Territorial Jurisdiction, Simplistic Way to Evidence Land Distinctions, in Open Court

  1. Congress is fully aware that there is land in North America that is owned by ‘The United States of America’, and the remaining land is NOT owned by the said Union. (26% is federal lands, says BLM – ‘Bureau of Land Management’, of the United States)

2. Land owned by ‘The United States of America’ is referred to ‘United States’.

3. ‘United States’ jurisdiction is a stand alone jurisdiction.

4. Laws that operate in land that is owned by ‘The United States of America’, which is identified as ‘United States’, is independent of the land that is NOT owned by the Union, which I like to identify as the American People’s land.

5. Generally all law is land associated, “he who owns the land makes the rules”.

6. If you are charged with doing activity (crime, or taxable activity, plus many other activities) that is subject to United States written law, they, not you, must fact evidence that the land is owned by ‘The United States of America’ before the court can proceed administratively. (All US courts are administrative, and not judicial.)

7. Just one example of this fact is the below instructions for making sworn statements in differing land jurisdictions, one is without, and one is within ‘United States of America’ geographically.

8. Relax, we show you how to make/file the written ‘challenge’ (not motion), without oral arguments.

9. Such has stopped many actins by city, county, state, and federal, court actions.

10. (((The People’s safety is in the People’s jury, and is not to be found in the United States courts.)))

11. Notice – Evidence of law distinctions –

28 U.S. Code § 1746  “(1)If executed without the United States: “I declare (or certify, verify, or state) under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on (date). (Signature)”. (2)If executed within the United States, its territories, possessions, or commonwealths: “I declare (or certify, verify, or state) under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on (date). (Signature)”. (Added Pub. L. 94–550, § 1(a), Oct. 18, 1976, 90 Stat. 2534.)” 

12. Note of distinction – in the above land jurisdictions, jurat utilization. One is without, and termed as “United States of America”. The other being “within the United States”, note the term is lacking “of America”. 

13. Generally – Affiant states that Affiant is not evidenced as withing, therefore is by default without, until otherwise evidenced.  

[[ For Counsel Time – http://www.pauljjhansen.com/?p=2225 ]]

PS. I, Paul John Hansen, filed like challenges, hand written, for I was in federal custody, having no access to a computer, or legal material. In the federal court, the three documents disappeared from the record, and the oral argument also disappeared from the transcribed record, then the prosecution dismissed the case. Which I was told, by the US Marshal, as I was walking out, that was the only case ever lost by that individual federal prosecutor in Florida, and the only case won by any defendant, that went to trial, in the federal court, in the last 8 years. NOTE – I refused to have an attorney, I would have surly lost if I retained BAR licensed counsel.

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Counsel Time Appointments, Step by Step After Payment

Updated – 12/22/2023

COUNSEL TIME – After payment is made, or you have a credit on your account, text me your name, email, and then call 5 min. later. (Cell number is below. (Cell, and Text > 251-362-8231)

If I am available, I’ll pick up, if not I’ll text you back instructions when we can counsel as soon as I notice your text generally.

(The reason we do it this way is because we get lots of Robo-Calls, and like distractions.)

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PMTs – CASH APP, and VENMO, are the best way to send money fast, easy, and economically, and it is 100% reliable. Most banks use it, we still use PayPal, if you do not have any of the above, but PayPal charges up to 3.5%. If you do not have the above ones it is of value to get them, we use them daily.        

Paul John Hansen’s CASH APP account name is > $pjjh1493 .

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You can also use the below:

Venmo – pauljjhansenlaw@gmail.com  < is my account address/name.

Where to pay for products and counsel time by PayPal if you do not have any of the above apps to pay with:

Retainer – Generally clients pay 35$ to 70$ for the first counsel time, what I do not use can be on retainer, to be used at any time, or for any future needs, or sent back to you. It can be used 15 minutes at a time, or even 5 minutes at a time with ongoing clients for quick questions on the phone, text, or by email.

I often charge 35$, or up to 70$ per hour, it all depends on how busy we are, and the intensity/urgency of your needs.

35$ is the minimum on new accounts, we have to set up your account, reply to emails, besides you can have one hour total for 35$ spread out over years if you wish.

COUNSEL TIME – After payment is made, or you have a credit on your account, text me your name, email, and then call 5 min. later. (Cell number is below. (Cell, and Text > 251-362-8231)

If I am available, I’ll pick up, if not I’ll text you back, ASAP, instructions when we can counsel.

(The reason we do it this way is because we get lots of Robo-Calls, and like distractions. Avoid leaving voice mailes if possible, best to use email so that we have a record of your needs, chronologically.)

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Trial by Jury, Fed Rule 38

Rule 38. Right to a Jury Trial; Demand

Primary tabs

(a) Right Preserved. The right of trial by jury as declared by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution—or as provided by a federal statute—is preserved to the parties inviolate.

(b) Demand. On any issue triable of right by a jury, a party may demand a jury trial by:

(1) serving the other parties with a written demand—which may be included in a pleading—no later than 14 days after the last pleading directed to the issue is served; and

(2) filing the demand in accordance with Rule 5(d).

(c) Specifying Issues. In its demand, a party may specify the issues that it wishes to have tried by a jury; otherwise, it is considered to have demanded a jury trial on all the issues so triable. If the party has demanded a jury trial on only some issues, any other party may—within 14 days after being served with the demand or within a shorter time ordered by the court—serve a demand for a jury trial on any other or all factual issues triable by jury.

(d) Waiver; Withdrawal. A party waives a jury trial unless its demand is properly served and filed. A proper demand may be withdrawn only if the parties consent.

(e) Admiralty and Maritime Claims. These rules do not create a right to a jury trial on issues in a claim that is an admiralty or maritime claim under Rule 9(h).

Notes

(As amended Feb. 28, 1966, eff. July 1, 1966; Mar. 2, 1987, eff. Aug. 1, 1987; Apr. 22, 1993, eff. Dec. 1, 1993; Apr. 30, 2007, eff. Dec. 1, 2007; Mar. 26, 2009, eff. Dec. 1, 2009.)

Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules—1937

This rule provides for the preservation of the constitutional right of trial by jury as directed in the enabling act (act of June 19, 1934, 48 Stat. 1064, U.S.C., Title 28, §723c [see 2072]), and it and the next rule make definite provision for claim and waiver of jury trial, following the method used in many American states and in England and the British Dominions. Thus the claim must be made at once on initial pleading or appearance under Ill.Rev.Stat. (1937) ch. 110, §188; 6 Tenn.Code Ann. (Williams, 1934) §8734; compare Wyo.Rev.Stat.Ann. (1931) §89–1320 (with answer or reply); within 10 days after the pleadings are completed or the case is at issue under 2 Conn.Gen.Stat. (1930) §5624; Hawaii Rev.Laws (1935) §4101; 2 Mass.Gen.Laws (Ter.Ed. 1932) ch. 231, §60; 3 Mich.Comp.Laws (1929) §14263; Mich.Court Rules Ann. (Searl, 1933) Rule 33 (15 days); England (until 1933) O. 36, r.r. 2 and 6; and Ontario Jud.Act (1927) §57(1) (4 days, or, where prior notice of trial, 2 days from such notice); or at a definite time varying under different codes, from 10 days before notice of trial to 10 days after notice, or, as in many, when the case is called for assignment, Ariz.Rev.Code Ann. (Struckmeyer, 1928) §3802; Calif.Code Civ.Proc. (Deering, 1937) §631, par. 4; Iowa Code (1935) §10724; 4 Nev.Comp.Laws (Hillyer, 1929) §8782; N.M.Stat.Ann. (Courtright, 1929) §105–814; N.Y.C.P.A. (1937) §426, subdivision 5 (applying to New York, Bronx, Richmond, Kings, and Queens Counties); R.I.Pub.Laws (1929), ch. 1327, amending R.I.Gen.Laws (1923) ch. 337, §6; Utah Rev.Stat.Ann. (1933) §104–23–6; 2 Wash.Rev.Stat.Ann. (Remington, 1932) §316; England (4 days after notice of trial), Administration of Justice Act (1933) §6 and amended rule under the Judicature Act (The Annual Practice, 1937), O. 36, r. 1; Australia High Court Procedure Act (1921) §12, Rules, O. 33, r. 2; Alberta Rules of Ct. (1914) 172, 183, 184; British Columbia Sup.Ct.Rules (1925) O. 36, r.r. 2, 6, 11, and 16; New Brunswick Jud. Act (1927) O. 36, r.r. 2 and 5. See James, Trial by Jury and the New Federal Rules of Procedure (1936), 45 Yale L.J. 1022.

Rule 81(c) provides for claim for jury trial in removed actions.

The right to trial by jury as declared in U.S.C., Title 28, §770 [now 1873] (Trial of issues of fact; by jury; exceptions), and similar statutes, is unaffected by this rule. This rule modifies U.S.C., Title 28, [former] §773 (Trial of issues of fact; by court).

Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules—1966 Amendment

See Note to Rule 9(h), supra.

Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules—1987 Amendment

The amendments are technical. No substantive change is intended.

Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules—1993 Amendment

Language requiring the filing of a jury demand as provided in subdivision (d) is added to subdivision (b) to eliminate an apparent ambiguity between the two subdivisions. For proper scheduling of cases, it is important that jury demands not only be served on other parties, but also be filed with the court.

Committee Notes on Rules—2007 Amendment

The language of Rule 38 has been amended as part of the general restyling of the Civil Rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic only.

Committee Notes on Rules—2009 Amendment

The times set in the former rule at 10 days have been revised to 14 days. See the Note to Rule 6.

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4340 IRS Assessment

“[A] Form 4340 is a transcript that specifies that name of the taxpayer, the taxpayer’s address,
social security number, type and amount of tax involved, and the date of each assessment.” Long v. United States, 972 F.2d 1174, 1181 n.8 (10th Cir. 1992);

United States v. Meyer, 914 F.3d 592, 594 (8th Cir. 2019) (An “IRS Form 4340 . . . ‘is a computer generated form that reflects the taxes assessed to and paid by the taxpayer in a particular year.’”) (quoting United States v. Jimenez, 513 F.3d 62, 79 n.4 (3d Cir. 2008)).

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Robert Fox makes his own passport / I.D., and wins his Federal Case.

‘Advanced Legal Researcher’, arrested many times, over many years, Robert Fox makes his own passport / I.D., arrested for false I.D., and wins in federal court.

TAKE AWAY from this case – never add symbols, words, or statements, to a document that is liken to U.S. formal documents.

https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/FSupp/766/569/1647217/

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United States v. Fox, 766 F. Supp. 569 (N.D. Tex. 1991)

U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas – 766 F. Supp. 569 (N.D. Tex. 1991)
June 3, 1991


766 F. Supp. 569 (1991)
UNITED STATES of America
v.
Robert James FOX.
No. CR3-90-0288-H.
United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division.

June 3, 1991.
*570 Candina Heath, Asst. U.S. Atty., Dallas, Tex., for U.S.

Robert James Fox, in pro per.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDERSANDERS, Chief Judge.

Before the Court are the Motion to Dismiss of Defendant Robert James Fox, filed May 6, 1991; and the Response of the United States, filed June 3, 1991.
I. Facts.Defendant Robert J. Fox, a Canadian national, was arrested on October 9, 1990 for allegedly pretending to be a foreign diplomat when he was stopped for a traffic violation on North Plano Road in Dallas County, Texas. At the time he was stopped by the Richardson Police, Fox displayed a document he claims is a diplomatic passport from the “Kingdom of Israel” or “Elohim’s Kingdom of Israel.”

http://www.embassyofheaven.org/pp_questions.htm

There were no marks or visas in the passport indicating that it had been used to enter the United States. The passport did, however, contain references to Bible verses. Fox was indicted on October 30, 1990 for alleged violations of Sections 1546(a) (possessing a falsely made passport) and 915 (pretending to be a diplomat) of Title 18, United States Code. Fox was arraigned on April 11, 1991 after having been found competent to stand trial by the United States Medical Center at Springfield, Missouri. The Court entered a plea of Not Guilty for Fox, who defended himself.[1]

By his present motion, Fox asks the Court to dismiss count one of the indictment, which charges that Fox “did knowingly possess and attempt to use a document prescribed by statute and regulation for entry into and evidence of authorized stay in the United States, to wit, a diplomatic passport from the Kingdom of Israel, knowing said passport to be forged, counterfeited, and falsely made”, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1546(a).
II. Section 1546.The facts concerning Fox’s conduct are not disputed as far as count one of the indictment is concerned, and the sole issue before the Court is one of statutory construction.

It is fundamental law in the United States that criminal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused. Chief Justice Marshall articulated this principle in 1820.

The rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly, is perhaps not much less old than construction itself. It is founded on the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals; and on the plain principle, that the power of punishment is vested in the legislative, not in the judicial department. It is the legislature, not the court, which is to define a crime, and ordain its punishment.

United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95, 5 L. Ed. 37 (1820); see Smith v. United States, 360 U.S. 1, 9, 79 S. Ct. 991, 997, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1041 (1959) (reversing conviction “in view of the traditional canon of construction which calls for the strict interpretation of criminal statutes and rules in favor of defendants where substantial rights are involved”); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 304-05, 310, 77 S. Ct. 1064, 1069-70, 1072, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1356 (1957) (quoting United States v. Wiltberger and reversing convictions because “we should follow the familiar rule that criminal statutes are to be strictly construed”); United States v. Resnick, 299 *571 U.S. 207, 209, 57 S. Ct. 126, 127, 81 L. Ed. 127 (1936) (“Statutes creating crimes are to be strictly construed in favor of the accused; they may not be held to cases not covered by the words used.”); United States v. Reeves, 752 F.2d 995, 999 (5th Cir.) (citing Federal Maritime Commission v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726, 93 S. Ct. 1773, 36 L. Ed. 2d 620 (1973), in stating that criminal statutes are to be strictly construed), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 834, 106 S. Ct. 107, 88 L. Ed. 2d 87 (1985); United States v. Rojas, 671 F.2d 159, 163 (5th Cir. Unit B Mar.1982) (discussing “the `rule of lenity’ requiring strict construction of criminal statutes”); United States v. Wells, 176 F. Supp. 630, 632 (S.D.Tex.1959) (“It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that penal statutes must be construed strictly, or as it is otherwise stated, strictly construed against the prosecution or strictly construed in favor of the person accused.”). This basic rule has been applied to Section 1546 by the United States Supreme Court. See United States v. Campos-Serrano, 404 U.S. 293, 297, 92 S. Ct. 471, 474, 30 L. Ed. 2d 457 (1971) (applying rule of strict construction to Section 1546 and stating that one is not subjected to a penalty unless the words of the statute plainly impose it).

Section 1546 of Title 18 reads in pertinent part as follows.

Whoever knowingly … attempts to use [or] possesses any [immigrant or nonimmigrant] visa, permit, border crossing card, alien registration receipt card, or other document prescribed by statute or regulation for entry into or evidence of authorized stay or employment in the United States, knowing it to be forged, counterfeited, or falsely made [shall be guilty of an offense against the United States].

18 U.S.C. § 1546(a). Fox’s argument in seeking dismissal of the Section 1546 charge is simple: a passport from Elohim’s Kingdom of Israel is not a document prescribed by statute or regulation for entry into or as evidence of authorized stay or employment in the United States. The Government, on the other hand, contends that the phrase “other document” includes such a passport.

The most thorough analysis of the relevant provision of Section 1546 was presented in United States v. Vargas, which discussed the scope of Section 1546 before its amendment in 1986. Prior to its amendment the Statute was restricted to documents “required for entry into the United States” and did not apply to documents “prescribed by statute … as evidence of authorized stay or employment in the United States”. Before discussing the 1986 amendment of Section 1546, the Court turns to the analysis of the Statute provided by United States v. Vargas.

In Vargas, the court noted that “[t]he offenses proscribed in § 1546 originated in § 22 of the Immigration Act of 1922, Ch. 190, 43 Stat. 165. The offenses specified in § 22 related to `immigration visa or permit.'” United States v. Vargas, 380 F. Supp. 1162, 1164 (E.D.N.Y.1974) (footnote omitted). After reviewing the history of Section 1546, the court stated that

the Statute and its predecessor dealt solely with immigrant visas and permits, which by definition were documents issued by the United States. There is no indication that the amendment of the statute in 1952 was designed to reach anything except documents equivalent to visas and permits also issued by officers of the United States.

Id. at 1165.

Accordingly, the Vargas court examined the relevant statutes concerning immigration, aliens, and nationality, see id. at 1166-67, as well as related sections of the federal criminal code. See id. at 1167-68. The court held that “[a] foreign passport, unlike a visa or permit, cannot generally be defined as a document required for entry into the United States.” Id. at 1168. In dismissing the indictment as a matter of law, the court stated that

absent an expression of congressional intent to create substantive offenses related to documents issued by foreign nations, and with strong indications to the contrary, the court cannot read the first *572 paragraph of § 1546 as applicable to foreign passports.

Id. at 1169.

There are two basic distinctions between Vargas and the present case. First, Vargas concerned a Colombian passport that allegedly was procured by fraud in violation of Section 1546. In this case, Fox is accused of possessing and attempting to use a passport from a nonexistent political entity, Elohim’s Kingdom of Israel. Just as the Vargas court found no evidence of congressional intent to apply Section 1546 to a passport from an officially recognized foreign nation, here the Court finds that there is absolutely no indication of congressional intent to make a substantive offense related to documents which are homemade and not represented as being issued by any real government, foreign or otherwise.[2] On this ground alone, the Section 1546 charge against Fox should be dismissed.

The second basic distinction between Vargas and the present case is a legal one, namely that Section 1546 was amended in 1986, twelve years after the Vargas decision. The part of the amendment relevant to this case is the substitution of “permit, border crossing card, alien registration receipt card, or other document prescribed by statute or regulation for entry into or as evidence of authorized stay or employment in the United States” for “permit, or document [required for entry into the United States]”. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1546 (Supp. 1991) Historical and Statutory Note, citing Pub.L. 99-603 § 103(a) (3), 100 Stat. 3359 (1986), as amended by Pub.L. 100-525 § 2(c), 102 Stat. 2609 (1988).

The issue, then, is whether a passport is a “document prescribed by statute or regulation for entry into or as evidence of authorized stay or employment in the United States.” As a preliminary matter, the Court considers it absolutely plain that a passport is not a document required by law as evidence of employment in the United States. In any event, the indictment against Fox does not allege that the Kingdom of Israel passport was used by Fox as evidence of employment in the United States.

Thus, the question presented by this case is whether Fox’s passport is a document required by statute or regulation for entry into or as evidence of authorized stay in the United States pursuant to Section 1546 as amended in 1986. The Court finds that it is not.

As already noted, Congress amended Section 1546 twelve years after the Vargas ruling. Had Congress wished to apply Section 1546 to passports, it easily could have listed them along with immigrant and non-immigrant visas, permits, border crossing cards, and alien registration receipt cards. When Congress amended Section 1546 it included a list of immigration-related documents all issued by the United States as examples of the sorts of documents the Statute was intended to encompass. Congress’ failure to include the most common document used in international travel among documents within the scope of Section 1546 indicates a lack of congressional intent to criminalize possession of a bogus passport under the Statute.

Congress amended Section 1546 as part of the Immigration Reform and Control *573 Act of 1986, Pub.L. 99-603 § 103, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986). The legislative history of that Act shows that Section 1546 was amended “to extend the criminal penalties for fraud and misuse of immigration-related documents to include border crossing cards, alien registration receipt cards, and other documents issued as evidence of lawful entry or employment in the United States.” H.R.Rep. No. 99-682(I), 99th Cong, 2d Sess., reprinted in 1986 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 5649, 5698. As this language as well as the language of the Statute itself indicates, Congress did not intend to criminalize possession of foreign or bogus passports when it amended Section 1546, but rather restricted the criminal sanction to immigration-related documents issued by the United States. There is no indication that the amendment of the statute in 1986 was designed to reach anything except documents equivalent to visas, permits, and border crossing cards also issued by officers of the United States. Absent indications of such congressional intent, the Court must construe Section 1546 in favor of Fox.

The Court’s conclusion that Fox’s passport is not within the scope of Section 1546 is buttressed by the fact that other sections of Chapter 75 of Title 18 provide criminal penalties for offenses related to passports. Section 1541 criminalizes issuing a passport without authority to do so. Section 1542 concerns making false statements in an application for a passport. Section 1543 states that “[w]hoever falsely makes, forges, counterfeits, mutilates, or alters any passport or instrument purporting to be a passport, with intent that the same be used” is guilty of an offense against the United States. Section 1544 creates a criminal sanction for misuse of a passport. Section 1545 criminalizes the violation of a safe conduct or passport issued under the authority of the United States. The only section of Chapter 75 of Title 18 that does not mention passports is the Statute at issue here, Section 1546. Particularly in light of the amendment of Section 1546 following the Vargas decision it is inconceivable that the Statute was intended by Congress to cover passports at all.

The Government argues that a passport is covered by the phrase “other document prescribed by statute or regulation for entry into or as evidence of authorized stay or employment in the United States”. In general, the government contends that since there are United States statutes concerning passports, passports must be documents intended by Congress to be within the scope of Section 1546. The Government argues, for example, that because Section 1182 of Title 8, United States Code, includes in its definition of excludable aliens “[a]ny nonimmigrant who is not in possession of (A) a passport … and (B) … a valid nonimmigrant visa or border crossing identification card”, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182 (1970), a passport from Elohim’s Kingdom of Israel is covered by Section 1546. Similarly, the Government points to 8 C.F.R. § 212.1, which requires presentation of a passport for admission of an alien into the United States.

There are several problems with the Government’s position. First, the Vargas court carefully examined the statutory scheme of Title 8 and rejected the Government’s argument, finding that “there is no basis for believing” that Section 212.1 “was intended to implement the criminal statute.” United States v. Vargas, 380 F. Supp. at 1167. As already noted, Congress easily could have expressly included passports within the scope of Section 1546 when it amended the Statute in 1986. That it chose to include several immigration-related documents but did not mention passports clearly expresses a congressional intent to leave passports outside the scope of Section 1546.

Second, Fox is a Canadian national, and the Code of Federal Regulations expressly waives the entry requirement of a passport for Canadian nationals except under circumstances that do not apply here. See 8 C.F.R. § 212.1(a). Thus, the federal regulation directly applicable to the present case provides that a passport is not a document required for entry into or as evidence of authorized stay in the United States.

*574 Third, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (7) (B) (i), which defines the documentation requirements for nonimmigrants, makes clear that a passport is only one of several types of documents which may be used for entry into the United States. Also, the Court cannot accept the Government’s contention that this statute, which so clearly concerns entry requirements, relates to the Section 1546 language about documents providing evidence of authorized stay in the United States. Section 1182 concerns criteria for excluding aliens, and speaks only of “contemplated” periods of “stay.”

Fourth, the federal statutes and regulations define the term “passport” as being a travel document attesting to the identity and nationality of the bearer, and not a document required for entry or authorized stay in the United States. See 8 C.F.R. § 51.1(e); 8 U.S.C. § 1202(b).

The cases relied on by the Government are inapposite to the present case. The first case, United States v. Dangdee, 616 F.2d 1118, 1119 n. 2 (9th Cir. 1980), stated that “Section 1546 … concerns passports, to the extent that `other documents of entry’ can be interpreted to encompass passports….” The Dangdee court limited the application of Section 1546 to passports, however, by stating that the rulings of Vargas and United States v. Restrepo-Granda, controlled the issue. See id. Vargas has already been discussed. In the latter case, the Fifth Circuit affirmed a conviction where Section 1546 was applied to a passport “containing a United States non-emigrant visa in violation of that section.” United States v. Restrepo-Granda, 575 F.2d 524, 530 (5th Cir.) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 935, 99 S. Ct. 331, 58 L. Ed. 2d 332 (1978).

The second case relied on by the Government, United States v. Fawole, 785 F.2d 1141 (4th Cir.1986), is factually inapposite because Fawole was a Fourth Amendment case in which the court never addressed the applicability of Section 1546 to passports.

Franco-de Jerez v. Burgos, 876 F.2d 1038 (1st Cir.1989), was a civil rights action where the main issue before the court was whether there was probable cause to file a criminal complaint against the defendant under several statutes, including Section 1546. See id. at 1040-41. Although the court did find that probable cause existed to charge the defendant under Section 1546 because it appeared she had altered her passport, see id. at 1041, as in the Restrepo-Granda case the passport contained a visa. See id. at 1039. In any event, the case was primarily about Section 1543, which expressly concerns passports, and only mentioned Section 1546 in passing.

Finally, in United States v. White, 757 F. Supp. 45 (D.D.C.1990), the court did not apply Section 1546 to a passport, but rather to an Immigration and Naturalization Service Form I-94. See id. at 46. The Government is correct that the White case concerned the crime of fraudulently obtaining a passport, but in White the defendants were properly charged of that offense under Section 1542 of Title 18.

In any case, the Court finds that to achieve the construction of Section 1546 that the Government urges requires an unnecessarily involved journey through the Code of Federal Regulations and Title 8 of the United States Code. Because Congress simply could have included passports with the immigration-related documents listed in Section 1546 indicates that the Government’s construction of the Statute is excessively liberal and broad, and violative of the fundamental rule of strict construction of criminal statutes. It is an “elementary rule” that a person “is not to be subjected to a penalty unless the words of the statute plainly impose it.” Keppel v. Tiffin Savings Bank, 197 U.S. 356, 362, 25 S. Ct. 443, 445, 49 L. Ed. 790 (1905). The Court cannot and does not find that the words of Section 1546 plainly impose a criminal sanction on possession of a bogus passport from a nonexistent nation. The Court does not accept the Government’s construction of Section 1546 because “when choice has to be made between two readings of what Congress has made a crime, it is appropriate, before we choose the harsher alternative, to require that Congress should have spoken in language that is clear and definite.” United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., *575 344 U.S. 218, 221-22, 73 S. Ct. 227, 229, 97 L. Ed. 260 (1952); see United States v. Tonry, 837 F.2d 1281, 1285 (5th Cir.1988) (“When there are two rational interpretations of a statute, one harsher than the other, the court may choose the harsher result only when the legislature has spoken in clear and definite language.”).
III. Conclusion.For the reasons stated above, the motion to dismiss of Defendant Robert James Fox is GRANTED and count one of the indictment, charging a violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1546(a) is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

NOTES[1] Fox was found not guilty of the Section 915 count after a trial before the Court.

[2] In this regard the Court notes that Fox denies being a citizen of any worldly country or having allegiance to any political entity. In his Answer to the Charges, filed November 27, 1990, Fox stated the following.

I am a Hebrew man of the tribes of Israel. I am a descendant of Shem, Abraham, Isaac and Jacob (Israel). I am a native born American and a stranger and sojourner in the land of my birth. I am not now nor have I ever been a citizen of the United States.

. . . . .

I created the Kingdom of Israel passport as a travel document and as a means of identifying myself and it is evidence of my declaration of my allegiance to the Creator of the Universe.

I deny that the passport is forged, counterfeited or falsely made. It is a genuine Kingdom of Israel passport and I have made no attempt to impersonate myself, I am myself.

 

 

 

Posted in Identification / Private, Passport | Leave a comment

Verification, Wet-Ink Notes

Verification, Wet-Ink Notes

  1. Be advised that verification is defined (Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th Edition) as follows: “Confirmation of correctness, truth, or authenticity, by affidavit, oath or deposition”.  Affidavit of truth of matter stated and object of verification is to assure good faith in averments or statements of party.”
  2. The federal statutes (Title 15 U.S.C sec.1692 et seq) require that you obtain a verification of the disputed debt, and to cease collection thereof until such verification is provided, therefore any attempt to collect is in violation of federal written law.
  3. Be advised that “Verify” is defined (Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th Edition) as follows: To confirm or substantiate by oath or affidavit. Particularly used of making formal oath to accounts, petitions, pleadings, and other papers. The word “verified,” when used in a statute, ordinarily imports a verity attested by the sanctity of an oath. It is frequently used interchangeably with “sworn.”

Basically, a man must put his ‘personal commercial liability’ on the line to verify for any one, or for any corporation, bank, etc.

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Liberty, Vocation of Your Choosing

The “TAXING AUTHORITY” of the United States, and all its subdivisions, are greatly limited.

To govern, to tax, they must have:

  1. Evidence you did the business in land owned by them. (25% of America is owned by the U.S.)
  2. They must prove contact, or contract.
  3. They must prove it was intentional.
  4. They must prove you do not have a right to the same activity.
  5. They must prove you are a “person” who has “taxable income” that was derived “domestically” within land of the “United States”.                                    (All the above bold words are terms and it is imperative that you understand their definitions as written in the U.S. – ‘STAT AT LARGE’.)
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Kids-for-cash judges ordered to pay more than $200M

https://apnews.com/article/crime-trending-news-government-and-politics-6f30f575dc739415af1e5b47b1be50f0

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I personally believe that a lot more like activities occur to turn jails into cash cows all across America.

 

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FreeInhabitant.com Office/Yacht Addition, 52′

Enjoying the flexibility to travel abroad, yet having the law office with us.
52 Foot Yacht, 950 hp.

1988 Jefferson Monticello 52′, 60,000 lb.

https://www.thehulltruth.com/galati-yacht-sales/466215-1988-52-jefferson-monticello-yacht-sale.html

52 Picture

“ACTA” is a Fantastic Motor Yacht, Perfect for Cruising or as a Live-A-Board Yacht. If you have ever Considered Experiencing the Adventure of America’s Great Loop Trip, “ACTA” can make this possible. Having three Staterooms and three Heads you have the option of how many guest you want onboard. The Master Stateroom if Full Beam with an Ensuite Head that has a Tub. The Electronics include a Chart Plotter, Radar, Bottom Depth Graph, VHF radio and more.

Pictures below:
Click on the picture to go to next picture.
(More to come.)

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Registration Under the Securities Act of 1933, Promissory Notes

Hansen’s comments – there are tracking requirements for individual instruments that these registered entities must follow to maintain legal standing to foreclose on individual notes. Essentially they must prove chain of title (owner). Contact pauljjhansenlaw@gmail.com for the process to do this with any note you may have suspicions about.
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The Securities Act of 1933 has two basic objectives:

To require that investors receive financial and other significant information concerning securities being offered for public sale; and
To prohibit deceit, misrepresentations, and other fraud in the sale of securities.
The SEC accomplishes these goals primarily by requiring that companies disclose important financial information through the registration of securities. This information enables investors, not the government, to make informed judgments about whether to invest in a company’s securities. Here’s an overview of how the registration process works. In general, all securities offered in the United States must be registered with the SEC or must qualify for an exemption from the registration requirements. The registration forms a company files with the SEC provide significant information, including:

A description of the company’s properties and business;
A description of the security to be offered for sale;
Information about the management of the company; and
Financial statements certified by independent accountants.
Registration statements and prospectuses become public shortly after the company files them with the SEC. All companies, domestic and foreign, are required to file registration statements and other forms electronically. Investors can then access registration and other company filings using EDGAR.

Not all offerings of securities must be registered with the SEC. The most common exemptions from the registration requirements include:

Private offerings to a limited number of persons or institutions;
Offerings of limited size;
Intrastate offerings; and
Securities of municipal, state, and federal governments.
By exempting many small offerings from the registration process, the SEC seeks to foster capital formation by lowering the cost of offering securities to investors.

The SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance may examine a company’s registration statement to determine whether it complies with our disclosure requirements. But the SEC does not evaluate the merits of offerings, nor do we determine if the securities offered are “good” investments.

While SEC rules require that companies provide accurate and truthful information, the SEC cannot guarantee the accuracy of the information in a company’s filings. In fact, every year the SEC brings enforcement actions against companies who have failed to provide important information to investors. Investors who purchase securities and suffer losses should know that they have important recovery rights if they can prove that there was incomplete or inaccurate disclosure of important information.

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