The case below shows how not rebutting “citizen”, “national” or “resident” of the US can give jurisdiction. People are most often NOT USÂ citizens, nationals or residents therefore are not subject to many laws specific to the US jurisdiction (Land & Subjects).Â Â Â Â One can be on Nebraska Land not owned or ceded to the USA, therefore not a USA Possession / territory, yet be subject to laws they normally would not be subject to just because they did not rebut the US prosecutors / attorneys statement/presumption of being a citizens, nationals or residents of the US, even when there is fact evidence the act was not done on US proprietorially held land.
So if we get a parking ticket, or any charge, that is not on their land, State of Nebraska, but was sited on Nebraska Land, we must clearly state “I am not a resident (citizen, national or resident) of the USA, or any subdivision thereof, such as the State of Nebraska, City of Omaha, County of Douglas, etc.
To see the core of this case just scroll down to the highlighted paragraph.
As a recent Congressional Research Service report explains, crime is ordinarily proscribed, tried, and punished according to the laws of the place where it occurs. American criminal law applies beyond the geographical confines of the United States, however, under certain limited circumstances. . . . A surprising number of federal criminal statutes have extraterritorial application, but prosecutions have been few. This may be because when extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction does exist, practical and legal complications, and sometimes diplomatic considerations, may counsel against its exercise.
Charles Doyle, Extraterritorial Application of American Criminal Law, Congressional Research Service (March 26, 2010). This post is about a recent decision that issued in U.S. v. Daniels, 2010 WL 2557506 (U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California 2010).
On August 27, 2009, a federal grand jury in California â€œreturned a nine-count indictmentâ€ charging Donald Daniels, Martin Washburn, Tapani Koivunen and Irina Rebegeneau with committing and conspiring to commit wire fraud, mail fraud and money laundering in violation of federal law. U.S. v. Daniels, supra. On October 1, 20009, the grand jury returned a superseding indictment that re-charged these counts but added two: â€œCounts 10 and 11, against Daniels, Washburn and [Sergei] Shkurkin, for using and conspiring to use extortionate means to collect or attempt to collect any extension of credit in violation of 18 U.S. Code Â§ 894.â€ U.S. v. Daniels, supra. These defendants then moved to dismiss Counts 10 and 11 on the theory that â€œapplying section 894 under such circumstances constitutes an impermissible extraterritorial application of the extortion statute,â€ i.e., that this district court could not legally â€œexercise jurisdiction over such conduct.â€ U.S. v. Daniels, supra.
Before we can analyze their argument, the governmentâ€™s response and the courtâ€™s ruling on the motion to dismiss, I need to outline how the charges arose:
Washburn was the president of FoodPro International, Inc.; Rebegeneau was a project manager/engineer at FoodPro; and Koivunen was the chief executive officer of Global Sierra Management, LLC. In 2003, FoodPro and GSM, along with AS Vahenurme Agro (`ASVâ€™), an Estonian company owned by Finnish partners, formed Global Sierra Partners, LLC (`GSPâ€™), a Nevada corporation. . . . created with the intent of opening a state-of-the-art milling and bakery operation in Estonia.
GSP sought a loan from [OPIC], a [U.S.] agency that provides financing . . . to encourage participation in foreign business projects. . . . OPIC [agreed to] provide an $8.9 million small business loan to GSP, and GSP would contribute $7.6 million in equity investment to the project. FoodPro would provide $3.8 million cash, ASV would provide $700,000 cash and $2 million in property contributions, and GSM would provide $1 million cash. . . .
The members of GSP devised a scheme [to] procure a short-term loan of $4.5 million from entities controlled by Daniels, . . . so GSP would appear to possess the financing it had promised OPIC it would procure. Once GSP received the loans from OPIC, GSP would return the money to Daniels, rather than invest it in the bakery. Daniels agreed to provide the short-term loan in exchange for 25% interest, which would ultimately result in a $1.15 million payment from GSP to Daniels. . . .
[By] October 2004, Daniels had become unhappy with the pace at which he was being repaid . . . . Daniels, Washburn and Shkurkin (a business associate of Daniels) devised a plan to convince the Finnish partners that Daniels’ money came from the Russian mafia and to threaten the Finnish partners with bodily harm unless they quickly paid the remaining $650,000 owed to Daniels. To effectuate the plan, Daniels asked Arkady Zalan, a high-level employee at FoodPro, if he knew anyone in the Russian mafia. Although Zalan did not know anyone in the Russian mafia, he ultimately contacted a man known as `Gennadi,â€™ who lived in Israel.
On October 20, 2004, Washburn sent an email to the Finnish partners, . . . stating that representatives for the investors, including two Americans . . . and one Russian (Gennadi), wanted a face-to-face meeting to address . . . the loan agreement. In a follow up email sent the next day by Shkurkin to Koivunen (and copied to Washburn, Zalan and the Finnish partners), Shkurkin stated `[y]ou [the Finnish partners] knew exactly what you were getting into. We were very clear. . .
On November 15, 2004, a meeting of the GSP Board of Directors took place at a hotel in Helsinki, Finland. In attendance were Washburn, Zalan, Koivunen, the Finnish partners, Shkurkin and Gennadi. Prior to the meeting, Daniels deposited $5,000 into Zalan’s bank account to pay for Gennadi’s expenses. . . . [and] Zalan, Washburn and Shkurkin crafted a statement for Gennadi to read to the assembled Board.
At the meeting, Gennadi read the statement, which, . . . [said] that if the remaining $650,000 were not paid by GSP to Daniels, it would be collected from GSP and GSP’s members by `all means necessary.â€™ The Finnish partners described this as a `mafia-styleâ€™ threat. . . .
U.S. v. Daniels, supra. As I noted above, this threat was the basis of the 18 U.S. Code Â§ 894 against the defendants listed above. They argued, basically, that the threat was made in a foreign county, so the U.S. federal court didnâ€™t have jurisdiction over the extortion charge. The government claimed the court had jurisdiction because â€œovert acts that aided and abettedâ€ the threat occurring in the U.S. U.S. v. Daniels, supra. As the judge noted, the government relied on the theory of territorial jurisdiction, under which the U.S. can assert jurisdiction over a crime if the crime, or part of the crime, occurred in U.S. territory. U.S. v. Daniels, supra. The court explained that to rule on the motion to dismiss, it had to decide â€œwhat conductâ€ violates Â§ 894 and then decide if part of that conduct occurred in the U.S. U.S. v. Daniels, supra.
Section 894 makes it a crime for anyone to â€œknowingly participate in any way . . . in the use of extortionate means to . . . attempt to collect any extension of credit.â€ It defines â€œextortionate meansâ€ as any â€œmeans which involves the use, or an express or implicit threat of use, of violence or other criminal means to cause harm to the person, reputation, or property of any personâ€. 18 U.S. Code Â§ 891(7). The court noted that by making anyone who â€œparticipate[s] in any wayâ€ in such activity liable, Congress â€œevinced an intent to reach a broad range of conduct.â€ U.S. v. Daniels, supra.
The judge then found that all three defendants participated in such activity:Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Daniels wired $5,000 to a bank account controlled by Zalan with the intent that Zalan use the funds to finance Gennadi’s travel to . . . Helsinki. Moreover, the purpose of the extortion scheme was to threaten the Finnish partners into repaying Daniels’ loan to a bank account in the United States. Washburn sent an email from the United States to, among others, the Finnish partners in order to arrange the meeting in Helsinki, with full knowledge that the threat would be delivered at the meeting. Shkurkin sent a vaguely threatening email from the United States to . . . the Finnish partners informing them that he would be attending the Helsinki meeting on behalf of Daniels.
U.S. v. Daniels, supra. The judge found that this activity, â€œstanding alone,â€ gave the court jurisdiction over Counts 10 and 11. U.S. v. Daniels, supra. The court also noted that Congress intended for Â§ to be applied extra-territorially, but that this, in and of itself, did not establish that international law would allow it to be applied in that fashion. U.S. v. Daniels, supra.
The judge explained that under international law five principles allow a sovereign to exercise extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction:
(1) territorial, wherein jurisdiction is based on the place where the offense is committed; (2) national, wherein jurisdiction is based on the nationality or national character of the offender; (3) protective, wherein jurisdiction is based on whether the national interest is injured; (4) universal, which amounts to physical custody of the offender; and (5) passive personal, wherein jurisdiction is based on the nationality or national character of the victim.
U.S. v. Daniels, supra (citing Chua Han Mow v. U.S., 730 F.2d 1308 (U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit 1984). The judge found that in this case exercising jurisdiction
is justified pursuant to the territorial and national principles of extraterritoriality. Firstly, . . . while the actual threat in this case was delivered overseas, much of the preparatory work was completed within the United States. Furthermore, the intended effects of the conspiracy — to recover money for Daniels that would be deposited in the United States — would have impacted the United States. Pursuant to the territorial principle of extraterritoriality, courts have frequently held that where a crime is committed outside of the United States, but its effects are felt within the United States, a federal criminal law may apply extraterritorially. . . . Secondly, Daniels, Washburn and Shkurkin all appear to be citizens, nationals or residents of the United States and no evidence to the contrary has been presented. The government therefore has a recognized and valid interest in prosecuting them for misdeeds committed outside of the country.
U.S. v. Daniels, supra. Finally, the judge found it was â€œreasonableâ€ for the U.S. to exercise jurisdiction over the activity at issue in Counts 10 and 11 because it was strongly linked to the U.S., the U.S. has a strong connection with the defendants given their nationality, there was little if any risk that exercising jurisdiction would conflict with the interests of another state and exercising jurisdiction was â€œconsistent with the traditions of the international system.â€ U.S. v. Daniels, supra.
While the judge noted that â€œthere can be no doubt that Finland likely has a strong interest in regulating the conduct at issue in this case,â€ he found that all of the other relevant factors â€œfavor finding that the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable.â€ U.S. v. Daniels, supra.
territorial jurisdiction, Law Definition
n-The geographical area over which a government or governmental subdivision has power. Webster’s New World Law Dictionary
- Territory within which a court or government agency may properly exercise its power.See, e.g. Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co. et al., 526 U.S. 574 (1999).
Territorial jurisdiction is the court’s power to bind the parties to the action. This law determines the scope of federal and state court power. State court territorial jurisdiction is determined by the Due Process Clause of the Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment and the federal court territorial jurisdiction is determined by the Due Process Clause of the Constitution’s Fifth Amendment.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
Attorneys are licensed to practise in only one kind of law in one place: written law in territory owned by and ceded to the United States of America.
To practise law in the State of California, an attorney and counselor at law must be admitted to the State Bar of California, which means that attorney must be admitted to practise before the highest court in the State of California, the Supreme Court of the State of California.
When I was practicing law in California, I won my last two civil cases by simply denying that my client, who was the alleged defendant, was a resident of the County of Los Angeles. To establish the courtâ€™s jurisdiction, the plaintiffâ€™s attorney had to plead and prove my clientâ€™s residency in the County of Los Angeles, which he could not do, as there is little habitable territory owned by and ceded to the United States of America in that county.
Dr. Eduardo M. RiveraÂ Â Â Â ((They disbarred him soon after.Â They will allow no Attorney to consider their client over the needs of the state/IRS.))
States v. Mundt, 29 F.3d 233, 237 (6th Cir. 1994) â€“ the court rejected “patently frivolous” argument that defendant was not a resident of any “federal zone” and therefore not subject to federal income tax laws. ((I need to research the type of activity this defendant was for them to secure jurisdiction as to income tax.Â Â Â On the surface it appeared that this man challenged by not doing business on a federal Land, yet they stuck him for not rebutting citizen, national or resident of the US. ))
Nebraska Revised Statute 44-2702, definition
(13) “Resident means any person to whom a contractual obligation is owed who resides in this state at the date of entry of…”Â Â Â Â Â Â ((Just as an example of a NE statute.Â Remember what in this state is defined as, see below.))
Nebraska Revised Statute 42-702 DefinitionsÂ Â Â Â (21) State means a state of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, or any territory or insular possession subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.