Assessor Property Tax, Requirements

Posted on May 16, 2019 by Paul John Hansen

Assessor Property Tax:

Oregon 306.255 Information for taxpayers concerning property taxes, appraisals and appeals.

(1) The county assessor shall provide and make available to taxpayers, upon request, the following information:

(a) An explanation of the ad valorem property tax system, including but not limited to the manner in which the amount of ad valorem property tax is determined, the manner in which the taxpayer’s share of that tax is determined and the manner in which the limitations on the amount of that tax is determined.

(b) An explanation of the methods of appraisal generally and, if of interest to the taxpayer, the method or methods of valuation of the type of property with which the taxpayer is concerned.

(c) A general explanation of the manner in which to appeal the value of property and a description of the kind of information that may be needed to present an appeal.

(2) The Department of Revenue shall prepare written materials concerning each of the subjects identified in subsection (1) of this section and make those materials available to the county assessors and to individual taxpayers upon request. [1991 c.903 §6]

(((Force the assessor to give what he relies upon that the subject land, and property in that land, is determined to be within the scope of the state property-tax written law with the package and aid of Paul John Hansen.))) pauljjhansenLAW@gmail,com

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Posted in Assessor Property Tax | Leave a comment

IRS, W2s, what are they, who are they for?

Posted on March 29, 2019 by Paul John Hansen

 

Per IRS manual 6209 Section 2;

W2s are not Income, are Class 5 Gift & Estate Tax ❗

3-28-19    Hansen will investigate this as time provides.

If a reader comes across pertinent info on this topics please email it to me for review and possible posting on this page.  Many hands make hard work easy.

Posted in W2 | Leave a comment

Recording Publicly, your rights?

Posted on January 24, 2019 by Paul John Hansen

Before Recording Publicly read carefully. Also challenge if the land you are on is in fact owned by the United States.

[[[Also SEE > See Blackston v. Alabama, 30 F.3d 117, 120 (11th Cir.1994) (finding that plaintiffs’ interest in filming public meetings is protected by the First Amendment) ]]]

 

United States Court of Appeals,Ninth Circuit.

Jerry Edmon FORDYCE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CITY OF SEATTLE, Defendant-Appellant.

Jerry Edmon FORDYCE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF SEATTLE;  M.S. Donnelly;  C. Villagracia, Defendants-Appellees.  (Two Cases.)

Jerry Edmon FORDYCE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CITY OF SEATTLE, Defendant-Appellant, M.S. Donnelly;  C. Villagracia, Defendants.

Nos. 93-35824, 93-35840, 93-35991 and 93-36020.

    Decided: May 16, 1995

Before:  LAY,*TROTT and T.G. NELSON, Circuit Judges. Ted Buck, Stafford Frey Cooper, Seattle, WA, for defendants-appellants-appellees. James E. Lobsenz, Carney, Badley, Smith & Spellman, Seattle, WA, for plaintiff-appellee-appellant.

I. Background

This case arises from the alleged interference by police officers of the City of Seattle with Jerry Edmon Fordyce’s attempt on August 5, 1990 to videotape a public protest march.   Fordyce, who apparently considered himself part of the protest, had volunteered to videotape the demonstration for “local television production,” presumably for broadcast on a public access channel.   Among his subjects were the activities of the police officers assigned to work the event.   Not surprisingly, the police themselves became targets of the protest and were subjected to rude and profane insults.   Generally, the police reacted to this treatment in a calm and professional manner, but the record suggests that some of these officers were not pleased with Fordyce’s actions, and that one officer in particular attempted physically to dissuade Fordyce from his mission.   At the end of the day, in a separate incident, a different officer arrested Fordyce when he attempted to videotape some sidewalk bystanders against their wishes.   Fordyce was charged with violating a Washington State privacy statute, Wash.Rev.Code § 9.73.030, which forbids the recording of private conversations without the consent of all participants.1  Fordyce spent the night in jail.   On October 1, 1990, the charges against Fordyce were dismissed on motion of the prosecuting attorney.

Subsequently, Fordyce brought a civil-rights suit against the City of Seattle and eight Seattle police officers.   Fordyce sought damages from the officers in their individual capacities pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for interfering with his First Amendment right to (((gather news and for arresting him))) without the requisite probable cause for allegedly violating Wash.Rev.Code § 9.73.030.   He also invoked supplemental jurisdiction in order to seek damages from the officers in their individual capacities for violations of state tort law.   Fordyce sought permanent injunctive relief against the City of Seattle and the officers forbidding enforcement of Wash.Rev.Code § 9.73.030 against amateur journalists such as himself, and sought damages from the City of Seattle pursuant to § 1983 and supplemental state tort claims.   Fordyce demanded attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

The defendants moved for summary judgment, and Fordyce moved for partial summary judgment.   The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Fordyce’s pre-arrest § 1983 and state tort claims, finding “no evidence that would permit a rational jury to find that he was assaulted.”  Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 840 F.Supp. 784, 788 (W.D.Wash.1993).   The district court also granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Fordyce’s damages claims pursuant to § 1983 and state law torts, concluding that the individual police officers were qualifiedly immune and the city nonliable.  Id. at 788-91.

The district court declined to award Fordyce the injunctive relief he had requested.   Instead, the district court sua sponte awarded Fordyce declaratory relief, which he had not requested, declaring that Wash.Rev.Code § 9.73.030 “does not prohibit the videotaping or sound-recording of conversations held in a public street, within the hearing of persons not participating in the conversation, by means of a readily apparent recording device.”  Id. at 794.

After entry of the declaratory judgment, Fordyce requested attorney’s fees against the City of Seattle (but not against the defendant police officers).   The defendants requested attorney’s fees as well, on the ground that Fordyce’s suit had been frivolous as to certain individual officers.   On October 13, 1993, the district court issued two unpublished orders.   The first granted attorney’s fees to Fordyce as a “prevailing party” under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, but only in the amount of 20 percent of the fees Fordyce had requested.   The second denied attorney’s fees to the defendants.

Both parties appeal the district court’s orders.   The City of Seattle and the individual defendants appeal the district court’s award of declaratory relief, award of attorney’s fees to Fordyce as a “prevailing party,” and denial of the defendants’ attorney’s fees.   Fordyce appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the City and the individual officers and the amount of attorney’s fees awarded to him.   We affirm in part, reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand.

II. Liability and Damages

 The district court based some of its dispositive rulings on its conclusion that the record contained “no evidence that would permit a rational jury to find that [Fordyce] was assaulted.”  Fordyce, 840 F.Supp. at 788.   We respectfully disagree.   As we read the record, a genuine issue of material fact does exist regarding whether Fordyce was (((assaulted and battered by a Seattle police))) officer in an attempt to prevent or dissuade him from exercising his First Amendment right to (((film matters of public interest.)))   Fordyce testified in a deposition that his (((camera was deliberately and violently smashed into his face))) by Officer Elster while Fordyce was publicly gathering information with it during the (((demonstration))).   Although corroboration is not required to establish a genuine issue of material fact when the issue is established by sworn testimony, Fordyce’s allegation is nonetheless corroborated by his videotape, which is in the record and which we have reviewed.   Thus, as to Officer Elster, the matter did not merit a grant of summary judgment with respect either to the First Amendment claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or to the supplemental state law claims of assault and battery.   These claims merit a trial.

 As to the § 1983 claims stemming from Fordyce’s arrest, we agree with the district court that the officers are entitled to qualified immunity from suit for damages.  Act Up!/Portland v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868 (9th Cir.1993).

The relevant facts are undisputed.   While Fordyce was videotaping people on the streets of Seattle, he was simultaneously audio-recording them as well.   Prior to arresting Fordyce, an officer asked him whether the videocamera was recording voices and warned him that a Washington State statute forbade recording private conversations without consent.   Fordyce refused to stop videotaping two boys after an adult relative supervising them asked him to stop and complained to the police.   The police officers also asked Fordyce to stop, but he refused.   He was then arrested for violating Wash.Rev.Code § 9.73.030.

At the time of Fordyce’s arrest, whether and under what circumstances conversations in public streets could be deemed private within the meaning of the privacy statute was not yet settled under Washington state law.   Under the facts marshalled pursuant to the motions for summary judgment, a reasonable officer could have believed Fordyce was recording private conversations in violation of the statute.   The evidence before the district court supports a claim that the officers arrested Fordyce for committing in their presence what they believed was a misdemeanor.   Accordingly, all the individual police officer defendants are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to Fordyce’s § 1983 damages claims relating to his arrest.

 We also affirm the district court’s decision granting summary judgment to the City of Seattle, dismissing it from the § 1983 damages claims.   Fordyce failed to show that the City of Seattle was culpable by virtue of a “policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by” Seattle that was itself unconstitutional.  Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2035-36, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978).   Fordyce also failed to show that any Seattle policy or any decision by a governmentally authorized decisionmaker was the moving force behind any deprivation of his constitutional rights.   See Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 1299, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986);  Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 645-46 (9th Cir.1991).

Because our opinion reinstates Office Elster as a defendant in this case, however, we vacate and remand to the district court the issue of whether Seattle can be held vicariously liable under state law for Fordyce’s state law tort damages claims against Officer Elster.

III. Declaratory and Injunctive Relief

The City of Seattle argues that the district court should not have granted declaratory relief because (1) Fordyce lacked standing;  and (2) Fordyce never served the Attorney General of Washington State with a copy of his complaint.   We vacate the district court’s grant of declaratory relief because the procedure resulting in the award was flawed.

First, the City contends that declaratory relief was unwarranted because no “case or controversy” exists, and therefore the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.  U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.   Seattle also argues that Fordyce did not have standing.   We disagree with the City.

At the time Fordyce was arrested, and at the time the district court issued its order, the highest court in Washington had not-and still has not-interpreted Wash.Rev.Code § 9.73.030 to permit recording of audible conversation among private citizens on public streets.2  Fordyce was, and still is, uncertain and insecure regarding his right vel non to videotape and audiotape private persons on public streets.   Noting that Fordyce says he will continue to participate in such activities, we are unable to conclude from the record that the circumstances culminating in his arrest no longer are a “brooding presence,” which cast an adverse effect on his legitimate interests as a citizen of the United States.  Headwaters, Inc. v. Bureau of Land Management, 893 F.2d 1012, 1015 (9th Cir.1989) (quoting Super Tire Eng’g Co. v. McCorkle, 416 U.S. 115, 122, 94 S.Ct. 1694, 1698, 40 L.Ed.2d 1 (1974)).

 We are satisfied that, under the facts of this case as they existed during the time of litigation in district court, Fordyce sufficiently demonstrated the existence of a concrete controversy.   Furthermore, in a case concerning the constitutionality of a state criminal statute, all that is required for an award of declaratory relief is that the plaintiff show “a genuine threat of enforcement of a disputed state criminal statute.”   Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 475, 94 S.Ct. 1209, 1223-24, 39 L.Ed.2d 505 (1974).   Thus, assuming that declaratory relief as an issue was properly before the district court, Fordyce had standing to be eligible for such relief pursuant to the principles enunciated in Steffel.3

The City next argues that the declaratory judgment was defective because it was awarded without service of “the proceeding” on the Washington State Attorney General in violation of a Washington State statute.   In a suit challenging a Washington State statute, Wash.Rev.Code § 7.24.110 provides that “the Attorney General shall also be served with a copy of the proceeding and be entitled to be heard.”

 We disagree with the City of Seattle that a state notice statute can be construed to impose a duty on a federal court.   The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution would bar federal court jurisdiction if Fordyce sought to sue the State of Washington.   Although the State of Washington may waive the protection of the Eleventh Amendment‘s jurisdictional bar by passing a statute consenting to be sued, a statute consenting to suit in state court does not constitute consent to suit in federal court.  Florida Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Florida Nursing Home Ass’n, 450 U.S. 147, 149-50, 101 S.Ct. 1032, 1033-34, 67 L.Ed.2d 132 (1981);  Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Comm’n, 327 U.S. 573, 66 S.Ct. 745, 90 L.Ed. 862 (1946).   Thus, even if Wash.Rev.Code § 7.24.110 were a statute consenting to suit, it could not be construed to require joinder of the State in Fordyce’s suit in federal court.

 We do agree with the thrust of Seattle’s argument, however.   The State of Washington could waive Eleventh Amendment protection by voluntarily appearing and defending on the merits.  Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 105 S.Ct. 3142, 87 L.Ed.2d 171 (1985);  Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 2 S.Ct. 878, 27 L.Ed. 780 (1883).   And the statute on which the City relies certainly manifests a decision by the State that its attorney general has a strong interest in defending the State’s statutes in court.   Voluntary appearance by the State of Washington assumes, however, that the State has been adequately notified of the pendency of the suit and of the particular matters at issue.

Here the district court never expressly informed the parties that it might render the declaratory judgment.   The parties argued their motions for summary judgment on the basis that only injunctive relief and damages were at issue.   The district court never indicated otherwise during the oral argument.   Subsequent to the hearing on the motions for summary judgment, the district court, sua sponte, issued an order inviting the ACLU of Washington State, several news organizations, and the Washington State Attorney General to file amicus briefs addressing six specific questions framed by the district court.4  The ACLU’s amicus brief first raised the possibility of declaratory relief, but even Fordyce’s reply brief to the amicus briefs casts the issues solely in terms of injunctive relief.   The parties essentially had no inkling that the district court was silently considering a grant of declaratory relief.

 We conclude the district court failed to comply with 28 U.S.C. § 2403(b) by failing to notify the Washington State Attorney General that it might rule on the constitutionality of Wash.Rev.Code § 9.73.030.   When neither a state nor “any agency, officer, or employee thereof” is a party to an action where the constitutionality of a state statute “is drawn in question,” a federal district court is required to notify the state attorney general and must “permit the State to intervene.”  28 U.S.C. § 2403(b).   Here, no representative of the State of Washington was a party to the action.   The City of Seattle was not an “agency” of the state of Washington for purposes of this federal statute.   See Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280, 97 S.Ct. 568, 572-73, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977) (Eleventh Amendment immunity does not extend to counties or similar municipal corporations).   By state law, a municipal corporation is not a state agency.  Plumbers & Steamfitters Union Local 598 v. WPPSS, 44 Wash.App. 906, 724 P.2d 1030, 1033 (1986) (citing Wash.Rev.Code § 42.17.020(1)).

Fordyce argues that the district court indicated its “intentions” in plenty of time for the State of Washington to intervene, if the State had so desired.   We conclude that such “telegraphed” intentions are not enough to avoid the duty to provide adequate notice and a formal opportunity to intervene to the State.   Because the City’s presence in the suit did not satisfy the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2304(b), and the issue was never certified to the Attorney General of Washington State, the district court never had the opportunity fully to hear the views of Washington State.   See Yniguez v. Arizona, 939 F.2d 727, 739 (9th Cir.1991).   Therefore the district court should not have rendered the declaratory relief.

We also conclude that the opportunity to file an amicus brief in no way substituted for a formal opportunity to participate fully as an intervening party in the litigation.   The “opportunity” for the Washington State Attorney General to participate in this lawsuit was circumscribed along the lines of a jury’s special verdict form.   If declaratory relief concerning the constitutionality of Wash.Rev.Code § 9.73.030 was an issue under consideration by the district court, the State of Washington should have been invited to intervene.   The district court abused its discretion by not formally extending an opportunity to the State of Washington to intervene in this action.

 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that although Fordyce may have had standing to be eligible for declaratory relief, the district court abused its discretion in failing to provide the State of Washington (or the City of Seattle) an adequate opportunity to be heard when it contemplated granting an unrequested declaratory judgment ruling on the constitutionality of Wash.Rev.Code § 9.73.030.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE and REMAND the district court’s grant of summary judgment as to Officer Elster because a genuine issue of material fact exists concerning Officer Elster’s alleged assault and battery against Fordyce prior to Fordyce’s arrest.   We also REVERSE and REMAND the grant of summary judgment as to Officer Elster on the § 1983 claims, because a genuine issue of material fact exists concerning whether he interfered with Fordyce’s First Amendment right to gather news.   We AFFIRM the grant of summary judgment as to all the individual officer defendants on the § 1983 damages claims relating to Fordyce’s arrest.   We AFFIRM the grant of summary judgment to the City of Seattle for Fordyce’s § 1983 damages claim.   We VACATE and REMAND for reconsideration the grant of summary judgment as to the vicarious liability Seattle may have for Fordyce’s state law tort claims for damages against Officer Elster.   We VACATE the award of declaratory relief against the defendants.   We do not reach the issue of attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, but VACATE the two attorney’s fees orders dated October 13, 1993, and REMAND those matters to the district court for reconsideration in light of our decisions in this appeal.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, and REMANDED.

Each party shall bear its own costs.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Wash.Rev.Code § 9.73.030 provides in relevant part:(1) Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, it shall be unlawful for any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or the state of Washington, its agencies, and political subdivisions to intercept, or record any:․(b) Private conversation, by any device electronic or otherwise designed to record or transmit such conversation regardless how the device is powered or actuated without first obtaining the consent of all the (((persons engaged in the conversation))).․(4) An employee of any regularly published newspaper, magazine, wire service, radio station, or television station acting in the course of bona fide news gathering duties on a full time or contractual or part time basis, shall be deemed to have consent to record and divulge communications or conversations otherwise prohibited by this chapter if the consent is expressly given or if the recording or transmitting device is (((readily apparent or obvious to the speakers))).   Withdrawal of the consent after the communication has been made shall not prohibit any such employee of a newspaper, magazine, wire service, or radio or television station from (((divulging))) the communication or conversation.

2.   See, e.g., Fordyce, 840 F.Supp. at 792-93 (discussing Washington state court decisions interpreting Wash.Rev.Code § 9.73.030).   Since the date of the district court’s order, the Washington supreme court opinions construing Wash.Rev.Code § 9.73.030 have not clarified whether (((conversations on public streets))) may be videotaped and audiotaped with impunity.   See State v. Corliss, 123 Wash.2d 656, 870 P.2d 317 (1994) (statute does not apply to police officer merely listening to conversation without recording it on same telephone receiver tipped in his direction by informant);  State v. Riley, 121 Wash.2d 22, 846 P.2d 1365 (1993) (line trap discovering only telephone number is not a recording of a “private communication”).

3.   We do not rule out a different conclusion on remand based on a demonstration of different facts and circumstances.   See Blair v. Shanahan, 38 F.3d 1514 (9th Cir.1994).

4.   The questions for the amici curiae were as follows:1.  Can a conversation between two private citizens standing on a public street or sidewalk be a “private conversation” within the meaning of the statute?2. Can a conversation between two on-duty city police officers on a public street or sidewalk be a “private conversation” within the meaning of the statute?3. Section 4 of the statute affords a presumption of consent where the recording is made by an “employee of any regularly published newspaper, magazine, wire service, radio station, or television station” and the “recording or transmitting device is readily apparent or obvious to the speakers.”   The plaintiff in the present case was videotaping in downtown Seattle for the purpose of showing his tape later over a (((public-access television))) [[[or public access internet???]]] station, where he had often broadcast before.   If section 4 is applied to afford a presumption of consent to a paid employee of, or contractor with, a “regularly published” communications medium, but to deny it to a (((freelance))), unpaid news-gatherer, would the result be to discriminate against the latter in violation of his or her First Amendment rights?4. If the answer to the previous question is yes, can and should the statute be read to afford the presumption of consent to all persons “acting in the course of bona fide news gathering”?   If so, is there a constitutional way to distinguish between “bona fide newsgathering” and the recording of events for other purposes?5. If the statute is applied to afford a presumption of consent to one engaged in “bona fide news gathering,” while denying it to a person who is recording simply out of interest or curiosity, would the result be an unconstitutional discrimination against the latter in violation of his or her (((First Amendment))) rights?6. If the answer to the preceding question is yes, can and should the statute be read to afford the presumption of consent to any person recording “if the recording or transmitting device is readily apparent or obvious to the speakers”?

TROTT, Circuit Judge:

Posted in Recording Publicly | Leave a comment

United States Statutes at Large

Posted on January 13, 2019 by Paul John Hansen

United States Statutes at Large

US Stat at Large

US Stat

How to locate a Stat

____ # of Congress (1 > __ +)

___ Chapter

___ Paragraph

Posted in Stat at Large | Leave a comment

USC and Stat at Large written law important conflict.

Posted on January 13, 2019 by Paul John Hansen

USC and Stat at Large written law important conflict.

12 US STAT 479

Person and Citizen abroad are require to file.

v.

Aliens here and Citizens abroad are required to file.

https://www.irs.gov › individuals › international-taxpayers › us-citizens-and-resident-aliens-abroad-filing-requirements

U.S. Citizens and Resident Aliens Abroad – Filing Requirements

May 24, 2023If you are a U.S. citizen or resident alien living or traveling outside the United States, you generally are required to file income tax returns, estate tax returns, and gift tax returns and pay estimated tax in the same way as those residing in the United States.

  1. Florida Agency for Health Care Administration v. Bayou Shores SNF, LLC,  828 F.3d 1297 (11th Cir. 2016)  The U.S. Code is not necessarily “positive law.” Rather, the text of the U.S. Code is prima facie evidence of the law of the United States; where the code conflicts with the Statutes at Large however, the Statutes at Large trump.See U.S. Nat. Bank of Oregon v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc. , 508 U.S. 439, 448, 113 S.Ct
Posted in IRS | Leave a comment

Foreign Agent Registration Act,OMB-1124-0001

Posted on January 4, 2019 by Paul John Hansen

Foreign Agent Registration Act,OMB_1124_0001,

Foreign Agent Registration Act,OMB_1124_0001

 

 

 

Posted in Foreign Agent | Leave a comment

The United States – Confederacy or Corporation

Posted on December 11, 2018 by Paul John Hansen

The United States – Confederacy or Corporation

These links are possibly an important myth buster.

I, Paul John Hansen have not viewed these links yet but will in the next few months and comment on each link.  Last edited on 12-11-2018.

The truth is always better.

 

http://www.supremelaw.org/letters/us-v-usa.htm

http://www.supremelaw.org/cc/usa.inc/

http://www.supremelaw.org/cc/usa.corp/

http://www.supremelaw.org/sos/

http://supremelaw.org/cc/williamson2/appeal/reply.to.brief.for.appellee.htm

http://www.supremelaw.org/cc/gilberts/intentm3.filed.htm#1871

http://www.supremelaw.org/cc/gilberts/intentm3.filed.htm#1873

((I think the above links are compiled by > http://www.supremelaw.org/index.htm ))

>>>

Not a corp.! e.g. here’s relevant litigation: INTERVENOR’S REPLY TO BRIEF FOR APPELLEE INTERVENOR’S REPLY TO BRIEF FOR APPELLEE [begin excerpt] Finally, Congress has never incorporated either the “United States” or the “United States of America” as such. See U.S. v. Cooper Corporation, 312 U.S. 600 (1941). It appears that Chief Justice John Marshall was responsible for fabricating the myth that “The United States of America” are a corporation. See Dixon v. The United States, 1 Marsh. Dec. 177, 181 (1811). However, without citing any actual legislative authority for that proposition, Marshall’s statement is merely dictum that was later cited in Bouvier’s Law Dictionary (1856), at the definitions of “Union” and “United States of America”. In any event, Dixon has been overruled by Cooper supra because Dixon was decided by a Circuit Court in a case on which C.J. Marshall presided. [end excerpt] Here’s C.J. Marshall’s “dictum” (note well the lack of any legislative authority for that false claim): http://supremelaw.org/decs/dixon/1_Marsh_Dec_177,181.pdf (third paragraph: “The United States of America will be admitted to be a corporation.” [sic] BUT, he cited no Act(s) of Congress!!) “Will be admitted”?? At some undisclosed future date? TILT!! Here’s the key ruling from U.S. v. Cooper Corporation: In United States v. Cooper Corporation, 312 U.S. 600 (1941), the Supreme Court wrote: http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-supreme-court/312/600.html “We may say in passing that the argument that the United States may be treated as a corporation organized under its own laws, that is, under the Constitution as the fundamental law, seems so strained as not to merit serious consideration .” Sincerely yours, /s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S. Private Attorney General, Civil RICO: 18 U.S.C. 1964; Agent of the United States as Qui Tam Relator (4X), Federal Civil False Claims Act: 31 U.S.C. 3729 et seq. All Rights Reserved (cf. UCC 1-308 https://www.law.cornell.edu/ucc/1/1-308)

>>

 

Posted in Corporation or Confederacy, United States | Leave a comment

Unlimited calling, texting, data, all for only $3.00 per month.

Posted on November 19, 2018 by Paul John Hansen

Unlimited calling, texting, data, all for only $3.00 per month. The advertizes pay you, not GOOGLE, and you get it all for 3$/month.

How I can get you unlimited local calling, and most international calling, texting, and 4G Data, for $3.00/month that matches the best coverage of all phones services in America. A quick read can save you thousands. How this company will get paid by “”‘your retailers'”” instead of by you. >>

MCS-USA (MCS Global Link)
Pay one time,
get:
Unlimited call,
Unlimited text,
Unlimited 4G data (unless the particular tower you are on is maxed out then you will get 2G, which is in my experience is close to never, I always have enough to watch YouTube.)
Keep your existing number and the cost is $4.07 per month.
Have a new local number is $3.02 per month.

My plan was exactly:
$300.00 – a one-time payment for 9 years of full service.
$17.00 – one-time tax.
$108.00 – I keep my number. (optional)
$5.94 – one-time tax. (optional, retain your old number)
$9.11 – one-time handling/shipping fees.

$440.05 = Total

I had a one-year-old LG phone, which Cricket gave me the unlock code which I use when the MCS SIM CARD is installed in the LG Phone which was super easy. Google any phone, YouTube will show you how to install the SIM CARD in your phone.
All American cell phone companies must give you the unlock code to your phone if it is 6 months old and fully paid for. (Basically they can not keep it locked from use with another SIM CARD even if you have an extended service contract with them.)

So now I have the exact same 50$ service with MCS-USA as I had with Cricket for
$4.07 per month for the next 108 months (9 years).

I was paying 50$ per month, or $5,400.00 for 9 years.

5,400
(-) 440
$4,960.00 < Saved ($45.93 x 108 months.)

All based on an honest cell phone company that is satisfied with the ‘advertising – information mining’ that is associated with all present-day cell phones in the entire World, just as Google and Facebook are doing every-time you get online. You see Google and Facebook and many others pay big money for information mined from everyone that uses their system, and then sell it for big profits, much the same for this company. The difference you profit a great deal also.

Just for an example, every new car in America has close to $2000.00 of paid advertising behind every single sale. Americans buy 45,000 new cars every day of the year. That is why my new cell phone service through MCS-USA is only four dollars (4$) per month for the next 108 months (9 years).
— OR —
Only $3.02 per month if you do not wish to keep your existing number.

(Changing over to MSC-USA with their SIM CARD does not alter any information stored on your phone, such as pictures, or your collected address and numbers, or any apps.)

NOTICE – To get the 9-year price for this product the order must be placed before midnight November 30, 2018, after that date you will only get 5 years for the same price and no guarantee on the 4G, potentially only 2G.

((100% money back guarantee.))

Text or Call me, Paul Hansen to arrange purchase – email > mcs.usa.hansen@gmail.com

(( As of 11-16-2018 – Upon my own empirical internet research I have not found one negative report on MSC-USA. ))

Posted in Cell Phone Service for only $3.00. | Leave a comment

Christian Terrorist, so says the U.S. – ‘IN-Justice Department’.

Posted on November 12, 2018 by Paul John Hansen

–Christian Terrorist–

In 1994 the Justice Department announced its perpetrator profile of who it considers being a religious cultist:

“A cultist is one who has a strong belief in the Bible and the Second coming of Christ; who frequently attends Bible studies; who has a high level of financial giving to a Christian cause; who home schools their children; who has accumulated survival foods and has a strong belief in the Second Amendment; and who distrusts government. Any of these may qualify but certainly more than one would cause us to look at this person as a threat, and his family as being in a risk situation that qualified for government intervention.”

The Defense Department’s operations plan for Civil Disturbance Doctrine:

“If any civil disturbance by a resistance group, religious organization, or other persons considered to be non-conformist takes place, Appendix 3 to Annex B of Plan 55-2 hereby gives all Federal forces total power over the situation if/when local and state authorities cannot put down said dissent.”

“POR:SGH:JCS Pub 6, Vol 5, AFR-60-5 hereby provides for America’s military and the National Guard State Partnership Program to join the United Nations personnel in said operations.”

The Crime Control Act of 1993 definition of “intent to commit terrorist acts” includes any acts that: “appear to be intended – (1) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (2) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion.”

·[Could evangelism be a terrorist act? Could influencing others to write to Congressmen be political intimidation intended to influence a policy of the government? How about distributing tracts?]

·This same Crime Control Act, Chapter 113B, Section 138 protects witnesses. You will not be able to confront or find out who your accusers are, even though your 6th Amendment allows you to confront your accusers in court. (How did they get around this? Did you waive this right?) Submission to this tribunal will automatically waive these rights.  (Actually, most all of this legislation is enforceable only within the District of Columbia and its several territorial States.)

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License to Practice Law (A RIGHT), Attorney v. Lawyer, Bar Association.

Posted on November 9, 2018 by Paul John Hansen

License to Practice Law (A RIGHT), Attorney v. Lawyer, Bar Association.
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The practice of law is a common right,  law as common to all.
Here’s the proof!

1. THAT The practice of Law is an occupation of common right, the same being a secured liberty right. (Sims v. Aherns, 271 S.W. 720 (1925))

2. THAT No state may convert a secured liberty right into a privilege, issue a license and fee for it. (Murdock vs Pennsylvania 319 US 105 (1943))

3. THAT The practice of Law cannot be licensed by any state/State. (Schware v. Board of Examiners, 353 U.S. 238, 239 (1957))

4. THAT Should any state convert a secured liberty right into a privilege, charge a fee and issue a license for it, one may ignore the license and fee and engage in the exercise of the right with impunity. (Shuttlesworth vs City of Birmingham 373 U.S. 262 (1962))

5. THAT “If you’ve relied on prior decisions of the Supreme Court you have a perfect defense for willfulness.” (U.S. v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346), as “The claim and exercise of a Constitutional right cannot be converted into a crime.”(Miller v. U.S., 230 F.2d. 486, 489).

6. THAT “Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule making or legislation which would abrogate them.” (Miranda v. Arizona 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed. 2d 694 (1966))

7. THAT Should any state convert any right to work into a privilege, issue a license and charge a fee, the same is unconstitutional, void, and without effect in law. (Marburry vs Madison 5 US 137 (1803))

8. THAT “All acts of legislature apparently contrary to natural right and justice are, in our laws and must be in the nature of things, considered as void. The laws of nature are the laws of God; whose authority can be superseded by no power on earth. A legislature must not obstruct our obedience to him from whose punishments they cannot protect us. All human constitutions which contradict his laws, we are in conscience bound to disobey. Such have been the adjudications of our courts of justice.” (Robin v. Hardaway, 1 Jefferson 109, 114 (1772)). THAT The Supreme Court has warned, “Because of what appear to be Lawful commands on the surface, many citizens, because of their respect for what appears to be law, are cunningly coerced into waiving their rights, due to ignorance.” (U.S. v. Minker, 350 U.S. 179, 187), the general misconception among the public being that any statute passed by legislators bearing the appearance of law constitutes Law. THAT A statute is not a “law,” (Flournoy v. First Nat. Bank of Shreveport, 197 La. 1067, 3 So.2d 244, 248), a concurrent or joint resolution of legislature is not “a law,” (Koenig v. Flynn, 258 N.Y. 292, 179 N.E. 705, 707; Ward v. State, 176 Okl. 368, 56 P.2d 136, 137; State ex rel. Todd v. Yelle, 7 Wash.2d 443, 110 P.2d 162, 165), nor is ‘Code’ “Law” (In Re Self v Rhay, 61 Wn (2d) 261) these being defined by Black’s Law Dictionary as rebuttable prima facie, or superficial, evidence of law, a facade, represented by ‘public policy,’ being color-able, or ‘color of law,’ being ‘counterfeit or feigned’ as defined.

9. THAT “The Natural Liberty of man is to be free from any superior power on earth, and not to be under the will or legislative authority of man, but only to have the law of nature for his rule.” – Samuel Adams

10. THAT ‘Litigants may be assisted by unlicensed layman during judicial proceedings’ (Brotherhood of Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar 377 U.S. 1; Gideon v. Wainwright 372 U.S. 335; Argersinger v. Hamlin, Sheriff 407 U.S. 425), and ‘Members of groups who are competent nonlawyers may assist other members of the group [family, association, or class] achieve the goals of the group in court without being charged with “Unauthorized practice of law.” ‘ (NAACP v. Button 371 U.S. 415; United Mineworkers of America v. Gibbs 383 U.S. 715; and Johnson v. Avery 89 S. Ct. 747 (1969).

11. THAT “Each citizen acts as a ‘Private Attorney General who ‘takes on the mantel of sovereign’ ” (Title 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, Wood v. Breier, 54 F.R.D. 7, 10-11 (E.D. Wis. 1972; Frankenhauser v. Rizzo, 59 F.R.D. 339 E.D. Pa. (1973). “It is not the function of our Government to keep the citizen from falling into error; it is the function of the citizen to keep the government from falling into error.” (American Communications Association v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 442 (1950) and a Sovereign Citizen cannot be punished for sincerely held religious convictions, such as the belief that he is in fact born free and at liberty to act as such. (Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192 (1991).

12. THAT The “Private Attorney General” concept holds that a successful private party plaintiff is entitled to recovery of his legal expenses, including attorney fees if he can advance a policy inherent in public interest legislation on behalf of a significant class of persons. ( ‘Equal Access to Justice Act’; Dasher v. Housing Authority of City of Atlanta, Ga., D.C.Ga., 64 F.R.D. 720, 722) while “In the early days of our Republic, ‘prosecutor’ was simply anyone who voluntarily went before the Grand Jury with a complaint.” (United States v. Sandford, Fed. Case No.16, 221 (C.Ct.D.C. 1806).

13. THAT any private citizen acting as Private Attorney General may bring suit against any public official in their private capacity under Rico for crimes against constitutionally protected natural liberty rights, often predicated upon mail and wire fraud, and allows average citizens acting as private attorneys generals to sue those organizations that commit such crimes as part of their private criminal enterprise for damages. There are over 60 federal statutes that encourage private enforcement by allowing prevailing plaintiffs to collect attorney’s fees. The object of RICO is thus not merely to compensate victims “but to turn them into prosecutors,” acting as “private attorneys generals,” dedicated to eliminating racketeering activity, and has the “further purpose [of] encouraging potential private plaintiffs diligently to investigate.” (Malley-Duff, 483 U.S., at 151; 3 Id., at 187), and have been awarded judgments declaring entire cities, townships, and counties corrupt criminal enterprises. “The provision for treble damages is accordingly justified by the expected benefit of suppressing racketeering activity, an object pursued the sooner the better.” (Rotella v. Wood et al., 528 U.S. 549 (2000); Dasher v. Housing Authority of City of Atlanta, Ga., D.C.Ga., 64 F.R.D. 720, 722; See also Equal Access to Justice Act, and Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Award Act of 1976).

14. THAT Facts are stubborn things. And “we are each accountable to our maker for our words, deeds, and even our inaction, as all that is necessary for the triumph of evil is that good men do nothing. For when good men do nothing, they get nothing good done, and so help evil to triumph by their inaction. On the field of action is where all honor lies (1st Lady Abigail Adams), and “There is a higher loyalty than loyalty to this country, [being] loyalty to God” (U.S. v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 172, 85 S. Ct. 850, 13 L. Ed. 2d 733 (1965), See also Public Law 97-280 declares The Bible the ‘true word of God,’ as Biblical Law, at “Common Law, which “supersedes all inferior laws,” whereas “Christianity is custom, [and] custom is Law.” (Robin v. Hardaway 1790).

THAT The A.B.A. and State Bar Associations are Non-Governmental, Private ‘Professional Associations,’ a foreign agency or power with respect to government, and NOT a ‘Licensing Agency’ in fact or Law, though AT it apparently, attempting to copyright the operation and administration of that which originates with the author of the law, under color of law pursuant to public policy and legalism it would seem, whereas no one stands in between man and God who is the author of the natural and common law, which cannot be copyrighted for private use in public administration of the law for the purposes of graft, fraud, and legal plunder.

28. THAT No legislation creates the bar association in any state, being a private closed union and power foreign to government, operating in the Americas in violation of the Taft/Hardy act as The 81st Congress in 1950 confirmed by investigation, and determination that the A.B.A is, in fact and law, proof of which can also be located in the hard copy printing of 28 USC 3002, section 15a, a branch of the National Lawyers Guild Communist Party, and is run by communist, whereas the online version of Title 28USC has been altered to read something entirely different, apparently because this fact has shown up in too many court petitions and memorandums of law over the past 100 years.

29. THAT No public institution, State office or instrumentality accredits any law school or holds Bar examinations, as the Bar Association accredits all law schools, conducting private examinations and selecting the students they will accept into their private fraternity, issuing these a union card as a defacto license, keeping the fees for themselves. They do not issue state licenses to Lawyers, and the “State BAR” Card is not a “License” per-say, but rather a “Union Dues Card.”

30. THAT The “CERTIFICATE” issued to public trustee/servants in each State by the Supreme Court of each state IS NOT A License to practice Law as an occupation, nor to do business as a Law Firm, but rather authorizes only the practice of Law “IN COURTS” as a member of the State Judicial Branch of Government, to represent only “Wards of [the] court, Infants and persons of unsound mind…” (See Davis’ Committee v. Loney, 290 Ky. 644, 162 S.W. 2d 189, 190.” – Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th Ed., Corpus Juris Secundum Volume 7, Section 4.) while “Clients are also called ‘wards of the courts’ in regard to their relationship with their attorneys.” – 7 CJS § 2.

31. THAT Attorneys authorized to practice law in the courts to represent wards of the court, such as infants and persons of unsound mind, are not authorized to represent any private citizen nor any for-profit business, such as the privately incorporated and federally funded STATE. Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 7, Sect. 4., as “…(A)n attorney occupies a dual position which imposes dual obligations…” the same being a conflict of interest. – 7 CJS § 4.

32. THAT Attorneys, Judges, and Justices, those who keep an Attorney on retainer to represent them as most all do, as “clients,” being thus “wards of the court,” are therefore as defined in Law “Infants or persons of unsound mind.”

33. THAT The U.S. Constitution Guarantees to every state in this union a Republican Form of government, any other form of government being FORBIDDEN. Whereas there is No Power or Authority for the joining of Legislative, Judicial, and Executive branches of government by a private monopoly over these, limiting and restricting eligibility or entry to key public offices to union members alone, creating the RULING CLASS of an ARISTOCRACY, the A.B.A., State Bar, and State Supreme Court’s currently do in violation of Article 2, Section 1, Separation of Powers clause of the U.S Constitution, the same being an Unconstitutional Monopoly, operating in Texas in violation of Article 1, Section 26 of the Texas Bill of Rights, being an “ILLEGAL & CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE” as defined under RICO, whereas Senate Report No. 93-549 clearly points out and admits that an abridgment of the “Supremacy Clause” and “Separation of Powers” has in this respect in fact occurred.

34. THAT In 1933, as expressed in Roosevelt’s Executive Orders 6073, 6102, 6111, and 6260, House Joint Resolution 192 of June 5, 1933 confirmed in Perry v. U.S. (1935) 294 U.S. 330-381, 79 LEd 912; 31 USC 5112, 5119, and 12 USC 95a, the U.S. declared bankruptcy. When the government went bankrupt, it lost its sovereignty, and being to big to fail, excepted a buy out and went into receivership, to be reorganized, restructured, and privatized, in favor of its foreign creditors and presumed new owners, criminals whose avowed and stated intent was to plunder, bankrupt, conquer, and enslave the people of the United States of America. “…every American will be required to register their biological property in a National system designed to keep track of the people and that will operate under the ancient system of pledging… By such methodology, we can compel people to submit to our agenda, which will affect our security as a chargeback for our fiat paper currency. Every American will be forced to register or suffer not being able to work and earn a living. They will be our chattel, and we will hold the security interest over them forever, by operation of the law merchant under the scheme of secured transactions. This will inevitably… leave every American a contributor to this fraud which we will call “Social Insurance.” – Col. Edward Mandell House.

30. THAT The goal, of an occult theocracy of the ancient mystery school of deceit, it has been alleged, was to merge the people with government in America, reversing their roles in law and erasing all distinction between jurisdictions in law, public and private, under public policy and ‘color of…’ or ‘colorable’. … law, absorbing both into a private commercial corporation supplanting lawful government and claiming ownership and legal title to the people themselves, all State public institutions having created a “shadow [of] government,” in furtherance of these schemes by privately incorporating all for profit between 1940 and 1970. Admitted in numerous responses to administrative remedy petitions, all public offices are in fact now vacant, and private contractors masquerade as public officials, who cannot as such hold positions of public office or trust.

31. THAT Corporations have a LEGAL obligation to maximize profits. “When government becomes a corporation, it ceases to be government” (See Clearfield Doctrine), and by becoming a corporator, lays down its sovereignty, so far as respects the transaction of the corporation, and exercises no power or privilege which is not derived from the charter (U.S. v. Georgia-Pacific Co., 421 F.2d 92, 101 (9th Cir. 1970), corporations being fictions from which no law may originate, as no right of action may originate from fraud, invalidating much of the last 100 years of American Jurisprudence, both State and National legislation.

33. THAT all revenue now belongs to admiralty maritime jurisdiction (Huntress), and ‘neither for profit government nor the foreign statute merchant or agent has access to sovereign immunity even though the agent himself may have been unaware of the limitations upon his authority.’ (See Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389. 409, 391; United States v. Stewart, 311 U.S. 60, 70, 108; In re Floyd Acceptances, 7 Wall. 666: United States v. Stewart, 311 U.S. 60, 70, 108; Federal Crop Insurance v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 1947) (Government may also be bound by the doctrine of equitable estoppel if acting in proprietary [for profit nature ] rather than sovereign capacity); the “Savings to Suitor Clause” is also available for addressing mercantile and admiralty matters aka “civil process” at the common law and within a state court or by Removal to Federal District Court exercisingAdmiraltyy Maritime Jurisdiction in which the state may not hear cases against the State or an agent thereof. (citation needed)

34. THAT the Eleventh Amendment does not protect state officials from claims for prospective relief when it is alleged that state officials acted in violation of federal law (Warnock v. Pecos County, Tex., 88 F3d 341 (5th Cir. 1996), “Officers of the court have no immunity, when violating a Constitutional right, from liability. For they are deemed to know the law.” (Owen v. Independence, 100 S.C.T. 1398, 445 US 622), and Inadequate training of subordinates may bethe basis for title 42 subsection 1983 claim. (Mandonado-Denis v. Castillo-Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 576 (1st Cir. 1994). “Public officers are merely the agents of the public, whose powers and authority are defined and limited by law. Any act without the scope of the authority so defined does not bind the principal, and all persons dealing with such agents are charged with knowledge of the extent of their authority. (Continental Casualty Co. v. United States, 113 F.2d 284, 286 (5th Cir. 1940)).
THAT public officials and even judges have no immunity, as officials and judges are deemed to know the law and sworn to uphold the law; and cannot claim to act in good faith in willful deprivation of law, they certainly cannot plead ignorance of the law, even the Citizen cannot plead ignorance of the law, the courts have ruled there is no such thing as ignorance of the law, it is ludicrous for learned officials and judges to plead ignorance of the law therefore there is no immunity, judicial or otherwise, in matters of rights secured by the Constitution for the United States of America. ( See: See, Owen vs. City of Independence, 100 S Ct. 1398; Maine vs. Thiboutot, 100 S. Ct. 2502; and Hafer vs. Melo, 502 U.S. 21; Title 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983).

35. THAT if such a thing existed as A ‘License To Practice Law,’ other than in a fictional corporate jurisdiction, the same would be in fact and law a corporate commercial ‘Title of Nobility,’ whereas Article I, Section 9 and 10 of the Constitution prohibits the States and the federal government from issuing titles of nobility or honor to any public trustee, servant, or officer, in their separate and equal station, as the same would evidence a conflicting interest and disqualification from holding an office of public trust, and of a felony under various provisions of state and federal law.

36. THAT Bar members elected by the people, but paid by a private corporation or agency foreign to lawful government in unlawful money, in accepting such appointments, commissions, and compensation, bribes in fact and law, to enforce the licensing of rights as privileges, throwing creditors to the state in unlawful debtors prisons for victimless crimes, acting as third-party debt collector of tribute and contribution for illegal ton-tine wagering ponzi-schemes and bankrupted ‘social insurance’ programs, as an insurance premium for the national debt, all under colour of copyrighted private law through legalism, are by the same disqualified from holding any office of public trust for what is defined in Law as their Treason in so doing in Fact, punishable by hanging.

37. THAT Courts, Judges, and Justices, bound by law to uphold and declare the law, are in so doing not at liberty to interpret the law, or make political determinations, and being unlicensed themselves, are subject to prosecution for impersonating a public official or officer for damages in federal admiralty maritime jurisdiction as statute merchants. (citations needed – Clerk Praxis File)

39. THAT a license is permission to do something illegal, and Obtaining a license proves willful intent to commit an illegal act.
THAT the Lawful practice of Law is both a property right, and a Liberty Right, both a sacrament, tenant, and Rite of religious practice, secured by the Bill Of Rights and Supreme Law of the Land, including, but not limited to, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, to each citizen.

40. THAT Any prosecution pursuant to UPL statute carries the burden of proving that the accused defendant did willfully, knowingly, and intentionally, avoid a known duty, obligation, or task under the law, that was not known as herein previously stated, to be an Unconstitutional requirement of legalism, religion teaches is sophistry and witchcraft or deception, any statute, regulation, or requirement, null and void and without effect in fact or law, bearing no obligation to obey. The Law may restrain, but not compel.

41. THAT Compulsion under the natural law does not originate with man, nor with governments formed by men in fictional jurisdictions of corporate legalese drawn in the sand on the ground or on paper by men, in their separate and equal station, but rather with the author of the law. “Rightful liberty is unobstructed action according to our will within limits drawn around us by the equal rights of others.” –Thomas Jefferson 1819.

42. THAT the Writer knows of no duty or obligation within the restrictions of his liberty rights or under the Natural Law, that he do no harm, to further refrain from championing the rights of others, to not prosecute evil doers, or to obtain a license, that does not exist, or permission, from any lesser private commercial authority or jurisdiction of the many on earth, past, present, or future, to observe, exercise, or practice a lesser private Legalese, or legalism, be it international, federal or state, or the higher Law for this matter, being the Natural Law derived as given from a higher authority than any on earth, the author of the law, where from all lesser jurisdictions, forms of governance and law originate by his commandments.

43. THAT all men being created equal, are born into the practice of law in their dealings with one another, as there is no action outside the natural Law excepting that which is criminal, and probably legalized by those practicing legalism, being witchcraft and black magic or sophistry as religion and the law teaches. That which is lawful, and that which is unlawful, is the sum of all acts, which men possess as an individual legacy, a property right or liability to each as nature accords, the Law itself being derived from man’s nature, and the author of the Law, not originating with governments of men, from which legalese and legalism originate. Nothing may regulate that which it did not create, that does not originate there from. ‘They who wash outside of the cup, but leave the inside filthy.’ Substance over form.

44. THAT Man, in his separate and equal station, practicing natural law in the election to act upon the creation of government being a fiction, can confer no power to government to license that practice which the people possess inherently as a liberty right to effect such creation of a fiction as government, from which no law may come except but for the regulation of itself, ants agents or representatives, for the protection of those natural liberty rights inherent in man, being the only lawful purpose of government, whereas that which does not originate with government, as is true of man, and the natural law of liberty, government cannot regulate, as it is rather the natural law in practice by men that regulates the operation of government and the creation of lesser laws that may regulate government and not the reverse. Fictions and the rules by which they operate cannot govern their creators.

45. THAT The lesser law, legalese, legalism, and legality, color of law and public policy, is no law at all, as created by supposed agents of government, can not and does not exercise jurisdiction over, nor can it change, alter, diminish, or abolish, the greater and higher Law of nature from which all law originates that gives breath to man’s liberty, given by God to each according to nature. It is this higher natural law of inherent liberty, which creates and regulates government, and its creation of lesser laws that may regulate, change, alter and diminish or abolish the acts of government(s) and fictions alone, and never the lawful liberty rights of the man who created these. The law cannot divide the man, or the man from himself and his rights, only the voodoo, and black magic of legalism, the fictional incorporation of man to serve as a fiction himself, can accomplish this in operation apparently, in abrogation of the Law itself.

46. THAT the Natural Law, as practiced by all men, and from which all fictions, lesser forms of law and governance are derived, is from the creator, and man’s unalienable and inherent natural liberty rights (the Will), and not from government, which can create no right or law governing the liberty of man, existing only to protect those lawfully exercised natural liberty rights which existed separate and sovereign from it, before the creation of government by the power of this liberty. There are NO licensed attorney’s! Never listen to a judge (administrative officer) when he/she tells you that “these are serious charges and you need to hire a licensed attorney”.

AS PER THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT;

The practice of Law CAN NOT be licensed by any state/State. (Schware v. Board of Examiners, 353 U.S. 238, 239)

The practice of Law is AN OCCUPATION OF COMMON RIGHT! (Sims v. Aherns, 271 S.W. 720 (1925))

The “CERTIFICATE” from the State Supreme Court:

ONLY authorizes,

To practice Law “IN COURTS” as a member of the STATE JUDICIAL BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT.

Can ONLY represent WARDS OF THE COURT, INFANTS, PERSONS OF UNSOUND MIND (SEE CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM, VOLUME 7, SECTION 4.)

“CERTIFICATE” IS NOT A LICENSE to practice Law AS AN OCCUPATION, nor to DO BUSINESS AS A LAW FIRM!!!

The “STATE BAR” CARD IS NOT A LICENSE!!! It is a “UNION DUES CARD”, an association, a good old boys and girls club.

The “BAR” is a “PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION.”

1. Like the Actors Union, Painters Union, etc.

2. No other association, EVEN DOCTORS, issue their own license. ALL ARE ISSUED BY THE STATE.

It is a NON-GOVERNMENTAL PRIVATE ASSOCIATION.

The State Bar is;

An Unconstitutional Monopoly.

A license to steal.

AN ILLEGAL & CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE.

Violates Article 2, Section 1, Separation of Powers clause of the U.S Constitution.

There is NO POWER OR AUTHORITY for joining of Legislative, Judicial, or Executive branches within a state as the BAR is attempting. “BAR” members have invaded all branches of government and are attempting to control de jure governments as agents of a foreign entity.

The majority of legislators are attorneys.

An attorney can only represent a ‘fiction‘(one of privilege), never a man (one of right).                   SOOOO if I act as ‘counsel’ for a man (6th Amendment – Bill of Rights) I do so only as he being a man, thus one must challenge the moving party what the man (your client) did to take on (contract/contact) a ‘statutory’ standing  as a ‘fiction’ in the United States? What did your client ‘do’, ‘sign’, or ‘say’, that is relied upon (evidence) by the moving party (not the court) that the U.S. court NOW has jurisdiction over you as a ‘PERSON’.  Lawyer Hansen 11-9-2018
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