellant knew, or were proven, to be false, the Appellant\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s conviction for False Information was not supported by the evidence, and thus in error.<\/p>\n

III<\/strong>.\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 The County Court erred when it convicted Appellant for Obstruction of a Law Enforcement Officer because Appellant\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s acts were not done with the intent to interfere with Officer Collins\u00e2\u20ac\u2122 official duties.<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

The County Court convicted the Appellant for Obstruction of a Law Enforcement Officer on the basis of testimony from Officer Kevin Collins. Officer Collins testified that on April 9, 2009, he was summoned to the courthouse by Housing Code Enforcement to give a citation to Appellant for housing code violations (126:17-20). Apparently, Appellant was in court attending to business unrelated to matters pertaining to this appeal. Officer Collins asked the Appellant to state his last name (127:5-14). According to Officer Collins, the Appellant said, \u00e2\u20ac\u0153John\u00e2\u20ac\u009d (127:13-24). When asked by Officer Collins for a mailing address, the Appellant \u00e2\u20ac\u0153kept giving me a U.S. post office number\u00e2\u20ac\u009d (128:11).\u00c2\u00a0 Based on these facts, there was insufficient evidence for the County Court to convict the Appellant for Obstructing a Law Enforcement Officer under the Omaha City Code Section 20-21. Omaha City Code Section 20-21 makes it \u00e2\u20ac\u0153unlawful for any person to purposefully or knowingly do any act, refuse to do any act, or to commit an act of omission with the intent to obstruct or interfere with any law enforcement officer or firefighter performing an official duty<\/span>.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d None of the Appellant\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s responses or non-responsive silences to Officer Collins\u00e2\u20ac\u2122 questions were done with the \u00e2\u20ac\u0153intent to obstruct or interfere with any law enforcement… duty.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d\u00c2\u00a0 Appellant\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s response of \u00e2\u20ac\u0153John\u00e2\u20ac\u009d when asked by Officer Collins for his last name was not uttered with the intent to obstruct Officer Collin\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s duties. As delineated in Argument IV, the Appellant has a peculiar way of understanding surnames. Since Appellant never had the intent to obstruct the duties of Officer Collins when uttering \u00e2\u20ac\u0153John,\u00e2\u20ac\u009d his response cannot support a conviction for obstruction. Paul John of the family Hansen is a full precise identification, and the fact that Paul was in court it is absurd that he would try and hide his identity.\u00c2\u00a0 The Officers response was impulsive and without thought.\u00c2\u00a0 Appellant\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s second response to Officer Collins was not uttered with the intent to obstruct Officer Collins\u00e2\u20ac\u2122 duties either. When Officer Collins asked Appellant for his address, Appellant gave a U.S. post office box address several times. When Officer Collins told Appellant that a U.S. post office box was not a sufficient address, the Appellant \u00e2\u20ac\u0153refused to give it\u00e2\u20ac\u009d (128:11). The testimony from Officer Collins failed to show that Appellant gave these responses with the intent to obstruct Officer Collins\u00e2\u20ac\u2122 duties. There was no testimony that Appellant recited the U.S. post office box after he was told by Officer Collins that a U.S. post office box was unacceptable. Instead, Officer Collins testimony stated that when asked for an address he \u00e2\u20ac\u0153kept giving me [a] U.S. post office box number\u00e2\u20ac\u009d (128:9). Surely, repetition of the address was not meant to obstruct Officer Collins, since Appellant may have been repeating the address so that Officer Collins could write down the address. According to Officer Collins\u00e2\u20ac\u2122 testimony, once Officer Collins informed Appellant that a U.S. post office box was unacceptable, Appellant \u00e2\u20ac\u0153refused to give it to me\u00e2\u20ac\u009d (128:11). Since Officer Collins did not specify how Appellant refused, it should be presumed that Appellant responded with silence. While silence can constitute obstruction, it is not clear why Appellant was silent. Appellant may not have understood the question or he may not have had an address that was not a U.S. post office box. While the silence may have obstructed the duties of Officer Collins, it was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s silence was intended by the Appellant to obstruct the duties of Officer Collins.\u00c2\u00a0 Appellant gave the only address he had associated with his life at that point in time.\u00c2\u00a0 The truth can not be converted into a crime.\u00c2\u00a0 Since neither the Appellant\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s response of \u00e2\u20ac\u0153John,\u00e2\u20ac\u009d the Appellant\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s repetition of his U.S. K post office box, or the Appellant\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s silence was proven beyond a reasonable doubt to be given by Appellant with the intent of obstructing the duties of Officer Collins, the County Court\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s conviction for Obstruction of a Law Enforcement Officer was not supported by the evidence, and was thus in error.\u00c2\u00a0 Appellant gave an address just as he was asked to give, that being the only address he used, to give a different answer would have been a false address.\u00c2\u00a0 Appellants truthful statements did not warrant an arrest.<\/p>\n

IV. The County Court erred in convicting Appellant of Obstruction of Law Enforcement because Appellant was not under arrest when he entered the stairwell.\u00c2\u00a0 In order for the act of flight to constitute the crime of Obstruction of a Law Enforcement Officer, there must be a command not to flee. Appellant was not given a command by Officer Paul, so he was free to leave via the stairwell<\/span><\/strong>.<\/span><\/p>\n

The County Court erred in convicting the Appellant for Obstruction of a Law Enforcement Officer on the basis of the testimony of Officer Gregory Hansen. Officer Hansen testified that on April 9, 2009, he received an assignment to cite the Appellant, due to the fact that Officer Collins was going off-duty (13 8:2-7). When Officer Hansen was asked how he came into contact with the Appellant, Officer Hansen testified, \u00e2\u20ac\u0153We actually passed [by one another] just outside the courtroom doors. And the bailiff inside the courtroom pointed to [Appellant]\u00e2\u20ac\u009d (138:16-20). Officer Hansen was then asked, \u00e2\u20ac\u0153And what did you do in response to that\u00e2\u20ac\u009d (138:21). In response, Officer Hansen testified, \u00e2\u20ac\u0153I turned and Mr. Hansen handed his brief case to an associate he was with and ran into the stairwell\u00e2\u20ac\u009d (138:22-23). Note- Seybert testified that no briefcase was passed. (276:8-15) Once Officer Hansen got to the stairwell, the Appellant was \u00e2\u20ac\u0153nowhere to be seen\u00e2\u20ac\u009d so Officer Hansen radioed the Douglas County Sheriffs (139:3-4). Deputy Jacob Ritonya heard the call and proceeded into the stairwell (147:2-11). Deputy Ritonya found the Appellant in the stairwell and placed him under arrest without incident (148:4-19).<\/p>\n

Based on these facts, there was insufficient evidence for the County Court to convict the Appellant for Obstructing a Law Enforcement Officer under the Omaha City Code Section 20-21. Omaha City Code Section 20-21 makes it \u00e2\u20ac\u0153unlawful for any person to purposefully or knowingly do any act, refuse to do any act, or to commit an act of omission with the intent to obstruct or interfere with any law enforcement officer or firefighter performing an official duty. \u00e2\u20ac\u0153Running away from officers has been held to be a violation of Obstruction of a Peace Officer\u00e2\u20ac\u009d\u00c2\u00a0 NelxRev.St. ~ 28-906(1<\/span>) (Reissue 2008), which is analogous to Obstructing a Law Enforcement Officer under the Omaha City Code Sec. 20-21. State v. Ellingson<\/span>, 13 Neb.App. 931, 703 N.W.2d 273 (2005).<\/p>\n

While fleeing is enough to constitute obstruction, there seems to be an implicit requirement that the Officer must attempt an arrest. Although Nebraska Appellate Courts have not expressly stated that an attempt to arrest is a requirement for flight to constitute obstruction, there are several reasons to believe that the requirement exists. First, without an attempt to arrest by the officer the arrestee can not form the mental state that is required for the commission of the crime. Secondly, an attempt to arrest is an essential element of the offense of fleeing in a motor vehicle under Neb.Rev.St. ~ 2<\/span> 8-905<\/span>, which is essentially the same as obstruction through flight, just minus the car. State v. Claussen<\/span>, 276 Neb. 630, 756 <\/em>N.W.2d 163 (2008). Thirdly, numerous other jurisdictions have made an attempt to arrest an essential element to an Obstruction of a Law Enforcement Officer prosecution. E.A.B. v. State<\/span>, 851 So.2d 308, 311 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003). Porter<\/span> v. State<\/span>, 224 Ga. App. 276, 279, 480 S.E2d 291, 294 (1997). Finally, without an attempt to arrest requirement, our right to privacy is meaningless, since an Officer could apprehend any person for obstruction anytime the person moves in the opposite direction of law enforcement.\u00c2\u00a0 Officer Hansen never attempted to arrest the Appellant, which is a necessary element for a prosecution of Obstruction of a Law Enforcement Officer that is based on flight. According to Officer Hansen\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s testimony, he turned toward the Appellant and the Appellant ran into the stairwell (138:22-23). Once Officer Hansen got to the stairwell, the Appellant was \u00e2\u20ac\u0153nowhere to be seen\u00e2\u20ac\u009d (139:3-4). Based on this testimony, Officer Hansen never communicated to the Appellant that he was under arrest. The only attempt to arrest the Appellant was given aprox. five hours earlier by Officer Collins, who told Appellant \u00e2\u20ac\u0153consider yourself under arrest and that I [Officer Collins] will be back\u00e2\u20ac\u009d (128:21-23). Given the several hours that had elapsed since Officer Collins\u00e2\u20ac\u2122 order, the freedom that Appellant enjoyed during this time, and the fact that Officer Collins did not show up to arrest the Appellant, Officer Collins\u00e2\u20ac\u2122 acts can hardly be considered an effective attempt to arrest to support an Obstruction conviction based on flight. Newton<\/span> v. Hoffman<\/span>, 10 Neb.App. 390, 632 N.W.2d 344 (2001) (holding that arrest is based on the totality of the circumstances as understood by a reasonable person).<\/p>\n

Since Officer Hansen never attempted to arrest Appellant, Appellant was free to leave the scene in any manner Appellant so chose. Without any legally sufficient evidence of an attempt to arrest, which is necessary to support an Obstruction of Law Enforcement based on flight, the County Court\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s conviction for Obstruction of a Law Enforcement Officer was not supported by the evidence, and thus in error.\u00c2\u00a0 How is it an Police Officer can tell someone he is under arrest, leaves him for five hours, then this same man walks by a completely different Officer and does not even recognize the man he is looking for, and gets accused of fleeing. Note- Appellant\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s witness testified that Appellant did not hand any briefcase to him nor was he running as he went into the stairway. (276:8-15) This Officer is attempting to stack charges without cause.<\/p>\n

V.\u00c2\u00a0 The County Court erred in convicting Appellant for Resisting Arrest because Appellant was not under arrest when he entered the stairwell. In order for the act of flight to constitute Resisting Arrest there must be a command not to flee. Appellant was not given a command by Officer Hansen, so he was free to leave via the stairwell.<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

The County Court convicted Appellant for Resisting Arrest on the basis of testimony from Officer Gregory Hansen. Officer Hansen testified that on April 9, 2009, he received an assignment to cite Appellant, due to the fact that Officer Collins was going off-duty (138:2-7). When Officer Hansen was asked how he came into contact with Appellant, Officer Hansen testified, \u00e2\u20ac\u0153We actually passed [by one another] just outside the courtroom doors. And the bailiff inside the courtroom pointed to [Appellant)\u00e2\u20ac\u009d (138:16-20). Officer Hansen was then asked, \u00e2\u20ac\u0153And what did you do in response to that\u00e2\u20ac\u009d (138:2 1). In response, Officer Hansen testified, \u00e2\u20ac\u0153I turned and Mr. Hansen handed his briefcase to an associate he was with and ran into the stairwell\u00e2\u20ac\u009d (13 8:22-23). Once Officer Hansen got to the stairwell, the Appellant was \u00e2\u20ac\u0153nowhere to be seen\u00e2\u20ac\u009d so Officer Hansen radioed the Douglas County Sheriffs (139:3-4). Deputy Jacob Ritonya heard the call and proceeded into the stairwell (147:2-11). Deputy Ritonya found Appellant in the stairwell and placed him under arrest without incident (148 :4-19).<\/p>\n

Based on these facts, there was insufficient evidence for the County Court to convict Appellant for Resisting Arrest under the Omaha City Code Section 20-22. Omaha City Code Section 20-22 makes it \u00e2\u20ac\u0153unlawful for any person arrested by a police officer, or by any person vested with authority to arrest, to resist arrest.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d An attempt to arrest is an express requirement of Omaha City Code Section 20-22.\u00c2\u00a0 Officer Hansen never attempted to arrest Appellant. According to Officer Hansen\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s testimony, he turned toward Appellant and claimed Appellant ran into the stairwell (138:22-23). Once Officer Hansen got to the stairwell, Appellant was \u00e2\u20ac\u0153nowhere to be seen\u00e2\u20ac\u009d (139:3-4). Based on this testimony, Officer Hansen never communicated to Appellant that he was under arrest. The only attempt to arrest Appellant was given aprox. five hours earlier by Officer Collins, who told Appellant \u00e2\u20ac\u0153consider yourself under arrest and that I [Officer Collins] will be back\u00e2\u20ac\u009d (128:21-23). Given the fact that several hours had elapsed since Officer Collins\u00e2\u20ac\u2122 order, the relative freedom that Appellant enjoyed during this time, and the fact that Officer Collins did not show up to arrest Appellant, Officer Collins\u00e2\u20ac\u2122 acts can hardly be considered an effective attempt to arrest to support the Resisting Arrest conviction. Newton<\/span> v. Huffman<\/span>, 10 Neb.App. 390, 632 N.W.2d 344 (2001) (holding that arrest is based on the totality of the circumstances as understood by a reasonable person).\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 Since Officer Hansen never attempted to arrest Appellant, Appellant can not be convicted of Resisting Arrest. An attempt to arrest is a necessary element for a Resisting Arrest conviction. Due to the fact that there was no evidence presented that Officer Hansen attempted to arrest Appellant, the County Court\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s conviction for Resisting Arrest was not supported by the evidence, and thus in error.\u00c2\u00a0 The Officer never said \u00e2\u20ac\u0153STOP\u00e2\u20ac\u009d, never said anything, no order, no response was given for no duty was created.<\/p>\n

VI. <\/strong>The County Court\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s sentence of 14 concurrent sentences of 6 months to run consecutively to 4 concurrent sentences of 6 months was excessive. The court did not properly take into consideration the Timmens\u00e2\u20ac\u2122 factors of the nature of the offense and the amount of violence involved in the commission of the offense<\/span>. State v. Timmens<\/span>, 263 Neb. 622, 631, 641 N.W.2d 383, 391 (2002). The judge erred when he was influenced by irrelevant information such as Appellant\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s pro se representation and unique trial tactics. State v. Pattno<\/span>, 254 Neb. 733. 579 N.W.2d 503 (1998). <\/strong>An Appellate Court will not disturb a sentence imposed that is within the statutory limits unless the sentencing court has abused its discretion. State v. Hurbenca<\/span>, 266 Neb. 853, 865, 669 <\/em>N.W.2d 668, 676 (2003). An abuse of discretion takes place when the sentencing court\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s reasons or rulings are untenable and unfairly deprive the defendant of a substantial right and a just result. State v. <\/span>Segura<\/span>, 265 Neb. 903, 909, 660 N.W.2d 512, 5 17-18 (2003). Where a sentence imposed within statutory limits is alleged on appeal to be excessive, the appellate court must determine whether the sentencing court abused its discretion in considering and applying circumstantial factors as well as any applicable legal principles in determining the sentence to be imposed. State v. Miller<\/span>, 11 Neb. App. 404,411,651 N.W.2d 594, <\/em>600 (2002). <\/strong> Furthermore, actions of the sentencing court, which are clearly against justice, reason, or evidence, constitute an abuse of discretion. State v. <\/span>Harrison<\/span>, 255 <\/em>Neb. 990, 1001, 588 <\/em>N.W.2d 556, <\/em>562 (1999). In part, Neb. Rev. Stat<\/span>. \u00c2\u00a7 29-2308 (Reissue 2008) provides: <\/strong>In all criminal cases that now are, or may hereafter be pending in the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court, the appellate court may reduce the sentence rendered by the District Court against the accused when, in its opinion, the sentence is excessive, and it shall be the duty of the appellate court to render such sentences against the accused as in its opinion may be warranted by the evidence.\u00c2\u00a0 The Nebraska Supreme Court has listed factors that control any sentence imposed by the District Court: In imposing a sentence, a judge should consider the defendant\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s age, mentality, education, experience, and social and cultural background, as well as his or her past criminal record or law-abiding conduct, motivation for the offense, nature of the offense, and the amount of violence<\/span> involved in the commission of the crime. State v. Timmens<\/span>, 263 Neb. 622, 631, 641 N.W.2d 383, 391 (2002).\u00c2\u00a0 The Nebraska Supreme Court made clear in Pattno<\/span> that, \u00e2\u20ac\u0153Due Process requires that Sentencing judges consider only relevant information as the basis for a sentence.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d State v. Pattno<\/span>, 254 Neb. 733, 741, 579 <\/em>N.W.2d 503 (1998) (citing State v. Clear<\/span>, 236 Neb. 648, 463 N.W.2d 581 (1990). <\/strong>In the present case, Appellant was convicted of 18 misdemeanors under the city ordinance. Appellant received the maximum sentence of 6 months for all misdemeanors. Appellant was sentenced to serve 14 of these sentences concurrently with one another, and four of these sentences concurrently with one another. Furthermore, Appellant was sentence to serve the 13 concurrent sentences consecutively to the 4 concurrent sentences. The County Court abused its discretion when it administered this excessive sentence to Appellant because it did not consider the relevant Timmens<\/span>\u00e2\u20ac\u2122 factors such as the nature of the offense or the amount of violence<\/span> involved in the commission of the offense. The judge\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s failure to consider these factors is not surprising considering that he was clearly aggravated by the legal arguments presented by Appellant. <\/strong>When considering the nature of the offense and the amount of violence involved in the commission of the crimes as set forth in Timmens<\/span>, the evidence supports a lesser sentence. The record does not show that there was any violence<\/span> involved in any of the charges levied against Appellant. Fourteen of the charges that Appellant was convicted for were housing code violations. The other four charges of which Appellant was convicted arose out of complications surrounding the citation process. If the non-violent nature of these convictions were properly taken into account, Appellant\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s sentences would be substantially less severe.\u00c2\u00a0 The judge\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s failure to fully consider the relevant Timmens<\/span>\u00e2\u20ac\u2122 factors was likely due to his bias toward Appellant. Throughout the course of the trial, the presiding judge was aggravated by Appellant\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s arguments. At times, the presiding judge would make comments mocking and demeaning Appellant\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s arguments and defenses. For example, the presiding judge instructed Appellant to move on to \u00e2\u20ac\u0153his next obvious <\/em>question with an answer\u00e2\u20ac\u009d and informed Appellant that he was making \u00e2\u20ac\u0153a great <\/em>assumption\u00e2\u20ac\u009d (emphasis added) (108:9-17). Appellant requested that the presiding judge recuse himself due to his \u00e2\u20ac\u0153coarse attitude\u00e2\u20ac\u009d but the presiding judge refused Appellant\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s request (118:17-22). Perhaps the presiding judge realized that his demeanor gave the sense of impropriety, since he felt it necessary to explain his attitude toward the Appellant immediately after sentencing. Immediately after sentencing the presiding judge stated, \u00e2\u20ac\u0153You know, I raise my voice, not because I\u00e2\u20ac\u2122m angry, because I\u00e2\u20ac\u2122ve never been angry with you, just frustrated. Frustrated at the time of trial and frustrated with a lot of things\u00e2\u20ac\u009d (449:4-7).\u00c2\u00a0 Pattno<\/span> made clear that due process prevents a court from considering information that is not relevant to sentencing. Timmens<\/span> does not set out as a relevant factor for sentencing the Appellant\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s annoying arguments or tortured logic. By allowing Appellant\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s representation of himself to influence the judge, the court overstepped its boundaries and violated Appellant\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s due process rights. The judge was likely unable to consider relevant mitigating factors, since the judge was obviously aggravated by Appellant\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s decision to represent himself and utilize a novel trial strategy. Appellant\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s decision to represent himself and implement unique trial tactics are irrelevant factors that should not have been taken into account under Pattno<\/span>. If the judge had properly considered only the relevant factors found in Timmens<\/span> he would have sentenced Appellant to a lesser sentence because the crimes involved here did not involve any violence<\/span>.\u00c2\u00a0 According to Neb. Rev. Stat<\/span>. \u00c2\u00a7 29-23 08 (Reissue 2008), \u00e2\u20ac\u0153The appellate court may reduce the sentence rendered by the District Court…, when in its opinion the sentence is excessive… The appellate courts must recognize that sentencing courts are subject to human error and fallibility, and thus can impose unconscionable, unreasonable, and untenable sentences, even if those sentences are \u00e2\u20ac\u0153within statutory limits.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d <\/strong>The mitigating factors set out by the Nebraska Supreme Court are a clear message that a sentence within statutory limits may still be excessive. Simply put, in determining an appropriate sentence, the court must consider, in each case, the nature of the offense and the situation of the offender. However, the court must not consider factors that are not relevant to sentencing, which would include Appellant\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s decision to represent himself and employ his legal arguments. In this case, the District Court abused its discretion by being influenced by these irrelevant factors. The District Court\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s sentences must be modified to ensure that Appellant is not unfairly deprived of a substantial right and a just result. \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0NARROW CONSTRUCTION OF PENAL STATUTES <\/span><\/strong>Penal statutes are narrowly construed. <\/sup> If there is fair doubt as to whether the act charged and proved is embraced within the prohibition, that doubt will be resolved in favor of the accused. <\/sup>The Doctrine of Lenity, ((Leniency)) a subcategory of this canon, provides that “ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity.” <\/sup>It “gives a criminal defendant the benefit of a lesser penalty where there is an ambiguity in the statute allowing for more than one interpretation.”<\/p>\n

The below 1a.,2a, \u00e2\u20ac\u0153A\u00e2\u20ac\u009dto\u00e2\u20ac\u009dQ\u00e2\u20ac\u009d are arguments that were refused to<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

be added by the appointed Public Defender upon Paul\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s Demand: <\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Additional to argument #1a, denial of discovery:<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Paul had no clue to what consisted alleged violation; he only had an information of some dated alleged \u00e2\u20ac\u02dcNotice of Violation\u00e2\u20ac\u2122.\u00c2\u00a0 Impossible to prepare a defense with no specific as to acts alleged.\u00c2\u00a0 How can one subpoena witness to aid in a defense with no specific acts. Discovery is \u00e2\u20ac\u02dcdue\u00e2\u20ac\u2122 to find specifics, then for aid in selecting specific witnesses and counter exhibits.\u00c2\u00a0 Paul had no clue to when or what act he was alleged to have done as with alleged resisting arrest, giving of false information, obstructing. It is impossible to prepare a defense with no specific as to acts alleged. In order to prepare a defense Paul needed the following:\u00c2\u00a0 resisting arrest- what do they claim I did, where did I do it, to whom, who witnessed it, was it what I did or was it something I refused to do. How can I compare it to the statute with out specifics? How can I seek council without specifics?\u00c2\u00a0 What words of false information, was with address, name, or body politic affiliation.\u00c2\u00a0 I needed this discovery before trial. Discovery is a right, not a privilege.<\/p>\n

United States Equal Protection Clause<\/a>, Fourteenth Amendment \/ limitation to the United <\/span><\/p>\n

States Constitution;\u00c2\u00a0 Sec.1,<\/span> \u00e2\u20ac\u0153without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its<\/p>\n

jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d\u00c2\u00a0 Nebraska<\/strong> Constitution, Art.1, CI-3<\/strong> \u00e2\u20ac\u0153No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d \u00c2\u00a0ALSO-Discovery is a common-law right of Paul\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s. (Case law not necessary.)\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 NOTE- Paul has a superior standing than a US citizen, as the record shows my un-rebutted status of native-born Nebraska man, thus not a statutory person. (100:17:19).\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 \u00e2\u20ac\u0153Due process of law in a criminal case includes right to trial by jury and right to defend in person or by counsel.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d Johnson v. State, 169 Neb. 783, 100 N.W.2d 844 (1960).\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 \u00e2\u20ac\u0153The Constitution guarantees a fair and impartial trial to every person accused of crime, and that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor shall he be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d Coxbill v. State, 115 Neb. 634, 214 N.W. 256 (1927).<\/p>\n

Additional to argument #2a, alleged as to give false information to an officer:<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

An Omaha Police Employee is not a constitutional officer.<\/p>\n

1. He is not elected, but is hired upon qualifications.\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 2. He has no tenure of office, only has a right to work.\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 3. Holds no official (officer) authority by the Nebraska Constitution, or the US<\/p>\n

Constitution.\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 4. Is only a statutory policy enforcer.\u00c2\u00a0 Again, Paul is not informed in the information of facts alleged as to what Paul said that was false. Information is defective \/ vague and is therefore not constitutional notice.\u00c2\u00a0 \u00e2\u20ac\u0153test of sufficiency of the indictment or information is whether it contains all essential elements of offense as set out in statute and clearly apprises defendant of fact constituting the offense\u00e2\u20ac\u009d. State v. Simpson<\/span>, 846 S.W. 2d 724 (Mo.1993); State v. Quigley 829 S.W. 2d 117(Mo.App.1992) (.I trust I could pay to find a like case in the US, and<\/p>\n

Nebraska courts, if need be on further appeal.)\u00c2\u00a0 Paul being bared from discovery and nothing specific in the \u00e2\u20ac\u02dcinformation\u00e2\u20ac\u2122, he lacks notice, therefore a \u00e2\u20ac\u0153due process violation\u00e2\u20ac\u009d.<\/p>\n

Paul knows not if the alleged statement was given at arrest at court house stairway, or<\/p>\n

6.5 hours before in court room, or during booking. Common sense, common justice<\/p>\n

demands such specific notice before being given six months jail time with all the social<\/p>\n

and financial destruction included. An information which omits a statutory element of the charged offense is constitutionally defective because it fails to state an offense. \u00c2\u00a0See as follows:\u00c2\u00a0 The information must apprise the defendant of the elements of the crime charged and the conduct of the defendant which is alleged to have constituted that crime and when information(s ) are defective the charges must be dismissed. \u00c2\u00a0See the following:\u00c2\u00a0 \u00e2\u20ac\u0153The substantial rights which both an indictment or information are designed to further are to inform the defendant of the charges against him so that he may adequately prepare a defense and to protect the defendant against double jeopardy.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d \u00c2\u00a0State v. Simpson<\/span>, 846 S.W. 2d 724 (Mo.1993); State v. Quigley 829 S.W. 2d 117 (Mo.App.1992.\u00c2\u00a0 \u00e2\u20ac\u0153In State v. Holt<\/span>, 104 Wn.2d 315, 321, 704 P.2d 1189 (1985), the Washington Supreme Court held that an information which omits a statutory element of the charged offense is constitutionally defective because it fails to state an offense. In State v. Leach<\/span>, 113 Wn.2d 679, 687, 782 P.2d 552 (1989), the Supreme Court<\/p>\n

expanded its holding in Holt and held that, like an information or complaint, a citation<\/p>\n

must state an offense. . . . In a recent opinion, the Supreme Court held that<\/p>\n

the essential elements rule, discussed in State v. Leach<\/span>, 113 Wn.2d 679, 782 P.2d 552<\/p>\n

(1989), applies to citations. Seattle<\/span> v. Hein<\/span>, 115 Wn.2d 555, 799 P.2d 734 (1990). . . . in State v. Robinson<\/strong>, 58 Wn. App. 599, 606, 794 P.2d 1293 (1990) (per curiam) the court reversed a fourth degree assault conviction where the citation charged the petitioner with a violation of \u00e2\u20ac\u01539A. 36.041 Assault 4th on police officer). The court reasoned that because the citation did not contain an essential element of the crime, i.e., the non-statutory element of intent, it failed to state a charge on which the petitioner could be tried and convicted. Robinson<\/span>, 58 Wn. App. At 606-07. . . . As the Leach court pointed out, although the CRRLJ provide efficient procedures<\/p>\n

for initiating misdemeanor prosecutions, they do not circumvent the constitutional requirement that a citation must apprise a defendant with reasonable certainty of the nature of the accusations against him. 113 Wn.2d at 695-98. . . \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0In contrast, complaints are issued by a prosecutor who is not present at the scene. Leach<\/span>, 113 Wn.2d at 698. Thus, the prosecutor must define the crime more specifically to assist a defendant in determining the incident the complaint addresses.<\/p>\n

Leach<\/span>, 113 Wn.2d at 698.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d \u00c2\u00a0See Auburn<\/span> v. Brooke<\/span>, 60 Wn.App. 87, 803 P.2d 1235 (1991).\u00c2\u00a0 The Constitutional Requirement of Notice is the Same for Both Complaints and Citations First, the allegations are not in the indictment<\/span> and that\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s fatal. Second, it\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s not “legally” sufficient to just make allegations, those allegations must be based on facts; those facts must establish where, when, why and how the false information was conveyed and what it specifically consisted of<\/span><\/strong>. For one to accuse one of false information after talking with them at length and then not stating specifically what it was that was deemed false is most unreasonable<\/span><\/strong>.<\/p>\n

And if facts are alleged (evidence), then they must be based on the testimony of witnesses with personal knowledge, Rule 602 Federal Rules of Evidence.\u00c2\u00a0 When Paul was in court it is absolutely absurd that Paul would even attempt to hid his identity. Saying Paul John is what I am called, and Hansen is my family name from my fathers side is a clear lawful identification, to which many utilize to avoid association with a legal, \u00e2\u20ac\u0153statutory person\u00e2\u20ac\u009d recognized name.\u00c2\u00a0 It is material when it affects whether the defendant received adequate notice from the information and it is prejudicial when it affects the defendant\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s ability to adequately defend against the charges in the information and those given to the jury in the instructions. Turner v State,<\/span> 892 S.W.2d 737 (Mo.App.1994).\u00c2\u00a0 “Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause. Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.” Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506, 514 (1869).<\/p>\n

[New] Error Arguments<\/span><\/strong> <\/span>#A, All Following Charging Statutes are vague, therefore unconstitutional as applied<\/strong><\/span>; (See Included Forwarded Certified Copies of each charging statute)\u00c2\u00a0 Failure to Comply with Notice of Violation, as in Count No. 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 22, 12, 14, and 15.\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 Sec. 48-53.\u00c2\u00a0 Prosecution of violation.\u00c2\u00a0 (General Penalties 1-10)\u00c2\u00a0 Any person<\/span><\/strong> failing to comply with a section of this code or with a notice<\/span><\/strong> of violation or order served in accordance with this code shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and be punished as provided in section 1-10 of the Omaha Municipal Code<\/span><\/strong>. The filing or pendency of an appeal under this code shall not stay the criminal prosecution of any violation. If the notice of violation is not complied with, the code official may also, in addition to the penalties set out in section 1-10 of this Code, institute the appropriate proceeding at law or in equity to restrain, correct or abate such violation, or to require the removal or termination of the unlawful occupancy of the structure in violation of the provisions of this code or of the order or direction made pursuant thereto.(Ord. No. 36379, \u00c2\u00a7 2, 9-16-03; Ord. No. 37950, \u00c2\u00a7 3, 1-8-08) Having an Unsafe Structure, as in Count No. 4, 13, Sec. 48-71<\/span>.\u00c2\u00a0(a.) General. <\/strong>When a structure or equipment is found by the code official to be unsafe, or when a structure is found unfit for human occupancy, or is found<\/p>\n

unlawful, such structure shall be declared as such by notice pursuant to the provisions of this code. (1)<\/strong>Unsafe structures.<\/em> An unsafe structure is one that is found to be dangerous to the life, health, property or safety of the public or the occupants of the structure by not providing minimum safeguards to protect or warn occupants in the event of fire, or because such structure contains unsafe equipment or is so damaged, decayed, dilapidated, structurally unsafe, or of such faulty construction or unstable foundation, that partial or complete collapse is possible.<\/p>\n

Sec. 1-2.\u00c2\u00a0 Definitions and rules of construction.<\/strong> Person<\/span>:<\/em> The word “person” shall include<\/span> and be applied to a firm, partnership, association, corporation, organization, club, society, group acting as a unit, political subdivision or body politic and corporate, as well as to an individual<\/span>.<\/p>\n

Paul demanded his right to have Plaintiff prove up \u00e2\u20ac\u02dcpersonal jurisdiction\u00e2\u20ac\u2122 timely.<\/p>\n

The above codes are clearly statutory and are to be applied<\/span> to a \u00e2\u20ac\u02dcperson<\/span>\u00e2\u20ac\u2122 as defined in<\/p>\n

Sec. 1-2 (See Sec. 1-2, above, definition of \u00e2\u20ac\u0153Person\u00e2\u20ac\u009d, and certified copy forwarded to this Court)\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 The Plaintiff had a legal and lawful duty to prove on the record and the court had a duty to write or possibly communicate what it has received from Plaintiff as to prove up personal jurisdiction as challenged.\u00c2\u00a0 With no findings given to Paul\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s motion (121:22-25 and 122:1-10) by the Court as required the County Court lost jurisdiction \/ authority to proceed. Such finding are required by law, a breach of law by the court is a constitutional violation, as a due process violation.\u00c2\u00a0 It was due ME.\u00c2\u00a0 Upon reading the charging information and statutes Paul has right to place the proof<\/p>\n

on the moving party if in [fact] he (Paul) is \u00e2\u20ac\u0153included\u00e2\u20ac\u009d in the class the code is to be applied.\u00c2\u00a0 \u00e2\u20ac\u0153Everyone knows\u00e2\u20ac\u009d is not acceptable; this Defendant has\/had a right to cross examine all offers of proof.\u00c2\u00a0 The judgment is void for lack of this said substantives right.\u00c2\u00a0 Charging Information, Obstructing Administration Of Law <\/strong>Sec. 20-21., and False Information Sec. 20-26, and Sec. 20-22, are all associate with a \u00e2\u20ac\u0153person<\/span><\/strong>\u00e2\u20ac\u009d, person as in definitions – <\/strong>Sec. 1-2.\u00c2\u00a0 Definitions and rules of construction. <\/strong>Person:<\/em> The word “person<\/span><\/strong>” shall include and be applied to a firm, partnership, association, corporation, organization, club, society, group acting as a unit, political subdivision or body politic and corporate, as well as to an individual. (SEE Forwarded Certified Copies of this section, also for the below municipal codes.) <\/strong>Sec. 20-21.\u00c2\u00a0 Obstructing law enforcement officer or firefighter.\u00c2\u00a0 It shall be unlawful for any \u00e2\u20ac\u0153person<\/span><\/strong>\u00e2\u20ac\u009d to purposefully or knowingly do any act, refuse to do any act, or to commit an act of omission with the intent to obstruct or<\/p>\n

interfere with any law enforcement officer or firefighter performing\u00c2\u00a0 official duty.<\/p>\n

Sec. 20-22.\u00c2\u00a0 Resisting arrest.\u00c2\u00a0 It shall be unlawful for any \u00e2\u20ac\u0153person<\/span>\u00e2\u20ac\u009d<\/strong> arrested by a police officer, or by any person vested with authority to arrest, to resist arrest.\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 Sec. 20-26.\u00c2\u00a0 Giving false information.\u00c2\u00a0 It shall be unlawful for any \u00e2\u20ac\u0153person<\/span>\u00e2\u20ac\u009d<\/strong> to give any information to a police officer, fireman or other city official, knowing that such information is false.\u00c2\u00a0 The word person is vague and therefore unconstitutional as applied.\u00c2\u00a0 It fails to give notice for the fact that the term \u00e2\u20ac\u0153person\u00e2\u20ac\u009d can not be described by the same word such as \u00e2\u20ac\u0153natural person\u00e2\u20ac\u009d as it is in the definitions.\u00c2\u00a0 Failure to notice due to vagueness can not be notice, no notice can only lead to no code violation.\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 There is no evidence in the record that Paul is a \u00e2\u20ac\u0153person\u00e2\u20ac\u009d as defined.\u00c2\u00a0 The only <\/strong><\/p>\n

\u00e2\u20ac\u02dcone\u00e2\u20ac\u2122 term the City claims is \u00e2\u20ac\u0153individual\u00e2\u20ac\u009d.\u00c2\u00a0 The term individual is vague, it must be interpreter as ether a sole entity, or a named corporation, and thus have no relationship to the living man Paul.<\/strong> ejusdem generis <\/span><\/strong> (ee-jos-dem jen-o-ris also eejoos- or ee-yoos-). [A Latin Term – \u00e2\u20ac\u0153of the same kind or class\u00e2\u20ac\u009d]\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 A canon of construction that when a general word or phrase follows a list of specific persons or things, the general word or phrase will be interpreted to include only persons or things of the same type as those listed.\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 For example, in the phrase horses, cattle, sheep, pigs, goats, or any other barnyard animal, the general language or any other barnyard animal \u00e2\u20ac\u201d despite its seeming breadth \u00e2\u20ac\u201d would probably be held to include only four-legged, hoofed<\/p>\n

mammals (and thus would exclude chickens).\u00c2\u00a0 Person: \u00c2\u00a0The word “person” shall include and be applied to: \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0<This is from the OMAHA MUNICIPAL CODE, Definition of “PERSON”, Sec. 1-2.\u00c2\u00a0 Definitions and rules of construction. <\/strong>Person:<\/em> The word “person<\/span><\/strong>” shall include: a firm,(A legal entity.)\u00c2\u00a0 partnership, (A legal entity.) association, (A legal entity.)\u00c2\u00a0 corporation, (A legal entity.)\u00c2\u00a0 organization, (A legal entity.) club, society, (A legal entity.) group acting as a unit, (A legal entity.) political subdivision, (A legal entity.) or body politic, (A legal entity.)
\nand corporate, (A legal entity.) as well as to an individual<\/span>. \u00c2\u00a0(Therefore<\/span><\/strong> the term individual is deemed as a legal entity.)\u00c2\u00a0 Blacks Law Dictionary 6th Edition <\/sup> page 773, the term \u00e2\u20ac\u0153Individual<\/span><\/strong>\u00e2\u20ac\u009d defined as a noun-\u00c2\u00a0 \u00e2\u20ac\u0153\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6that it may, in proper cases, include artificial persons.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d \u00c2\u00a0The statutes are vague, a common-law court would\/will judge that as true. -\u00e2\u20ac\u0153In common usage, the term `person<\/span><\/strong>\u00e2\u20ac\u2122 does not include the sovereign and statutes employing it will ordinarily not be construed to do so.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d \u00e2\u20ac\u201c US Supreme Court in U.S. v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258,
\n67 SCt 677 (1947): -\u00e2\u20ac\u0153Since in common usage, the term `person<\/span><\/strong>\u00e2\u20ac\u2122 does not include the
\nsovereign, statutes employing the phrase are ordinarily construed to exclude it.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d \u00e2\u20ac\u201c US Supreme Court in US v. Fox 94 US 315:\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 \u00e2\u20ac\u0153the party seeking to establish the court\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s in personam jurisdiction still carries the burden of proof, and the burden does not shift to the party challenging jurisdiction.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d Ameritas Inv. Corp. v. McKinney, 269 Neb. 564, 694 N.W.2d 191 (2005)<\/a><\/p>\n

B. All Charging Statutes and Information(s) lack essential elements of specifics to give constitutional notice<\/span><\/strong>;<\/p>\n

As discussed above a man like Paul is not specifically included and therefore not<\/p>\n

included.\u00c2\u00a0 Vagueness voids all criminal information\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s \/ notices.\u00c2\u00a0 (282:20-24)<\/p>\n

C. Defendant Received no constitutional notice<\/span><\/strong>;\u00c2\u00a0 Paul did not receive any notice to correct any violation due to the fact that the statute is vague and does not specifically include a man like Paul, Paul being a non-statutory person.\u00c2\u00a0 \u00e2\u20ac\u0153\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6due to improper service and lack of actual notice, a court fails to obtain personal<\/a> jurisdiction<\/a> over the party in possession of or owning the property being sold.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 Curtis v. Giff, 17 Neb.App. 149, 757 N.W.2d 139, Neb.App.,2008<\/p>\n

D. Trial Court refused to reveal its jurisdiction to deny defendant a type of trial by jury<\/span><\/strong>;<\/p>\n

Court refused to give written or oral findings as to what Plaintiff offered as evidence on<\/p>\n

the record to prove personal jurisdiction, this being a substantive due process violation. (10:10 to page 12:15, and 281:13-23).<\/p>\n

E. State failed to prove subject property was in the jurisdiction of the corporate STATE OF <\/span><\/strong>NEBRASKA<\/span><\/strong>;\u00c2\u00a0 No evidence is on the record that Paul\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s private property was in the jurisdiction of the corporate STATE OF NEBRASKA.\u00c2\u00a0 \u00e2\u20ac\u0153the party seeking to establish the court\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s in personam jurisdiction still carries the burden of proof, and the burden does not shift to the party challenging jurisdiction.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d Ameritas Inv. Corp. v. McKinney, 269 Neb. 564, 694 N.W.2d 191 (2005)<\/a><\/p>\n

F. State failed to prove subject property was in the jurisdiction of the corporate <\/span><\/strong>CITY<\/span><\/strong> OF <\/span><\/strong>OMAHA<\/span><\/strong>;\u00c2\u00a0 No evidence is on the record that Paul\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s private property was in the jurisdiction of the corporate STATE OF NEBRASKA. \u00e2\u20ac\u0153the party seeking to establish the court\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s in personam jurisdiction still carries the burden of proof, and the burden does not shift to party challenging jurisdiction.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d Ameritas Inv. Corp. v. McKinney, 269 Neb. 564, 694 N.W.2d 191 (2005)<\/a><\/p>\n

G. Court<\/span><\/strong> failed to confirm that prosecutor was licensed by the STATE OF <\/span><\/strong>NEBRASKA<\/span><\/strong> authorities<\/span><\/strong>;<\/p>\n

H.Court errored to see Defendant had no funds to repair or demo any subject buildings, therefore can not be punished for an impossibility<\/span><\/strong>;\u00c2\u00a0 Paul notified the court that he had no fund to do any repairs or demolition. (304:11-12)\u00c2\u00a0 It is unconstitutional to punish a man for an act it is impossible for him to perform.<\/p>\n

[New] Error Arguments # I, Court errored to see that <\/span><\/strong>Nebraska<\/span><\/strong> statutes chapter 28 does not include a violation of an municipal code as a criminal act<\/span><\/strong>;<\/p>\n

Chapter 28 of the Nebraska Revised Statutes has no provision in it for the municipal code<\/p>\n

to be classed as a criminal charge.\u00c2\u00a0 This being purely a law argument, as to a subject<\/p>\n

matter jurisdictional challenge.\u00c2\u00a0 If the Nebraska Legislature has not constitutional<\/p>\n

authority to class said code violations as criminal it in turn then forbidden to pass such<\/p>\n

non-existing permission onto this municipal corporation now existing as a metropolitan<\/p>\n

city and known as the “City of Omaha” a body corporate and politic.<\/p>\n

[New] Error Arguments # J., Court errored in not noticing that no affidavit accompanied the information of a damaged party by the man called Paul John Hansen, as \u00e2\u20ac\u0153not\u00e2\u20ac\u009d a named corporation<\/span>. <\/strong>If due process would have been followed, Paul would have exercised his sovereign right as a de jure Citizen, native-born Nebraska man.\u00c2\u00a0 Paul then would have forced the<\/p>\n

proof of a complaining party, their affidavit, and proof of damage for as to give the court its needed element of personal jurisdiction.\u00c2\u00a0 No person can make a criminal complaint upon said man but by affidavit.\u00c2\u00a0 Common Law demands this.\u00c2\u00a0 No proof is found in the record of Paul being of a privileged class. Paul class of right by birth demands his right of common-law due process.\u00c2\u00a0 This DOUGLAS COUNTY court and its aiding county prosecutor railroaded Paul past his common law right on to a statutory privileged venue, or better said the authority to resolve the controversy by an administrative court .\u00c2\u00a0 The controversy had no business in a statutory court and said must be resolved in a common law jurisdiction, period.\u00c2\u00a0 The statutory court had not ascertained jurisdiction as was its duty.\u00c2\u00a0 No evidence was placed on the record that the named<\/p>\n

defendant as \u00e2\u20ac\u0153Paul J Hansen\u00e2\u20ac\u009d is as \u00e2\u20ac\u0153not\u00e2\u20ac\u009d a named corporation.<\/p>\n

K. Court errored when Defendant motioned for Plaintiff to prove up Personal Jurisdiction, with written findings of fact and conclusions of law, to which nothing was placed on the record, nether were findings written into the record.<\/span> (This error is essentially the same as one of Suder\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s list.) <\/strong>The Court error is in not first having Plaintiff prove up personal jurisdiction \u00e2\u20ac\u0153on the record\u00e2\u20ac\u009d when challenged timely by Paul. (30:22-23 and 33:11-14)<\/p>\n

Paul asks for findings of facts and conclusions of law as to said challenge\/motion.<\/p>\n

(32:25 to 33:1)\u00c2\u00a0 Paul noticed the Court that the Prosecutors words can not be evidence<\/p>\n

upon Paul\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s objected or challenged.\u00c2\u00a0 (36:7-9) Paul orally informed the Court of some of the essential elements of personal jurisdiction, and with supporting notice of Case law offered as EXHIBT #1. (36:9-16 and 37:12-14)\u00c2\u00a0 Court received EXHIBIT No. 1 (SEE 39a in B.O.E.)\u00c2\u00a0 Paul as an untrained layman as to court procedure relies on basic common law efforts to have the court take judicial notice of the case law in said Exhibit No. 1. (37:8-9)\u00c2\u00a0 The 8th<\/sup> Circuit Federal Court clearly notices that personal jurisdiction is a \u00e2\u20ac\u0153prerequisite<\/span><\/strong>\u00e2\u20ac\u009d that meaning Paul had no obligation or could not be compelled against his will to face the pains of trial until the plaintiff meet \u00e2\u20ac\u0153FIRST\u00e2\u20ac\u009d said prerequisites,<\/span><\/strong> and placed them before the court \u00e2\u20ac\u0153ON\/IN THE RECORD\u00e2\u20ac\u009d. (SEE EXHIBIT No. 1 Cases of Kellogg, Sanders, and Hatridge) Simply stated the court gains personal jurisdiction over Paul only through the evidence offered by the Plaintiff, and can not be assumed or upon presumption due to Paul\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s timely challenge.\u00c2\u00a0 No evidence and no court findings, of personal jurisdiction is found in the record, therefore the County Court lost, or did not gain, personal jurisdiction as is required by law upon Paul\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s challenge. \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0Also it is important that if the court is one of limited jurisdiction, if challenged, the jurisdiction must be proven by the Plaintiff.\u00c2\u00a0 Paul also gave noticed to the Judge on the day of trial that evidence of personal jurisdiction has not been placed on the record, and that the court lacks jurisdiction to proceed against Paul. (121:22-25 and 122:1-10)\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 Paul was forced to face an administrative hearing, denied the protection of a comm.-law trial by a jury.\u00c2\u00a0 Substantial due process denied Paul.<\/p>\n

As to being denied findings, orally or written, by the court see below:<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Paul\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s motion for findings, (SEE Motions in file, I never received a copy of them so can not locate them\/it for you.), were\/are civil in nature.\u00c2\u00a0 Any courts determination as to the record of personal jurisdiction is common-law in nature.\u00c2\u00a0 The Trial Court is purely statutory, and administrative in nature.\u00c2\u00a0 Jurisdiction to apply a municipal code is based on \u00e2\u20ac\u009dprivileged class\u00e2\u20ac\u009d\u00c2\u00a0 on USA territory. Denial of findings for Paul is a due process violation, the court loses jurisdiction, and any judgment of the trial court lacking jurisdiction due to a sustentative due process violation creates only void judgments.\u00c2\u00a0 Paul requested finding, court denied findings.\u00c2\u00a0 Paul challenges<\/span><\/strong> Plaintiff to find requested findings in the record to prove compliance.\u00c2\u00a0 Nebr. Revised Statutes\u00c2\u00a0 25-1127. Trial by court; general finding; findings of fact; conclusions of law.\u00c2\u00a0 Upon the trial of questions of fact by the court, it shall not be necessary for the court to state its finding, except, generally, for the plaintiff or defendant, unless one of the parties request it, with a view of excepting to the decision of the court upon the questions of law involved in the trial; in which case the court shall state in writing the conclusions of fact found separately from the conclusions of law.\u00c2\u00a0 Source:<\/strong>R.S.1867, Code \u00c2\u00a7 297, p. 444; R.S.1913, \u00c2\u00a7 7865; C.S.1922, \u00c2\u00a7 8810; C.S.1929, \u00c2\u00a7 20-1127; R.S.1943, \u00c2\u00a7 25-1127.\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 Paul did timely request findings. (110:9-21)\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 \u00e2\u20ac\u0153The court need only state its finding generally unless one of the parties timely<\/span><\/strong> requests conclusions of fact.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d Henkle & Joyce Hardware Co. v. Maco, Inc., 195 Neb. 565, 239 \u00c2\u00a0N.W.2d 772 (1976).\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 Special findings are unnecessary unless<\/span><\/strong> requested. Bailey v. McCoy, 187 Neb. 618, 193 N.W.2d 270 (1971).\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 Any future common-law review (trial for damages) will clearly show that the Trial Court and or the Plaintiff denied the record proof of personal jurisdiction for a reason, they had<\/p>\n

no proof.\u00c2\u00a0 As stated in Paul\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s first hand written brief as to personal jurisdiction<\/span><\/strong> see the following:\u00c2\u00a0 It is important that if the court is one of limited jurisdiction, if challenged, the<\/p>\n

jurisdiction must be proven by the Plaintiff.\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 Paul primary ability to even begin to build a defense is contingent to this knowledge.\u00c2\u00a0 The County court made error by denying Paul such essential information. (110:9-21)\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 One big question is, \u00e2\u20ac\u0153what did the Plaintiff offer the Court\u00e2\u20ac\u009d that gives force and effect of law why Paul was\/is to be subject, to the trial court, an administrative court, and denied his demand for a common law trial by jury as a free inhabitant.\u00c2\u00a0 One would think that the Plaintiff can be brought before a court of common law and then be forced to produce the said evidence, and if none can be produced, face judgments for damages, and establish a void judgment with this original case.\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 Authorities<\/span><\/strong> of case law \u00e2\u20ac\u0153While the plaintiffs bear the ultimate burden of proof<\/span><\/strong>, personal jurisdiction need not be proved by a preponderance of the evidence until trial or until the court holds an evidentiary hearing.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d Ameritas Inv. Corp. v. McKinney, 269 Neb. 564, 694 N.W.2d 191 Neb.,2005.\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 There is no preponderance of evidence found in the record of this case. \u00e2\u20ac\u0153Personal<\/a> jurisdiction<\/a> is the power of a tribunal to subject and bind a particular entity to its decisions.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 \u00e2\u20ac\u0153Lack of personal<\/a> jurisdiction<\/a> may be waived and such jurisdiction conferred by the conduct of the parties.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d Trogdon v. Trogdon, 18 Neb.App. 313, 780 N.W.2d 45, Neb.App.,2010.\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 No preponderance of evidence is found in the record therefore nothing can be binding as to this case.\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 Paul never waived any type of claim of personal jurisdiction unto the court or the Plaintiff.\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 Paul just demanded that Plaintiff prove, on the record, evidence that jurisdiction exist that Paul has a duty to stand before a bench trial and has no right to a jury trial in this instant case.\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 \u00e2\u20ac\u0153\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6due to improper service and lack of actual notice, a court fails to obtain personal<\/a> jurisdiction<\/a> over the party in possession of or owning the property being sold.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 Curtis v. Giff, 17 Neb.App. 149, 757 N.W.2d 139, Neb.App.,2008.\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 No evidence of personal service, or actual notice upon Paul is found anywhere in the record.<\/p>\n

\u00e2\u20ac\u0153A judgment entered without personal<\/a> jurisdiction<\/a> is void.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d\u00c2\u00a0 Cave v. Reiser 268 Neb. 539, 684 N.W.2d 580, Neb.,2004.\u00c2\u00a0 \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0This cases judgments are void where personal jurisdiction is not proven in the record on each individual charge, \u00e2\u20ac\u0153\u00e2\u20ac\u00a6a party could file a special appearance for the sole purpose of objecting to the court\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s assertion of personal<\/a> jurisdiction<\/a> over the objector.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 Miller v. Steichen, 268 Neb. 328, 682 N.W.2d 702, Neb.,2004.\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 Paul was arrested and forced before the court and did each time challenge personal jurisdiction as with each individual charge.<\/p>\n

\u00e2\u20ac\u0153the party seeking to establish the court\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s in personam jurisdiction still carries the burden of proof, and the burden does not shift to the party challenging jurisdiction.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d Ameritas Inv. Corp. v. McKinney, 269 Neb. 564, 694 N.W.2d 191 (2005)<\/a>.\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 The Plaintiff produced no preponderance of evidence to prove up personal jurisdiction when challenged on the record.\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 \u00e2\u20ac\u0153To defeat a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the nonmoving party need only make a prima facie showing of jurisdiction.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d Applied Underwriters, Inc. v. Employer Outsource Service, Inc., 2007 WL 1470454 (Neb. Ct. App. 2007)<\/a>.\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 No prima facia showing is found in the record and court refused to revile such finding, evidence noticed, to Paul so that he could challenge such alleged evidence.\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 Persuasive<\/span><\/strong> Cases:\u00c2\u00a0 Plaintiff has burden<\/a> to sustain requisite jurisdiction<\/a> when motion is made to dismiss for lack of personal<\/a> jurisdiction<\/a>, but once prima facie case has been established, defendant bears burden<\/a> of producing evidence to rebut that showing.\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 Omni Lingua, Inc<\/a>. v. Great Golf Resorts of World, Inc<\/a>. 500 N.W.2d 721, Iowa App.,1993.\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 No evidence was ever presented so Paul could rebut.\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 Court refused to reveal findings when motioned. Statute 25-1127, 1131,\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 The Court of Appeals held that personal<\/a> jurisdiction<\/a> over nonresident former employee was consistent with due process. Omaha Cold Storage Terminals v. Cunningham 417 N.W.2d 254, Iowa App.,1987.\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 Thus if personal jurisdiction is not proven as challenged it is a due process violation against the man Paul.\u00c2\u00a0 “Where a court failed to observe safeguards, it amounts to denial of due process of law, court is deprived of jurisdiction.”\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 Merritt v. Hunter, C.A. Kansas 170 F2d 739.\u00c2\u00a0 Motion to Dismiss, Personal Jurisdiction Challenge. (T 99-100, and 101)\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 “When acting to enforce a statute and its subsequent amendments to the present date, the<\/p>\n

judge of the municipal court is acting as an administrative officer and not in a judicial capacity; courts in administering or enforcing statutes do not act judicially, but merely ministerially”.\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 Thompson v. Smith, 154 SE 583.\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 The free inhabitant, Paul, demanded proof that they had legal standing to force him in front of the cases administrative officer, and thus denying him a common-law trial by jury guaranteed in the organic law of the land due to native-born men like Paul.\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 L. Court errored to see that the Plaintiff failed to produced sufficient evidence that each individual charge did in fact apply to the Defendant as a private man, and not a statutory person\/entity only.<\/span> (Essentially acknowledging a difference of Public statutes vs. Private state.)\u00c2\u00a0 (This error is essentially the same as one of Suder\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s list.) <\/strong>No evidence was produced that Paul was a \u00e2\u20ac\u0153privileged<\/span>\u00e2\u20ac\u009d person (a statutorily governed person), therefore the presumption of right remains which is governed by common law.\u00c2\u00a0 No evidence was presented that the Man Paul John or his property was subject to written laws that apply upon land owned or ceded to a government entity associated with the United States of America. Paul John, Appellant, has a natural right to own, use, enjoy, alienate, <\/span><\/strong>defend in a common law court, and even exclude man created government, agencies, from his private property that is not in a United States of America Possession or Territory <\/span><\/strong>subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States of America. \u00c2\u00a0\u00e2\u20ac\u0153the free inhabitants of each of these States,..\u00e2\u20ac\u009d Article IV. Articles of Confederation of November 15, 1777, Paul John, Appellant, has a natural right to a <\/span><\/strong>common law remedy with all issues related to his private property, land, independent of written law.<\/span><\/strong> Paul as \u00e2\u20ac\u0153the free inhabitants of each of these States,..\u00e2\u20ac\u009d Article IV. Articles of Confederation of November 15, 1777. \u00c2\u00a0Though safety and health is a common law violation the Plaintiff did not allege this but claimed that Paul was subject to the City Municipal Code.\u00c2\u00a0 If a common law claim was initiated by the Plaintiff the controversy would have flowed to a common-law hearing upon Paul\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s demand as a native-born of right. <\/strong>It is a violation of the CITY OF OMAHA charter\/constitution to drag those not in their jurisdiction to their administrative courts.\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 Paul\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s motion for Plaintiff to put fact proof of personal jurisdiction, with court findings, to prove jurisdiction over Him had to be done for each individual charge before the court could gain personal jurisdiction over Paul and force him through the pains of discovery, legal cost, trial, gathering witnesses and evidence for his defense and ultimately trial before the administrative court\/tribunal. \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0a. Plaintiff produced no fact proof that Paul placed his land and shelters in the corporate CITY OF OMAHA, or corporate DOUGLAS COUNTY, or corporate STATE OF NEBRASKA. \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0b. Plaintiff produced no fact proof that Paul\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s land or shelters were open to the public except by trespass.\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 c. Plaintiff produced no fact proof that Paul did any act to give jurisdiction to the Administrative Trial Court.\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 SEE all case law above, in argument \u00e2\u20ac\u0153K\u00e2\u20ac\u009d, to support this challenge also<\/p>\n

M. Court errored in not noticing that Paul was denied due process.<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

As a law argument for proof of the lack of subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction Paul argues the following:\u00c2\u00a0 City claimed investigation as to Code Violations on several Paul\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s property, City claimed notice by mailing and attachment to various front doors of Paul\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s homes. (SEE EXHIBIT NO. 33)\u00c2\u00a0 Paul claims no notice, and herein notices this court of a record that is void of a constitutional notice.\u00c2\u00a0 Paul now notices the court that said alleged notice gives Paul \u00e2\u20ac\u015320 days\u00e2\u20ac\u009d to appeal to the \u00e2\u20ac\u0153Omaha Building Board\u00e2\u20ac\u009d. (SEE EXHIBIT NO. 33, page one, paragraph 2)<\/p>\n

This is clearly stated that Paul does not get a hearing before the city demanded Paul to vacate the property within two days of the date of this notice. Notice date Oct. 7, ordered to vacate Oct. 9, 2008. Paul therefore not only did not receive constitutional notice, for no place in the record is there evidence Paul waived any constitutional protection such as due process at \u00e2\u20ac\u0153notice\u00e2\u20ac\u009d, but was moved immediately to a penalty phase as \u00e2\u20ac\u0153vacate\u00e2\u20ac\u009d and \u00e2\u20ac\u0153pay $100.00\u00e2\u20ac\u009d if you want to appeal.<\/p>\n

What do we have here: a. Starts with an alleged violation. b. No constitutional notice.\u00c2\u00a0 c. Notice to vacate. d. No hearing. e. Told if you want your \u00e2\u20ac\u0153first\u00e2\u20ac\u009d hearing (appeal) you must pay $100.00.\u00c2\u00a0 Does not this man have due process rights?\u00c2\u00a0 Does Paul have a right to a hearing.\u00c2\u00a0 Must he pay before he can be heard?\u00c2\u00a0 Is being heard a right. Is it not true that a right can not be taxed?\u00c2\u00a0 Is not demanding $100.00 Federal Reserve one dollar notes a tax?\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 \u00c2\u00a0Is it not constitutional for hearing first then the appeal?\u00c2\u00a0 Clearly a due process violation of the worst sort.\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 The plaintiff is damaging Paul and has violated its own charter by denying due process systematically and constructively, against the native \u00e2\u20ac\u201cborn private person and his private property.\u00c2\u00a0 Paul was denied due process for his natural right, God given right, of a jury trial, as found in the Nebraska Constitution a Charter baring excess government and lack of due process. \u00e2\u20ac\u0153..The right<\/span><\/strong> of trial by jury<\/span><\/strong> shall<\/span><\/strong> remain inviolate<\/span><\/strong>, ..\u00e2\u20ac\u009d\u00c2\u00a0 Neb. Const. art. I, sec. 6 (1875).\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 Adding the said Constitution (Charter \/ Limiting Document) does not state any time limit but says quote \u00e2\u20ac\u201c \u00e2\u20ac\u0153inviolate,\u00e2\u20ac\u009d.\u00c2\u00a0 The courts or the legislature can not, abridge this protection, or infringe on Paul, as a native-born, with his natural rights, from God, to a trial by jury, period.\u00c2\u00a0 The said right never came from the government (State) or man (state) and man or the government can not lawfully or legally take the said right away.\u00c2\u00a0 \u00e2\u20ac\u0153It is a part of our fundamental law that the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d Fugate v. Skate, 169 Neb. 420, 99 N.W.2d 868 (1959).<\/p>\n

N. No evidence is in the record of a promulgated rule that identifies Paul as one <\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

subject to the municipal code, essentially to prove force and effect of law. <\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

No evidence has been presented by the Plaintiff, on the record, that the code that Paul was accused of violating has a record of a promulgated rule that identifies Paul as one subject to the municipal code, to prove notice and force and effect of law upon Paul. (30:22-23 and 33:11-14)<\/p>\n

O. Court<\/span><\/strong> errored in not noticing that no statute is found in the record makes a violation of a municipal code a criminal violation.<\/span> <\/strong>No evidence has been produced to prove that the charges Omaha Municipal Code violations is a criminal violation.<\/p>\n

P. The Court errored that a charge of \u00e2\u20ac\u0153Giving False Information\u00e2\u20ac\u009d is not a criminal act subject to arrest<\/span>. <\/strong>Paul was arrested unconstitutionally for allegedly giving false information which is not a breach of the peace.\u00c2\u00a0 \u00e2\u20ac\u0153For the purpose of breach of the peace statute, peace is that state and sense of safety which is necessary to the comfort and happiness of every citizen, and which government is instituted to secure.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d\u00c2\u00a0 State v. Edwards, 239 S,C. 339, 123 S.E. 2d 247, 249.\u00c2\u00a0 Also it is highly suspect that the \u00e2\u20ac\u0153Omaha Police Department is a government entity.\u00c2\u00a0 Evidence is that it is a corporation doing business as the \u00e2\u20ac\u0153corporate OMAHA POLICE DEPARTMENT\u00e2\u20ac\u009d so registered with EIN number, the same for the \u00e2\u20ac\u0153corporate CITY OF OMAHA\u00e2\u20ac\u009d.<\/p>\n

Q. The Court errored in not noticing that when Paul was arrested and told he was going to be booked that he was not taken before a Magistrate as is due process for any act that is not a breach of the peace.<\/span> <\/strong>Paul was arrested unconstitutionally for allegedly giving false information which is not a breach of the peace.\u00c2\u00a0 Paul therefore had due process right to be taken before a Magistrate for a probable cause hearing before being deprived his liberty as is due a native-born, free inhabitant, man.<\/p>\n

S<\/span><\/strong>UMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Whether it be law or not is not argued here by Paul, where the written law \u00e2\u20ac\u0153is law\u00e2\u20ac\u009d is the ultimate question before this court.\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 The Constitution of September 17, 1787, Article VI Clause 2 states:<\/p>\n

\u00e2\u20ac\u0153This Constitution<\/span><\/strong>, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land<\/span>; and the Judges in every State<\/span> shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d<\/p>\n

Any first year student of law should know as did the members of the Constitutional Convention that laws made under the authority of \u00e2\u20ac\u0153this Constitution<\/span><\/strong>\u00e2\u20ac\u009d would always be limited to the Land owned by the United States of America.<\/p>\n

The \u00e2\u20ac\u0153Law\u00e2\u20ac\u009d is the legislation enacted pursuant to \u00e2\u20ac\u0153[A]ll legislative Powers herein granted\u00e2\u20ac\u009d and \u00e2\u20ac\u0153vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d\u00c2\u00a0 At the minimum the authority is proprietary power, possibly not legislative power.\u00c2\u00a0 The governable \u00e2\u20ac\u0153Land\u00e2\u20ac\u009d is identified in Article IV of the Northwest Ordinance of July 13, 1787:<\/p>\n

\u00e2\u20ac\u0153The said territory<\/span>, and the States which may be formed therein<\/span>, shall forever remain a part of this Confederacy of the United States of America, subject to the Articles of Confederation, and to such alterations therein as shall be constitutionally made; and to all the acts and ordinances of the United States in Congress assembled, conformable thereto.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d<\/p>\n

Ratification of this Constitution by the first nine States establishes \u00e2\u20ac\u0153this Constitution\u00e2\u20ac\u009d among the States (entities) not the people<\/span><\/strong> of those states, a people<\/span><\/strong> which Paul is as a \u00e2\u20ac\u0153free inhabitant\u00e2\u20ac\u009d.<\/p>\n

\u00e2\u20ac\u0153..,the free inhabitants<\/span><\/strong> of each of these States, paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives from justice excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens<\/span><\/strong> in the several States;..\u00e2\u20ac\u009d Article IV, Articles of Confederation of November 15, 1777.<\/p>\n

No proof is found on the record that any act of Appellant was done on Land, ceded to, or owned by the United States of America, of which the State of Nebraska, City of Omaha, and Douglas County, are subdivisions of.\u00c2\u00a0 If the subject Land is not owned by the USA it is NOT governed by the USA or the USA subdivisions as a matter of law.<\/p>\n

The County Court erred by convicting and sentencing Appellant. The District Court erred in affirming because there was no evidence introduced at trial that the Omaha City Code applies to Appellant. Furthermore, there was not sufficient evidence introduced at trial for the Court(s) to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant had the requisite mental state for conviction of Resisting Arrest, False Information, and two counts of Obstruction of a Law Enforcement Officer. Finally, the sentence that Appellant received was excessive, since the court did not consider the non-violent character of the offenses, and the court was improperly swayed by the fact that Appellant proceeded pro se. Accordingly, Appellant respectfully requests that the Nebraska Appeals Court reverse the County Court\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s convictions and sentencing decisions. As to all charges Paul John: Hansen did not violate any law that had evidence of force and effect upon him by the record of this case. Plaintiff failed to prove personal jurisdiction on the record<\/span><\/strong> as to each individual charges. The record shows a multitude of due process violations.\u00c2\u00a0 Paul John has, and had, a common law right, as a birth right, to remedy in trial by jury, and no code, statute, legal or lawful entity can subvert such.\u00c2\u00a0 All Courts on the Land of Nebraska, The United States and the United States of America have a foremost duty to not infringe upon any rights of this Appellant.\u00c2\u00a0 Respectfully ask that this Court reverse all charges as is it\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s duty in this instant case as a matter of law and of justice compliant with an republic form of government.\u00c2\u00a0 All references to written law above is only to acknowledge State government limitations and in no way does Paul as an free inhabitant exchange\/consent to accepting State protection as a constitutional right but always relies upon His own God given birth right as a free inhabitant as found in Article IV of the Articles of Confederation of November 15, 1777.\u00c2\u00a0 I trust that if this case is not ruled as requested a court of competent jurisdiction, as a right, will force the disclosure of all essential jurisdictional challenges, for no bar against can lawfully exist.<\/p>\n

1-7-2011\u00c2\u00a0 _______________________\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 Appellant<\/p>\n

called- Paul John: Hansen, A Free Inhabitant<\/p>\n

<\/span><\/p>\n

<\/span><\/p>\n

CERTIFICATE<\/span> OF<\/span> SERVICE<\/span><\/p>\n

I, the signed, hereby certified that a 2 true copies of the above and foregoing Brief was personally served on Marty Conboy, Assistant City Prosecutor, Hall of Justice, and one (1) original and ten (10) copies to the captioned Nebraska Appeals Court, by pre-paid post, US Mailing, this day of January 7, 2011.\u00c2\u00a0 \u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0_________________<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

360 Day Jail Sentence Appeal to Nebraska Appeal Court, Brief, Composed by Paul John: Hansen.\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 (Word Document, parts are scrambled in transfer.) NO. A-10-000983\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0\u00c2\u00a0 (due\u00c2\u00a0 1-12-10) Gray IN THE NEBRASKA COURT OF APPEALS STATE OF NEBRASKA Plaintiff, Appellee vs. Paul … Continue reading →<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[50,11],"tags":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"http:\/\/www.pauljjhansen.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/162"}],"collection":[{"href":"http:\/\/www.pauljjhansen.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"http:\/\/www.pauljjhansen.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/www.pauljjhansen.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/www.pauljjhansen.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=162"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"http:\/\/www.pauljjhansen.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/162\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":163,"href":"http:\/\/www.pauljjhansen.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/162\/revisions\/163"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"http:\/\/www.pauljjhansen.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=162"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/www.pauljjhansen.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=162"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/www.pauljjhansen.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=162"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}