{"id":1950,"date":"2019-01-24T02:11:15","date_gmt":"2019-01-24T02:11:15","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.pauljjhansen.com\/?p=1950"},"modified":"2019-01-24T02:23:36","modified_gmt":"2019-01-24T02:23:36","slug":"recording-publicly-your-rights","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"http:\/\/www.pauljjhansen.com\/?p=1950","title":{"rendered":"Recording Publicly, your rights?"},"content":{"rendered":"<style type=\"text\/css\">\n\t<!-- @page { margin: 0.79in } P { margin-bottom: 0.08in } H2 { margin-bottom: 0.08in } H2.cjk { font-family: \"SimSun\" } H2.ctl { font-family: \"Arial\" } H3 { margin-bottom: 0.08in } H3.cjk { font-family: \"SimSun\" } H3.ctl { font-family: \"Arial\" } A:link { so-language: zxx } --><br \/>\t<\/style>\n<h2 class=\"western\"><span style=\"color: #0000ff; font-size: medium;\"><span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;\"><b>B<span style=\"color: #0000ff;\">efore Recording Publicly read carefully. Also challenge if the land you are on is in fact owned by the United State<\/span>s.<\/b><\/span><\/span><\/h2>\n<p>[[[Also SEE &gt;\u00a0See Blackston v. Alabama, 30 F.3d 117, 120 (11th Cir.1994) (finding that plaintiffs&#8217; interest in <span style=\"color: #ff0000;\">filming public meetings<\/span> is protected by the First Amendment) ]]]<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<h2 class=\"western\"><span style=\"color: #000000;\"><span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"><b>United States Court of Appeals,Ninth Circuit.<\/b><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/h2>\n<h3 class=\"western\" align=\"CENTER\"><span style=\"color: #000000;\"><span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"><b>Jerry Edmon FORDYCE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CITY OF SEATTLE, Defendant-Appellant.<\/b><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/h3>\n<h3 class=\"western\" align=\"CENTER\"><span style=\"color: #000000;\"><span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"><b>Jerry Edmon FORDYCE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF SEATTLE; \u2009M.S. Donnelly; \u2009C. Villagracia, Defendants-Appellees. \u2002(Two Cases.)<\/b><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/h3>\n<h3 class=\"western\" align=\"CENTER\"><span style=\"color: #000000;\"><span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"><b>Jerry Edmon FORDYCE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CITY OF SEATTLE, Defendant-Appellant, M.S. Donnelly; \u2009C. Villagracia, Defendants.<\/b><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/h3>\n<h3 class=\"western\" align=\"CENTER\"><span style=\"color: #000000;\"><span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"><b>Nos.\u200293-35824, 93-35840, 93-35991 and 93-36020.<\/b><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/h3>\n<h3 class=\"western\" align=\"CENTER\"><span style=\"color: #000000;\">\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0<span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"><b>Decided: May 16, 1995<\/b><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/h3>\n<p align=\"LEFT\"><span style=\"color: #000000;\"><span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: small;\">Before: \u2009LAY,*TROTT and T.G. NELSON, Circuit Judges. Ted Buck, Stafford Frey Cooper, Seattle, WA, for defendants-appellants-appellees. James E. Lobsenz, Carney, Badley, Smith &amp; Spellman, Seattle, WA, for plaintiff-appellee-appellant.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p align=\"LEFT\"><span style=\"color: #000000;\"><span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: small;\">I.\u2003Background<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p align=\"LEFT\"><span style=\"color: #000000;\"><span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: small;\">This case arises from the alleged interference by police officers of the City of Seattle with Jerry Edmon Fordyce&#8217;s attempt on August 5, 1990 to videotape a public protest march. \u2002 Fordyce, who apparently considered himself part of the protest, had volunteered to videotape the demonstration for \u201clocal television production,\u201d presumably for broadcast on a public access channel. \u2002 Among his subjects were the activities of the police officers assigned to work the event. \u2002 Not surprisingly, the police themselves became targets of the protest and were subjected to rude and profane insults. \u2002 Generally, the police reacted to this treatment in a calm and professional manner, but the record suggests that some of these officers were not pleased with Fordyce&#8217;s actions, and that one officer in particular attempted physically to dissuade Fordyce from his mission. \u2002 At the end of the day, in a separate incident, a different officer arrested Fordyce when he attempted to videotape some sidewalk bystanders against their wishes. \u2002 Fordyce was charged with violating a Washington State privacy statute, Wash.Rev.Code \u00a7\u20029.73.030, which forbids the recording of private conversations without the consent of all participants.<\/span><\/span><\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/caselaw.findlaw.com\/us-9th-circuit\/1054985.html#footnote_1\" name=\"footnote_ref_1\"><span style=\"color: #006699;\"><span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: small;\">1<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/a><span style=\"color: #000000;\"><span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: small;\">\u00a0\u2002Fordyce spent the night in jail. \u2002 On October 1, 1990, the charges against Fordyce were dismissed on motion of the prosecuting attorney.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p align=\"LEFT\"><span style=\"color: #000000;\"><span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: small;\">Subsequently, Fordyce brought a civil-rights suit against the City of Seattle and eight Seattle police officers. \u2002 Fordyce sought damages from the officers in their individual capacities pursuant to 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u20021983 for interfering with his First Amendment right to (((<span style=\"color: #ff0000;\">gather news and for arresting him<\/span>))) without the requisite probable cause for allegedly violating Wash.Rev.Code \u00a7\u20029.73.030. \u2002 He also invoked supplemental jurisdiction in order to seek damages from the officers in their individual capacities for violations of state tort law. \u2002 Fordyce sought permanent injunctive relief against the City of Seattle and the officers forbidding enforcement of Wash.Rev.Code \u00a7\u20029.73.030 against amateur journalists such as himself, and sought damages from the City of Seattle pursuant to \u00a7\u20021983 and supplemental state tort claims. \u2002 Fordyce demanded attorney&#8217;s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u20021988.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p align=\"LEFT\"><span style=\"color: #000000;\"><span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: small;\">The defendants moved for summary judgment, and Fordyce moved for partial summary judgment. \u2002 The district court granted the defendants&#8217; motion for summary judgment as to Fordyce&#8217;s pre-arrest \u00a7\u20021983 and state tort claims, finding \u201cno evidence that would permit a rational jury to find that he was assaulted.\u201d \u2002Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 840 F.Supp. 784, 788 (W.D.Wash.1993). \u2002 The district court also granted the defendants&#8217; motion for summary judgment as to Fordyce&#8217;s damages claims pursuant to \u00a7\u20021983 and state law torts, concluding that the individual police officers were qualifiedly immune and the city nonliable. \u2002Id. at 788-91.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p align=\"LEFT\"><span style=\"color: #000000;\"><span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: small;\">The district court declined to award Fordyce the injunctive relief he had requested. \u2002 Instead, the district court sua sponte awarded Fordyce declaratory relief, which he had not requested, declaring that Wash.Rev.Code \u00a7\u20029.73.030 \u201cdoes not prohibit the videotaping or sound-recording of conversations held in a public street, within the hearing of persons not participating in the conversation, by means of a readily apparent recording device.\u201d \u2002Id. at 794.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p align=\"LEFT\"><span style=\"color: #000000;\"><span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: small;\">After entry of the declaratory judgment, Fordyce requested attorney&#8217;s fees against the City of Seattle (but not against the defendant police officers). \u2002 The defendants requested attorney&#8217;s fees as well, on the ground that Fordyce&#8217;s suit had been frivolous as to certain individual officers. \u2002 On October 13, 1993, the district court issued two unpublished orders. \u2002 The first granted attorney&#8217;s fees to Fordyce as a \u201cprevailing party\u201d under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u20021988, but only in the amount of 20 percent of the fees Fordyce had requested. \u2002 The second denied attorney&#8217;s fees to the defendants.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p align=\"LEFT\"><span style=\"color: #000000;\"><span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: small;\">Both parties appeal the district court&#8217;s orders. \u2002 The City of Seattle and the individual defendants appeal the district court&#8217;s award of declaratory relief, award of attorney&#8217;s fees to Fordyce as a \u201cprevailing party,\u201d and denial of the defendants&#8217; attorney&#8217;s fees. \u2002 Fordyce appeals the district court&#8217;s grant of summary judgment to the City and the individual officers and the amount of attorney&#8217;s fees awarded to him. \u2002 We affirm in part, reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p align=\"LEFT\"><span style=\"color: #000000;\"><span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: small;\">II.\u2003Liability and Damages<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p align=\"LEFT\"><span style=\"color: #000000;\">\u2003<span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: small;\">The district court based some of its dispositive rulings on its conclusion that the record contained \u201cno evidence that would permit a rational jury to find that [Fordyce] was assaulted.\u201d \u2002Fordyce, 840 F.Supp. at 788. \u2002 We respectfully disagree. \u2002 As we read the record, a genuine issue of material fact does exist regarding whether Fordyce was (((<\/span><\/span><span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: small;\"><span style=\"color: #ff0000;\">assaulted and battered by a Seattle police<\/span>)))<\/span><\/span><span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: small;\"> officer in an attempt to prevent or dissuade him from exercising his First <\/span><\/span><span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: small;\">Amendment<\/span><\/span><span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: small;\"> right to (((<\/span><\/span><span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif; color: #ff0000; font-size: small;\">film matters of public interest<\/span><span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: small;\"><span style=\"color: #ff0000;\">.<\/span>))) \u2002 Fordyce testified in a deposition that his (((<\/span><\/span><span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: small;\"><span style=\"color: #ff0000;\">camera was deliberately and violently smashed into his face<\/span>)))<\/span><\/span><span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: small;\"> by Officer Elster while Fordyce was publicly gathering information with it during the (((<\/span><\/span><span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: small;\"><span style=\"color: #ff0000;\">demonstration<\/span>)))<\/span><\/span><span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: small;\">. \u2002 Although corroboration is not required to establish a genuine issue of material fact when the issue is established by sworn testimony, Fordyce&#8217;s allegation is nonetheless corroborated by his videotape, which is in the record and which we have reviewed. \u2002 Thus, as to Officer Elster, the matter did not merit a grant of summary judgment with respect either to the First <\/span><\/span><span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: small;\">Amendment<\/span><\/span><span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: small;\"> claims under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u20021983 or to the supplemental state law claims of assault and battery. \u2002 These claims merit a trial.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p align=\"LEFT\"><span style=\"color: #000000;\">\u2003<span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: small;\">As to the \u00a7\u20021983 claims stemming from Fordyce&#8217;s arrest, we agree with the district court that the officers are entitled to qualified immunity from suit for damages. \u2002Act Up!\/Portland v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868 (9th Cir.1993).<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p align=\"LEFT\"><span style=\"color: #000000;\"><span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: small;\">The relevant facts are undisputed. \u2002 While Fordyce was videotaping people on the streets of Seattle, he was simultaneously audio-recording them as well. \u2002 Prior to arresting Fordyce, an officer asked him whether the videocamera was recording voices and warned him that a Washington State statute forbade recording private conversations without consent. \u2002 Fordyce refused to stop videotaping two boys after an adult relative supervising them asked him to stop and complained to the police. \u2002 The police officers also asked Fordyce to stop, but he refused. \u2002 He was then arrested for violating Wash.Rev.Code \u00a7\u20029.73.030.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p align=\"LEFT\"><span style=\"color: #000000;\"><span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: small;\">At the time of Fordyce&#8217;s arrest, whether and under what circumstances conversations in public streets could be deemed private within the meaning of the privacy statute was not yet settled under Washington state law. \u2002 Under the facts marshalled pursuant to the motions for summary judgment, a reasonable officer could have believed Fordyce was recording private conversations in violation of the statute. \u2002 The evidence before the district court supports a claim that the officers arrested Fordyce for committing in their presence what they believed was a misdemeanor. \u2002 Accordingly, all the individual police officer defendants are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to Fordyce&#8217;s \u00a7\u20021983 damages claims relating to his arrest.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p align=\"LEFT\"><span style=\"color: #000000;\">\u2003<span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: small;\">We also affirm the district court&#8217;s decision granting summary judgment to the City of Seattle, dismissing it from the \u00a7\u20021983 damages claims. \u2002 Fordyce failed to show that the City of Seattle was culpable by virtue of a \u201cpolicy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by\u201d Seattle that was itself unconstitutional. \u2002Monell v. New York City Dep&#8217;t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2035-36, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). \u2002 Fordyce also failed to show that any Seattle policy or any decision by a governmentally authorized decisionmaker was the moving force behind any deprivation of his constitutional rights. \u2002 See Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 1299, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986); \u2009Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 645-46 (9th Cir.1991).<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p align=\"LEFT\"><span style=\"color: #000000;\"><span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: small;\">Because our opinion reinstates Office Elster as a defendant in this case, however, we vacate and remand to the district court the issue of whether Seattle can be held vicariously liable under state law for Fordyce&#8217;s state law tort damages claims against Officer Elster.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p align=\"LEFT\"><span style=\"color: #000000;\"><span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: small;\">III.\u2003Declaratory and Injunctive Relief<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p align=\"LEFT\"><span style=\"color: #000000;\"><span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: small;\">The City of Seattle argues that the district court should not have granted declaratory relief because (1) Fordyce lacked standing; \u2009and (2) Fordyce never served the Attorney General of Washington State with a copy of his complaint. \u2002 We vacate the district court&#8217;s grant of declaratory relief because the procedure resulting in the award was flawed.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p align=\"LEFT\"><span style=\"color: #000000;\"><span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: small;\">First, the City contends that declaratory relief was unwarranted because no \u201ccase or controversy\u201d exists, and therefore the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. \u2002U.S. Const. art. III, \u00a7\u20022. \u2002 Seattle also argues that Fordyce did not have standing. \u2002 We disagree with the City.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p align=\"LEFT\"><span style=\"color: #000000;\"><span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: small;\">At the time Fordyce was arrested, and at the time the district court issued its order, the highest court in Washington had not-and still has not-interpreted Wash.Rev.Code \u00a7\u20029.73.030 to permit recording of audible conversation among private citizens on public streets.<\/span><\/span><\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/caselaw.findlaw.com\/us-9th-circuit\/1054985.html#footnote_2\" name=\"footnote_ref_2\"><span style=\"color: #006699;\"><span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: small;\">2<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/a><span style=\"color: #000000;\"><span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: small;\">\u00a0\u2002Fordyce was, and still is, uncertain and insecure regarding his right vel non to videotape and audiotape private persons on public streets. \u2002 Noting that Fordyce says he will continue to participate in such activities, we are unable to conclude from the record that the circumstances culminating in his arrest no longer are a \u201cbrooding presence,\u201d which cast an adverse effect on his legitimate interests as a citizen of the United States. \u2002Headwaters, Inc. v. Bureau of Land Management, 893 F.2d 1012, 1015 (9th Cir.1989) (quoting Super Tire Eng&#8217;g Co. v. McCorkle, 416 U.S. 115, 122, 94 S.Ct. 1694, 1698, 40 L.Ed.2d 1 (1974)).<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p align=\"LEFT\"><span style=\"color: #000000;\">\u2003<\/span><span style=\"color: #000000;\"><span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: small;\">We are satisfied that, under the facts of this case as they existed during the time of litigation in district court, Fordyce sufficiently demonstrated the existence of a concrete controversy. \u2002 Furthermore, in a case concerning the constitutionality of a state criminal statute, all that is required for an award of declaratory relief is that the plaintiff show \u201ca genuine threat of enforcement of a disputed state criminal statute.\u201d \u2002 Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 475, 94 S.Ct. 1209, 1223-24, 39 L.Ed.2d 505 (1974). \u2002 Thus, assuming that declaratory relief as an issue was properly before the district court, Fordyce had standing to be eligible for such relief pursuant to the principles enunciated in Steffel.<\/span><\/span><\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/caselaw.findlaw.com\/us-9th-circuit\/1054985.html#footnote_3\" name=\"footnote_ref_3\"><span style=\"color: #006699;\"><span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: small;\">3<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/a><\/p>\n<p align=\"LEFT\"><span style=\"color: #000000;\"><span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: small;\">The City next argues that the declaratory judgment was defective because it was awarded without service of \u201cthe proceeding\u201d on the Washington State Attorney General in violation of a Washington State statute. \u2002 In a suit challenging a Washington State statute, Wash.Rev.Code \u00a7\u20027.24.110 provides that \u201cthe Attorney General shall also be served with a copy of the proceeding and be entitled to be heard.\u201d<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p align=\"LEFT\"><span style=\"color: #000000;\">\u2003<span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: small;\">We disagree with the City of Seattle that a state notice statute can be construed to impose a duty on a federal court. \u2002 The Eleventh <\/span><\/span><span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: small;\">Amendment<\/span><\/span><span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: small;\"> to the United States Constitution would bar federal court jurisdiction if Fordyce sought to sue the State of Washington. \u2002 Although the State of Washington may waive the protection of the Eleventh <\/span><\/span><span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: small;\">Amendment<\/span><\/span><span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: small;\">&#8216;s jurisdictional bar by passing a statute consenting to be sued, a statute consenting to suit in state court does not constitute consent to suit in federal court. \u2002Florida Dep&#8217;t of Health &amp; Rehab. Servs. v. Florida Nursing Home Ass&#8217;n, 450 U.S. 147, 149-50, 101 S.Ct. 1032, 1033-34, 67 L.Ed.2d 132 (1981); \u2009Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Comm&#8217;n, 327 U.S. 573, 66 S.Ct. 745, 90 L.Ed. 862 (1946). \u2002 Thus, even if Wash.Rev.Code \u00a7\u20027.24.110 were a statute consenting to suit, it could not be construed to require joinder of the State in Fordyce&#8217;s suit in federal court.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p align=\"LEFT\"><span style=\"color: #000000;\">\u2003<span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: small;\">We do agree with the thrust of Seattle&#8217;s argument, however. \u2002 The State of Washington could waive Eleventh <\/span><\/span><span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: small;\">Amendment<\/span><\/span><span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: small;\"> protection by voluntarily appearing and defending on the merits. \u2002Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 105 S.Ct. 3142, 87 L.Ed.2d 171 (1985); \u2009Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 2 S.Ct. 878, 27 L.Ed. 780 (1883). \u2002 And the statute on which the City relies certainly manifests a decision by the State that its attorney general has a strong interest in defending the State&#8217;s statutes in court. \u2002 Voluntary appearance by the State of Washington assumes, however, that the State has been adequately notified of the pendency of the suit and of the particular matters at issue.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p align=\"LEFT\"><span style=\"color: #000000;\"><span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: small;\">Here the district court never expressly informed the parties that it might render the declaratory judgment. \u2002 The parties argued their motions for summary judgment on the basis that only injunctive relief and damages were at issue. \u2002 The district court never indicated otherwise during the oral argument. \u2002 Subsequent to the hearing on the motions for summary judgment, the district court, sua sponte, issued an order inviting the ACLU of Washington State, several news organizations, and the Washington State Attorney General to file amicus briefs addressing six specific questions framed by the district court.<\/span><\/span><\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/caselaw.findlaw.com\/us-9th-circuit\/1054985.html#footnote_4\" name=\"footnote_ref_4\"><span style=\"color: #006699;\"><span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: small;\">4<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/a><span style=\"color: #000000;\"><span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: small;\">\u00a0\u2002The ACLU&#8217;s amicus brief first raised the possibility of declaratory relief, but even Fordyce&#8217;s reply brief to the amicus briefs casts the issues solely in terms of injunctive relief. \u2002 The parties essentially had no inkling that the district court was silently considering a grant of declaratory relief.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p align=\"LEFT\"><span style=\"color: #000000;\">\u2003<span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: small;\">We conclude the district court failed to comply with 28 U.S.C. \u00a7\u20022403(b) by failing to notify the Washington State Attorney General that it might rule on the constitutionality of Wash.Rev.Code \u00a7\u20029.73.030. \u2002 When neither a state nor \u201cany agency, officer, or employee thereof\u201d is a party to an action where the constitutionality of a state statute \u201cis drawn in question,\u201d a federal district court is required to notify the state attorney general and must \u201cpermit the State to intervene.\u201d \u200228 U.S.C. \u00a7\u20022403(b). \u2002 Here, no representative of the State of Washington was a party to the action. \u2002 The City of Seattle was not an \u201cagency\u201d of the state of Washington for purposes of this federal statute. \u2002 See Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280, 97 S.Ct. 568, 572-73, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977) (Eleventh <\/span><\/span><span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: small;\">Amendment<\/span><\/span><span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: small;\"> immunity does not extend to counties or similar municipal corporations). \u2002 By state law, a municipal corporation is not a state agency. \u2002Plumbers &amp; Steamfitters Union Local 598 v. WPPSS, 44 Wash.App. 906, 724 P.2d 1030, 1033 (1986) (citing Wash.Rev.Code \u00a7\u200242.17.020(1)).<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p align=\"LEFT\"><span style=\"color: #000000;\"><span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: small;\">Fordyce argues that the district court indicated its \u201cintentions\u201d in plenty of time for the State of Washington to intervene, if the State had so desired. \u2002 We conclude that such \u201ctelegraphed\u201d intentions are not enough to avoid the duty to provide adequate notice and a formal opportunity to intervene to the State. \u2002 Because the City&#8217;s presence in the suit did not satisfy the requirements of 28 U.S.C. \u00a7\u20022304(b), and the issue was never certified to the Attorney General of Washington State, the district court never had the opportunity fully to hear the views of Washington State. \u2002 See Yniguez v. Arizona, 939 F.2d 727, 739 (9th Cir.1991). \u2002 Therefore the district court should not have rendered the declaratory relief.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p align=\"LEFT\"><span style=\"color: #000000;\"><span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: small;\">We also conclude that the opportunity to file an amicus brief in no way substituted for a formal opportunity to participate fully as an intervening party in the litigation. \u2002 The \u201copportunity\u201d for the Washington State Attorney General to participate in this lawsuit was circumscribed along the lines of a jury&#8217;s special verdict form. \u2002 If declaratory relief concerning the constitutionality of Wash.Rev.Code \u00a7\u20029.73.030 was an issue under consideration by the district court, the State of Washington should have been invited to intervene. \u2002 The district court abused its discretion by not formally extending an opportunity to the State of Washington to intervene in this action.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p align=\"LEFT\"><span style=\"color: #000000;\">\u2003<span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: small;\">For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that although Fordyce may have had standing to be eligible for declaratory relief, the district court abused its discretion in failing to provide the State of Washington (or the City of Seattle) an adequate opportunity to be heard when it contemplated granting an unrequested declaratory judgment ruling on the constitutionality of Wash.Rev.Code \u00a7\u20029.73.030.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p align=\"LEFT\"><span style=\"color: #000000;\"><span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: small;\">IV.\u2003Conclusion<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p align=\"LEFT\"><span style=\"color: #000000;\"><span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: small;\">For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE and REMAND the district court&#8217;s grant of summary judgment as to Officer Elster because a genuine issue of material fact exists concerning Officer Elster&#8217;s alleged assault and battery against Fordyce prior to Fordyce&#8217;s arrest. \u2002 We also REVERSE and REMAND the grant of summary judgment as to Officer Elster on the \u00a7\u20021983 claims, because a genuine issue of material fact exists concerning whether he interfered with Fordyce&#8217;s First Amendment right to gather news. \u2002 We AFFIRM the grant of summary judgment as to all the individual officer defendants on the \u00a7\u20021983 damages claims relating to Fordyce&#8217;s arrest. \u2002 We AFFIRM the grant of summary judgment to the City of Seattle for Fordyce&#8217;s \u00a7\u20021983 damages claim. \u2002 We VACATE and REMAND for reconsideration the grant of summary judgment as to the vicarious liability Seattle may have for Fordyce&#8217;s state law tort claims for damages against Officer Elster. \u2002 We VACATE the award of declaratory relief against the defendants. \u2002 We do not reach the issue of attorney&#8217;s fees under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u20021988, but VACATE the two attorney&#8217;s fees orders dated October 13, 1993, and REMAND those matters to the district court for reconsideration in light of our decisions in this appeal.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p align=\"LEFT\"><span style=\"color: #000000;\"><span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: small;\">AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, and REMANDED.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p align=\"LEFT\"><span style=\"color: #000000;\"><span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: small;\">Each party shall bear its own costs.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p align=\"LEFT\"><span style=\"color: #000000;\"><span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: small;\">FOOTNOTES<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p align=\"LEFT\"><a href=\"https:\/\/caselaw.findlaw.com\/us-9th-circuit\/1054985.html#footnote_ref_1\" name=\"footnote_1\"><span style=\"color: #006699;\"><span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: small;\">1<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/a><span style=\"color: #000000;\"><span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: small;\">.\u00a0\u00a0\u2003Wash.Rev.Code \u00a7\u20029.73.030 provides in relevant part:(1)\u2002Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, it shall be unlawful for any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or the state of Washington, its agencies, and political subdivisions to intercept, or record any:\u2024(b)\u2002Private conversation, by any device electronic or otherwise designed to record or transmit such conversation regardless how the device is powered or actuated without first obtaining the consent of all the (((<\/span><\/span><\/span><span style=\"color: #000000;\"><span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: small;\"><span style=\"color: #ff0000;\">persons engaged in the conversation<\/span>)))<\/span><\/span><\/span><span style=\"color: #000000;\"><span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: small;\">.\u2024(4)\u2002An employee of any regularly published newspaper, magazine, wire service, radio station, or television station acting in the course of bona fide news gathering duties on a full time or contractual or part time basis, shall be deemed to have consent to record and divulge communications or conversations otherwise prohibited by this chapter if the consent is expressly given or if the recording or transmitting device is (((<\/span><\/span><\/span><span style=\"color: #000000;\"><span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: small;\"><span style=\"color: #ff0000;\">readily apparent or obvious to the speakers<\/span>)))<\/span><\/span><\/span><span style=\"color: #000000;\"><span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: small;\">. \u2002 Withdrawal of the consent after the communication has been made shall not prohibit any such employee of a newspaper, magazine, wire service, or radio or television station from (((<\/span><\/span><\/span><span style=\"color: #000000;\"><span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: small;\"><span style=\"color: #ff0000;\">divulging<\/span>)))<\/span><\/span><\/span><span style=\"color: #000000;\"><span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: small;\"> the communication or conversation.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p align=\"LEFT\"><a href=\"https:\/\/caselaw.findlaw.com\/us-9th-circuit\/1054985.html#footnote_ref_2\" name=\"footnote_2\"><span style=\"color: #006699;\"><span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: small;\">2<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/a><span style=\"color: #000000;\"><span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: small;\">.\u00a0\u00a0\u2003See, e.g., Fordyce, 840 F.Supp. at 792-93 (discussing Washington state court decisions interpreting Wash.Rev.Code \u00a7\u20029.73.030). \u2002 Since the date of the district court&#8217;s order, the Washington supreme court opinions construing Wash.Rev.Code \u00a7\u20029.73.030 have not clarified whether (((<\/span><\/span><\/span><span style=\"color: #000000;\"><span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: small;\"><span style=\"color: #ff0000;\">conversations on public streets<\/span>)))<\/span><\/span><\/span><span style=\"color: #000000;\"><span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: small;\"> may be videotaped and audiotaped with impunity. \u2002 See State v. Corliss, 123 Wash.2d 656, 870 P.2d 317 (1994) (statute does not apply to police officer merely listening to conversation without recording it on same telephone receiver tipped in his direction by informant); \u2009State v. Riley, 121 Wash.2d 22, 846 P.2d 1365 (1993) (line trap discovering only telephone number is not a recording of a \u201cprivate communication\u201d).<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p align=\"LEFT\"><a href=\"https:\/\/caselaw.findlaw.com\/us-9th-circuit\/1054985.html#footnote_ref_3\" name=\"footnote_3\"><span style=\"color: #006699;\"><span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: small;\">3<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/a><span style=\"color: #000000;\"><span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: small;\">.\u00a0\u00a0\u2003We do not rule out a different conclusion on remand based on a demonstration of different facts and circumstances. \u2002 See Blair v. Shanahan, 38 F.3d 1514 (9th Cir.1994).<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p align=\"LEFT\"><a href=\"https:\/\/caselaw.findlaw.com\/us-9th-circuit\/1054985.html#footnote_ref_4\" name=\"footnote_4\"><span style=\"color: #006699;\"><span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: small;\">4<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/a><span style=\"color: #000000;\"><span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: small;\">.\u00a0\u00a0\u2003The questions for the amici curiae were as follows:1.\u2003 Can a conversation between two private citizens standing on a public street or sidewalk be a \u201cprivate conversation\u201d within the meaning of the statute?2.\u2003Can a conversation between two on-duty city police officers on a public street or sidewalk be a \u201cprivate conversation\u201d within the meaning of the statute?3.\u2003Section 4 of the statute affords a presumption of consent where the recording is made by an \u201cemployee of any regularly published newspaper, magazine, wire service, radio station, or television station\u201d and the \u201crecording or transmitting device is readily apparent or obvious to the speakers.\u201d \u2002 The plaintiff in the present case was videotaping in downtown Seattle for the purpose of showing his tape later over a (((<\/span><\/span><\/span><span style=\"color: #000000;\"><span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: small;\"><span style=\"color: #ff0000;\">public-access television<\/span>))) [[[<span style=\"color: #0000ff;\">or public access internet???<\/span>]]]<\/span><\/span><\/span><span style=\"color: #000000;\"><span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: small;\"> station, where he had often broadcast before. \u2002 If section 4 is applied to afford a presumption of consent to a paid employee of, or contractor with, a \u201cregularly published\u201d communications medium, but to deny it to a (((<\/span><\/span><\/span><span style=\"color: #000000;\"><span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: small;\"><span style=\"color: #ff0000;\">freelance<\/span>)))<\/span><\/span><\/span><span style=\"color: #000000;\"><span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: small;\">, unpaid news-gatherer, would the result be to discriminate against the latter in violation of his or her First <\/span><\/span><\/span><span style=\"color: #000000;\"><span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: small;\">Amendment<\/span><\/span><\/span><span style=\"color: #000000;\"><span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: small;\"> rights?4.\u2003If the answer to the previous question is yes, can and should the statute be read to afford the presumption of consent to all persons \u201cacting in the course of bona fide news gathering\u201d? \u2002 If so, is there a constitutional way to distinguish between \u201cbona fide newsgathering\u201d and the recording of events for other purposes?5.\u2003If the statute is applied to afford a presumption of consent to one engaged in \u201cbona fide news gathering,\u201d while denying it to a person who is recording simply out of interest or curiosity, would the result be an unconstitutional discrimination against the latter in violation of his or her (((<span style=\"color: #ff0000;\">First <\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><span style=\"color: #000000;\"><span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: small;\"><span style=\"color: #ff0000;\">Amendment<\/span>)))<\/span><\/span><\/span><span style=\"color: #000000;\"><span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: small;\"> rights?6.\u2003If the answer to the preceding question is yes, can and should the statute be read to afford the presumption of consent to any person recording \u201cif the recording or transmitting device is readily apparent or obvious to the speakers\u201d?<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p align=\"LEFT\"><span style=\"color: #000000;\"><span style=\"font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: small;\">TROTT, Circuit Judge:<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Before Recording Publicly read carefully. Also challenge if the land you are on is in fact owned by the United States. [[[Also SEE &gt;\u00a0See Blackston v. Alabama, 30 F.3d 117, 120 (11th Cir.1994) (finding that plaintiffs&#8217; interest in filming public &hellip; <a href=\"http:\/\/www.pauljjhansen.com\/?p=1950\">Continue reading <span class=\"meta-nav\">&rarr;<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[256],"tags":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"http:\/\/www.pauljjhansen.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1950"}],"collection":[{"href":"http:\/\/www.pauljjhansen.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"http:\/\/www.pauljjhansen.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/www.pauljjhansen.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/www.pauljjhansen.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=1950"}],"version-history":[{"count":4,"href":"http:\/\/www.pauljjhansen.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1950\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1954,"href":"http:\/\/www.pauljjhansen.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1950\/revisions\/1954"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"http:\/\/www.pauljjhansen.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=1950"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/www.pauljjhansen.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=1950"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/www.pauljjhansen.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=1950"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}